上市公司高管薪酬激勵效率研究
發(fā)布時間：2018-11-10 11:31
【摘要】：現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度下,薪酬激勵是現(xiàn)代企業(yè)激勵高管最重要的方式之一,企業(yè)所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營權(quán)相互分離,由于經(jīng)營者和所有者之間存在目標不一致和信息不對稱等問題,在所有者完全監(jiān)督不可能做到的情況下,如何激勵經(jīng)營者就成為一個非常重要的問題。高管,即企業(yè)的高級管理人員,在企業(yè)中充當代理人的角色,他們的經(jīng)營決策直接關(guān)系到企業(yè)的業(yè)績和未來的成長。目前,企業(yè)高管的激勵問題已成為非常流行的話題,上市公司的高管激勵也成為關(guān)系上市公司經(jīng)營效率的基本問題。因此探明高管薪酬激勵的效果,探索更為合理的高管激勵措施,減少由于道德風險所導(dǎo)致的代理成本,使之更加公平合理更趨完善,從而提高上市公司經(jīng)營績效,確保我國的企業(yè)能夠長期穩(wěn)定發(fā)展,在國際化競爭中立于不敗就顯得尤為必要。 本文將以實證研究為主,以2008-2010年在滬深兩市上市的中國上市公司為樣本,通過對高管薪酬激勵效率相關(guān)概念及委托代理理論、人力資本理論、產(chǎn)權(quán)理論等相關(guān)理論的梳理,運用三階段DEA方法和SFA方法對我國上市公司高管薪酬激勵效率進行探究,旨在為企業(yè)進行高管薪酬激勵設(shè)計、提高企業(yè)績效提供必要的理論支持和參考依據(jù)。 本文主要得出以下結(jié)論：第一,三階段DEA方法剔除環(huán)境變量與隨機誤差后所得效率評價結(jié)果比傳統(tǒng)DEA計算結(jié)果相對較準確,同時,對比分析顯示三階段DEA方法所得效率評價結(jié)果與考慮環(huán)境變量的SFA所得結(jié)果趨于一致,但整體高管激勵效率并不高。年平均純技術(shù)效率保持相對穩(wěn)定的狀態(tài),且純技術(shù)效率相對較高,說明高管薪酬激勵的管理相對有效,規(guī)模效率低是影響綜合技術(shù)效率的主要原因。第二,由于不同公司治理環(huán)境以及不同的外部市場約束等因素,導(dǎo)致即使是相同的公司治理機制,對高管的影響也會具有明顯差異,若只是簡單套用,而不能加以本士化,就會造成公司股權(quán)激勵水土不服的狀態(tài)。第三,通過SFA方法對上市公司高管薪酬激勵效率進行評價,發(fā)現(xiàn)高管人均現(xiàn)金薪酬仍是推動企業(yè)價值提升的主動力,可通過適當加大相應(yīng)投入進一步提高激勵效率；而高管股權(quán)激勵的激勵效率還不明顯,因此需要加強高管股權(quán)激勵力度和深度,增加股權(quán)激勵的合理性與規(guī)范性,使股權(quán)激勵措施真正起到激勵效果。第四,環(huán)境變量中,流通股第一大股東持股比率與資產(chǎn)負債率對高管薪酬激勵效率具有積極的影響作用,獨立董事比例與企業(yè)規(guī)模對高管薪酬激勵效率產(chǎn)生負面影響。
[Abstract]:Under the modern enterprise system, salary incentive is one of the most important ways to motivate executives in modern enterprises. The ownership and management rights of enterprises are separated from each other, and there are some problems such as inconsistent objectives and asymmetric information between managers and owners. How to motivate the operator becomes a very important problem under the condition that the owner can not supervise completely. Executives, the senior managers of the enterprise, act as agents in the enterprise, and their business decisions are directly related to the performance and future growth of the enterprise. At present, the incentive problem of enterprise executives has become a very popular topic, and the executive incentive of listed companies has become a basic problem related to the operational efficiency of listed companies. Therefore, to find out the effect of executive compensation incentive, to explore more reasonable incentive measures, to reduce the agency cost caused by moral hazard, to make it more fair, reasonable and perfect, so as to improve the operating performance of listed companies. To ensure the long-term and stable development of Chinese enterprises, it is necessary to stand undefeated in the international competition. This paper will focus on empirical research, taking the listed companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2008 to 2010 as samples, combing the related concepts of executive compensation incentive efficiency, principal-agent theory, human capital theory, property rights theory and so on. This paper probes into the efficiency of executive compensation incentive of listed companies in China by using three-stage DEA method and SFA method in order to provide the necessary theoretical support and reference basis for the design of executive compensation incentive and the improvement of enterprise performance. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: first, the efficiency evaluation results obtained by three-stage DEA method, excluding environmental variables and random errors, are more accurate than those of traditional DEA calculation results, and at the same time, The comparative analysis shows that the efficiency evaluation results obtained by three-stage DEA approach tend to be consistent with those obtained by SFA considering environmental variables, but the overall executive incentive efficiency is not high. The average annual pure technical efficiency is relatively stable and the pure technical efficiency is relatively high, which indicates that the management of executive compensation incentive is relatively effective, and the low scale efficiency is the main reason that affects the comprehensive technical efficiency. Second, due to different corporate governance environment and different external market constraints, even the same corporate governance mechanism, there will be significant differences in the impact on executives, if it is simply applied, but not the local. Will cause the company's stock right to encourage the state of resistance. Thirdly, through the SFA method to evaluate the incentive efficiency of executive compensation in listed companies, it is found that the per capita cash compensation of executives is still the main driving force to promote the value of enterprises, and the incentive efficiency can be further improved by appropriately increasing the corresponding input. However, the incentive efficiency of executive equity incentive is not obvious, so it is necessary to strengthen the intensity and depth of executive equity incentive, increase the rationality and standardization of equity incentive, so that equity incentive measures really play an incentive effect. Fourthly, among the environmental variables, the ratio of the largest shareholder holding and the asset-liability ratio of circulating shares have a positive effect on the incentive efficiency of executive compensation, while the proportion of independent directors and the scale of the enterprise have a negative impact on the incentive efficiency of executive compensation.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中南林業(yè)科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F272.92;F832.51;F224
本文編號：2322359
[Abstract]:Under the modern enterprise system, salary incentive is one of the most important ways to motivate executives in modern enterprises. The ownership and management rights of enterprises are separated from each other, and there are some problems such as inconsistent objectives and asymmetric information between managers and owners. How to motivate the operator becomes a very important problem under the condition that the owner can not supervise completely. Executives, the senior managers of the enterprise, act as agents in the enterprise, and their business decisions are directly related to the performance and future growth of the enterprise. At present, the incentive problem of enterprise executives has become a very popular topic, and the executive incentive of listed companies has become a basic problem related to the operational efficiency of listed companies. Therefore, to find out the effect of executive compensation incentive, to explore more reasonable incentive measures, to reduce the agency cost caused by moral hazard, to make it more fair, reasonable and perfect, so as to improve the operating performance of listed companies. To ensure the long-term and stable development of Chinese enterprises, it is necessary to stand undefeated in the international competition. This paper will focus on empirical research, taking the listed companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2008 to 2010 as samples, combing the related concepts of executive compensation incentive efficiency, principal-agent theory, human capital theory, property rights theory and so on. This paper probes into the efficiency of executive compensation incentive of listed companies in China by using three-stage DEA method and SFA method in order to provide the necessary theoretical support and reference basis for the design of executive compensation incentive and the improvement of enterprise performance. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: first, the efficiency evaluation results obtained by three-stage DEA method, excluding environmental variables and random errors, are more accurate than those of traditional DEA calculation results, and at the same time, The comparative analysis shows that the efficiency evaluation results obtained by three-stage DEA approach tend to be consistent with those obtained by SFA considering environmental variables, but the overall executive incentive efficiency is not high. The average annual pure technical efficiency is relatively stable and the pure technical efficiency is relatively high, which indicates that the management of executive compensation incentive is relatively effective, and the low scale efficiency is the main reason that affects the comprehensive technical efficiency. Second, due to different corporate governance environment and different external market constraints, even the same corporate governance mechanism, there will be significant differences in the impact on executives, if it is simply applied, but not the local. Will cause the company's stock right to encourage the state of resistance. Thirdly, through the SFA method to evaluate the incentive efficiency of executive compensation in listed companies, it is found that the per capita cash compensation of executives is still the main driving force to promote the value of enterprises, and the incentive efficiency can be further improved by appropriately increasing the corresponding input. However, the incentive efficiency of executive equity incentive is not obvious, so it is necessary to strengthen the intensity and depth of executive equity incentive, increase the rationality and standardization of equity incentive, so that equity incentive measures really play an incentive effect. Fourthly, among the environmental variables, the ratio of the largest shareholder holding and the asset-liability ratio of circulating shares have a positive effect on the incentive efficiency of executive compensation, while the proportion of independent directors and the scale of the enterprise have a negative impact on the incentive efficiency of executive compensation.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中南林業(yè)科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F272.92;F832.51;F224
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