【摘要】：職工持股制度(Employee Stock Ownership Plans,簡(jiǎn)ESOP),是指由企業(yè)內(nèi)部職工出資認(rèn)購本公司部分股權(quán),委托專門機(jī)構(gòu)(如職工持股會(huì),信托基金會(huì)等)對(duì)股票進(jìn)行托管運(yùn)作、集中管理,職工股持股機(jī)構(gòu)作為整體參股公司,參與公司的經(jīng)營決策并且按股分享紅利獲得收入。西方關(guān)于職工持股制度的理論主要開始于50年代,學(xué)者們分別從產(chǎn)權(quán)理論、委托代理理論與人力資本理論等方面分析職工持股制度的重要性,得到了廣泛的關(guān)注。經(jīng)過多年的發(fā)展,職工持股制度在西方已經(jīng)成為諸多企業(yè)激勵(lì)職工首選方式。但是,關(guān)于職工股是否能夠促進(jìn)企業(yè)的經(jīng)營績效,職工持股制度是否對(duì)職工有激勵(lì)作用,相關(guān)的實(shí)證分析并沒有統(tǒng)一的結(jié)論。一方面,職工持股可以減少企業(yè)的代理問題,減緩職工與管理層之間的矛盾,鼓勵(lì)職工努力工作,分享信息,提高企業(yè)生產(chǎn)率；另一方面,職工持股制度作為團(tuán)隊(duì)激勵(lì)的一種,可能會(huì)引起“搭便車”等問題使激勵(lì)作用消失。 本文選取中國A股市場(chǎng)1999-2010年上市公司數(shù)據(jù),利用SAS等統(tǒng)計(jì)軟件,對(duì)職工持股與公司績效進(jìn)行回歸發(fā)現(xiàn)： (1)我國的職工持股制度對(duì)職工并沒有激勵(lì)作用,職工持股并不能促進(jìn)企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)績效的增加。 (2)我國的職工持股制度與公司的市場(chǎng)績效顯著負(fù)相關(guān)。 (3)企業(yè)發(fā)行職工股,更多的是希望職工通過股票上市流通后拋售套利。 通過以上結(jié)論,可以看出,我國實(shí)行職工股制度的目的并不在于促進(jìn)企業(yè)發(fā)展,提高企業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力,而是把職工持股制度當(dāng)成企業(yè)股份制改革的一部分,這就使職工希望通過上市后拋售股票套利獲得收益,并不會(huì)關(guān)心企業(yè)的經(jīng)營發(fā)展。職工持股制度并不具有長期的激勵(lì)作用。最后,本文針對(duì)我國職工持股制度出現(xiàn)的問題提出了相應(yīng)的政策規(guī)范建議。
[Abstract]:ESOP (Employee Stock Ownership Plans, simple ESOP) refers to the enterprise's internal staff to subscribe for part of the shares of the Company, entrust specialized agencies (such as employee stock-holding associations, trust foundations, etc.) to carry out the escrow operation and centralized management of the shares. As a whole, the employee-owned company participates in the decision-making of the company and receives income from the share-sharing dividend. The western theories about the ESOP mainly began in the 1950s. Scholars analyzed the importance of ESOP from the aspects of property right theory, principal-agent theory and human capital theory, and got extensive attention. After years of development, ESOP has become the preferred way to encourage employees in many enterprises in the West. However, there is no unified conclusion as to whether the employee stock can promote the performance of the enterprise and whether the employee ownership system has an incentive effect on the staff and workers, and there is no unified conclusion in the relevant empirical analysis. On the one hand, employee shareholding can reduce the agency problems of enterprises, alleviate the contradiction between workers and management, encourage workers to work hard, share information, and improve the productivity of enterprises; On the other hand, employee shareholding system, as a kind of team incentive, may cause some problems such as hitchhiking and so on, so that the incentive function disappears. This paper selects the data of listed companies from 1999 to 2010 in Chinese A-share market, and makes use of SAS and other statistical software to regression the employee ownership and company performance: (1) the ESOP system in China has no incentive effect on the staff and workers, and the results are as follows: (1) Employee shareholding can not promote the increase of enterprise financial performance. (2) there is a significant negative correlation between the ESOP system and the company's market performance. (3) it is hoped that workers will sell arbitrage after their shares are listed in circulation. Through the above conclusions, we can see that the purpose of implementing the occupational stock system in China is not to promote the development of enterprises and improve the competitiveness of enterprises, but to take the system of employee stock ownership as part of the reform of joint stock system of enterprises. This makes workers want to sell stock arbitrage after the listing to gain profit, and will not care about the business development of the enterprise. The employee shareholding system does not have long-term incentive effect. Finally, this article puts forward the corresponding policy and standard suggestions to the problems of the employee stock ownership system in our country.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：復(fù)旦大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F272.92

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