央企控股上市公司治理特殊問題研究
發(fā)布時間：2018-11-11 21:16
【摘要】：央企控股上市公司作為國有控股上市公司的重要組成部分，其公司治理區(qū)別于英美等發(fā)達(dá)資本主義國家的上市公司治理，具有傳統(tǒng)的行政干預(yù)色彩。在所有權(quán)與控制權(quán)分離的現(xiàn)代公司結(jié)構(gòu)下，央企部分改制上市的發(fā)展路徑、國有資產(chǎn)特定的所有制模式、以及央企身份的特殊性使央企控股上市公司形成了異于一般上市公司的特殊治理問題。 在國有資本的法律保護(hù)與現(xiàn)代公司制度法律完善的雙重目標(biāo)下，央企控股上市公司治理具有一定的特殊性。本文將圍繞央企控股上市公司治理中因其治理特殊性而引發(fā)的獨(dú)立性缺失以及控股股東的泛行政管理問題，分別從原因以及危害兩個方面進(jìn)行闡述，最后再初步探索解決特殊性問題的有效途徑，以尋求央企控股上市公司治理特殊性、合法性和有效性的統(tǒng)一。 本文分為引言、正文、結(jié)論三大部分。 引言簡要介紹了央企控股上市公司治理的背景和特殊性，闡明本文研究的意義與目的。 正文分為三章。第一章主要介紹央企控股上市公司概念及其治理的特點(diǎn)。央企控股與上市公司的結(jié)合，令央企控股上市公司呈現(xiàn)出多層委托代理機(jī)制、負(fù)責(zé)人選聘行政化、政府部門并行監(jiān)管以及壟斷的事實(shí)化的特點(diǎn)，，成為央企控股上市公司治理特殊問題出現(xiàn)的源頭。第二章主要圍繞央企控股上市公司獨(dú)立性缺失和控股股東泛行政管理兩大問題，來闡明其成因、表現(xiàn)及危害。獨(dú)立性問題體現(xiàn)在人員與機(jī)構(gòu)、資產(chǎn)與業(yè)務(wù)兩個方面，并因此造成董事、高管人員的尋租以及出現(xiàn)同業(yè)競爭和關(guān)聯(lián)交易問題。而控股股東的泛行政管理則不利于央企控股上市公司治理機(jī)制的完善，并可能引發(fā)內(nèi)幕交易行為。第三章則主要圍繞特殊性問題，初步探索其解決之道。在協(xié)調(diào)好部門監(jiān)管職責(zé)的前提下，加強(qiáng)央企控股上市公司內(nèi)部治理機(jī)構(gòu)之間的制約與平衡，為中小股東利益的保護(hù)提供切實(shí)可行的法律途徑，外部治理上則著力減少行政管理方式的干預(yù)，并充分利用央企同類及相關(guān)資產(chǎn)的重組或者央企整體上市的契機(jī)，規(guī)范央企控股上市公司資產(chǎn)、業(yè)務(wù)的獨(dú)立性。 結(jié)論部分則通過歸納總結(jié)全文觀點(diǎn)，重申央企控股上市公司治理的特點(diǎn)，存在的特殊性問題，以及針對問題可以采取的改進(jìn)建議。
[Abstract]:As an important part of the state-owned listed companies, the corporate governance of the state-owned enterprises is different from that of the listed companies in the developed capitalist countries such as the United States and the United States, and has the traditional color of administrative intervention. Under the structure of modern company with the separation of ownership and control, the development path of partial restructuring and listing of central enterprises, the specific ownership mode of state-owned assets, And the particularity of the identity of the central enterprises makes the listed companies to form a special governance problem different from the general listed companies. Under the dual goals of the legal protection of state-owned capital and the legal perfection of the modern company system, the governance of the listed companies controlled by the central enterprises has its own particularity. This paper will focus on the lack of independence caused by the particularity of corporate governance and the pan-administrative management of controlling shareholders in the governance of listed companies controlled by central enterprises, respectively from the two aspects of reasons and harm. Finally, the author explores the effective way to solve the problem of particularity, in order to seek the unity of governance particularity, legitimacy and validity of the listed companies controlled by central enterprises. This paper is divided into three parts: introduction, text and conclusion. The introduction briefly introduces the background and particularity of corporate governance, and clarifies the significance and purpose of this study. The text is divided into three chapters. The first chapter mainly introduces the concept of the listed company and its governance characteristics. The combination of the holding of central enterprises with listed companies has made the listed companies under the control of central enterprises present the characteristics of multi-layer principal-agent mechanism, administrative selection and appointment of responsible persons, parallel supervision by government departments and the fact of monopoly. Become the source of the special problems in the governance of the listed companies controlled by the central enterprises. The second chapter mainly focuses on the lack of independence and the pan-administrative management of controlling shareholders to clarify the causes, performance and harm. The issue of independence is embodied in the aspects of personnel and institution, assets and business, and has resulted in the rent-seeking of directors and executives, as well as the problems of peer competition and related party transactions. The pan-administrative management of controlling shareholders is not conducive to the improvement of corporate governance mechanism and may lead to insider trading. The third chapter mainly focuses on the particularity of the problem, preliminary exploration of its solution. Under the premise of coordinating the responsibility of department supervision, we should strengthen the restriction and balance among the internal governance institutions of the listed companies controlled by the central enterprises, and provide a practical legal way for the protection of the interests of the minority shareholders. On the external governance, we should reduce the intervention of administrative management, and make full use of the opportunity of the reorganization of the similar assets of the central enterprises and related assets or the whole listing of the central enterprises, and standardize the independence of the assets and business of the listed companies controlled by the central enterprises. In the conclusion part, the author summarizes the views of the full text, and restates the characteristics of the governance of the listed companies controlled by the central enterprises, the particularity of the problems, and the suggestions to be taken to improve the problems.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國社會科學(xué)院研究生院
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F832.51;D922.291.91
本文編號：2326159
[Abstract]:As an important part of the state-owned listed companies, the corporate governance of the state-owned enterprises is different from that of the listed companies in the developed capitalist countries such as the United States and the United States, and has the traditional color of administrative intervention. Under the structure of modern company with the separation of ownership and control, the development path of partial restructuring and listing of central enterprises, the specific ownership mode of state-owned assets, And the particularity of the identity of the central enterprises makes the listed companies to form a special governance problem different from the general listed companies. Under the dual goals of the legal protection of state-owned capital and the legal perfection of the modern company system, the governance of the listed companies controlled by the central enterprises has its own particularity. This paper will focus on the lack of independence caused by the particularity of corporate governance and the pan-administrative management of controlling shareholders in the governance of listed companies controlled by central enterprises, respectively from the two aspects of reasons and harm. Finally, the author explores the effective way to solve the problem of particularity, in order to seek the unity of governance particularity, legitimacy and validity of the listed companies controlled by central enterprises. This paper is divided into three parts: introduction, text and conclusion. The introduction briefly introduces the background and particularity of corporate governance, and clarifies the significance and purpose of this study. The text is divided into three chapters. The first chapter mainly introduces the concept of the listed company and its governance characteristics. The combination of the holding of central enterprises with listed companies has made the listed companies under the control of central enterprises present the characteristics of multi-layer principal-agent mechanism, administrative selection and appointment of responsible persons, parallel supervision by government departments and the fact of monopoly. Become the source of the special problems in the governance of the listed companies controlled by the central enterprises. The second chapter mainly focuses on the lack of independence and the pan-administrative management of controlling shareholders to clarify the causes, performance and harm. The issue of independence is embodied in the aspects of personnel and institution, assets and business, and has resulted in the rent-seeking of directors and executives, as well as the problems of peer competition and related party transactions. The pan-administrative management of controlling shareholders is not conducive to the improvement of corporate governance mechanism and may lead to insider trading. The third chapter mainly focuses on the particularity of the problem, preliminary exploration of its solution. Under the premise of coordinating the responsibility of department supervision, we should strengthen the restriction and balance among the internal governance institutions of the listed companies controlled by the central enterprises, and provide a practical legal way for the protection of the interests of the minority shareholders. On the external governance, we should reduce the intervention of administrative management, and make full use of the opportunity of the reorganization of the similar assets of the central enterprises and related assets or the whole listing of the central enterprises, and standardize the independence of the assets and business of the listed companies controlled by the central enterprises. In the conclusion part, the author summarizes the views of the full text, and restates the characteristics of the governance of the listed companies controlled by the central enterprises, the particularity of the problems, and the suggestions to be taken to improve the problems.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國社會科學(xué)院研究生院
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F832.51;D922.291.91
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