本文選題：合作博弈 + 相變儲(chǔ)熱��； 參考：《電網(wǎng)技術(shù)》2017年09期

【摘要】：在冬季供暖期,中國(guó)東北"以熱定電"的供熱模式造成大量棄風(fēng),通過(guò)儲(chǔ)熱消納棄風(fēng)是提高風(fēng)電吸納率的一種有效手段。所采用的供熱模式參與主體包括風(fēng)電場(chǎng)、棄風(fēng)供熱企業(yè)、熱電廠和電網(wǎng)公司,提出了基于合作博弈的相變儲(chǔ)熱容量?jī)?yōu)化配置模型。其以聯(lián)盟年總凈值收益最大為目標(biāo)函數(shù),考慮了棄風(fēng)功率約束、供熱約束、相變儲(chǔ)熱技術(shù)約束等。進(jìn)一步提出基于Shapely值分配模型的二次利潤(rùn)分配方案,構(gòu)建各方公平合理的利潤(rùn)分配機(jī)制。通過(guò)對(duì)某省4年棄風(fēng)進(jìn)行分析,求得最優(yōu)相變儲(chǔ)熱容量。分析表明采用Shapely值進(jìn)行利潤(rùn)分配后,聯(lián)盟各成員都有可觀收益,投資回報(bào)期較短。
[Abstract]:During the heating period in winter, the heating mode of "fixing electricity by heat" in Northeast China causes a great deal of abandoned wind, and it is an effective means to increase the absorption rate of wind power through heat storage. The participants of the heating mode include wind farm, abandoned heat supply enterprise, thermal power plant and power grid company. A phase change heat storage capacity optimization model based on cooperative game is proposed. The objective function is the maximum annual gross net income of the Union, and the constraints of abandoned wind power, heat supply and phase change heat storage technology are considered. Furthermore, a secondary profit distribution scheme based on Shapely value distribution model is proposed to construct a fair and reasonable profit distribution mechanism for all parties. The optimum phase change heat storage capacity is obtained by analyzing the 4-year abandoned wind in a province. The analysis shows that each member of the alliance has considerable income and the period of return on investment is shorter after using Shapely value to distribute profits.
【作者單位】： 浙江大學(xué)電氣工程學(xué)院;國(guó)網(wǎng)遼寧省電力有限公司;
【基金】：國(guó)家科技支撐計(jì)劃重大項(xiàng)目(2015BAA01B02)~~
【分類號(hào)】：TU995

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本文編號(hào)：2060072