【摘要】：我國(guó)中小上市企業(yè)在國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展中具有舉足輕重的地位，國(guó)家越來(lái)越重視中小上市企業(yè)的成長(zhǎng)，并通過(guò)積極的財(cái)政政策、貨幣政策等促進(jìn)中小上市企業(yè)的融資和成長(zhǎng)。然而，中小上市企業(yè)由于企業(yè)規(guī)模相對(duì)較小，治理體制相對(duì)不完善，各種代理沖突和信息不對(duì)稱的問(wèn)題尤為明顯，反映在企業(yè)投資領(lǐng)域就是各種非效率投資行為，表現(xiàn)為投資不足或投資過(guò)度。投資決策作為企業(yè)成長(zhǎng)的主要?jiǎng)右蚝臀磥?lái)現(xiàn)金流量增長(zhǎng)的重要基礎(chǔ)，是企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)決策的基礎(chǔ)，，中小上市企業(yè)的非效率投資行為阻礙了企業(yè)的健康持續(xù)發(fā)展。 本文在回顧國(guó)內(nèi)外相關(guān)研究文獻(xiàn)的基礎(chǔ)上，以2008-2010年為研究時(shí)間窗口，選取深圳中小板77家制造業(yè)類中小上市企業(yè)為研究對(duì)象，構(gòu)建中小上市企業(yè)成長(zhǎng)性評(píng)價(jià)的指標(biāo)體系，根據(jù)成長(zhǎng)性評(píng)價(jià)結(jié)果將其分為高、低成長(zhǎng)性企業(yè)組。并進(jìn)一步建立投資度量模型度量企業(yè)非效率投資的類型和程度。最后，基于企業(yè)不同的成長(zhǎng)性，研究我國(guó)中小上市企業(yè)的非效率投資行為的影響因素，并提出相應(yīng)的對(duì)策建議，從而為改善我國(guó)中小上市企業(yè)非效率投資行為以及國(guó)家制定相關(guān)政策提供一定的理論指導(dǎo)和決策參考。 本文的主要研究結(jié)論有：2008-2010年間，我國(guó)中小上市企業(yè)普遍存在投資不足行為而非投資過(guò)度行為�？傮w而言，較大的企業(yè)規(guī)模使企業(yè)擁有更多的投資機(jī)會(huì)，股權(quán)相對(duì)集中使控股股東傾向于締造商業(yè)帝國(guó)，這兩者都增加了我國(guó)中小上市企業(yè)的投資規(guī)模。企業(yè)的負(fù)債融資減少了我國(guó)中小上市企業(yè)的整體投資水平，債務(wù)融資在一定程度上發(fā)揮了對(duì)企業(yè)投資的制約作用，這種治理作用在低成長(zhǎng)企業(yè)中更加顯著，但是由于我國(guó)政府的干預(yù)政策使短期借款、銀行借款存在軟約束作用，短期借款和銀行借款沒(méi)有發(fā)揮相應(yīng)的制約作用。企業(yè)的高管薪酬發(fā)揮薪酬管治機(jī)制，降低企業(yè)由于代理關(guān)系導(dǎo)致的過(guò)度投資。
[Abstract]:China's small and medium-sized listed enterprises play an important role in the national economic development. The state pays more and more attention to the growth of small and medium-sized listed enterprises, and promotes the financing and growth of small and medium-sized listed enterprises through positive fiscal policy and monetary policy. However, due to the relatively small scale of small and medium-sized listed enterprises and the imperfect governance system, the problems of various agency conflicts and information asymmetry are particularly obvious, which are reflected in the various inefficient investment behaviors in the field of enterprise investment. It is characterized by underinvestment or overinvestment. As the main motivation of enterprise growth and the important foundation of future cash flow growth, investment decision is the basis of financial decision. The non-efficient investment behavior of small and medium-sized listed enterprises hinders the healthy and sustainable development of enterprises. In this paper, based on the review of domestic and foreign relevant research literature, taking 2008-2010 as the research time window, 77 small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises in Shenzhen are selected as the research objects, and the index system of the growth evaluation of small and medium-sized listed enterprises is constructed. According to the results of growth evaluation, it is divided into high and low growth groups. Furthermore, an investment measurement model is established to measure the type and degree of inefficient investment. Finally, based on the different growth of enterprises, this paper studies the influencing factors of the inefficient investment behavior of small and medium-sized listed enterprises in China, and puts forward the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions. Therefore, it can provide some theoretical guidance and decision reference for improving the inefficient investment behavior of small and medium-sized listed enterprises in China and the formulation of relevant policies by the state. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: from 2008 to 2010, China's small and medium-sized listed enterprises generally have underinvestment behavior rather than excessive investment behavior. In general, the larger size of the enterprise makes the enterprise have more investment opportunities, and the relative concentration of equity makes the controlling shareholder tend to build the business empire, both of which increase the investment scale of the small and medium-sized listed enterprises in China. Debt financing of enterprises reduces the overall investment level of small and medium-sized listed enterprises in our country, and debt financing plays a restrictive role in the investment of enterprises to a certain extent, and this governance role is more significant in low-growth enterprises. However, because of the intervention policy of our government, the bank loan has the function of soft restraint, and the short-term loan and the bank loan do not play the corresponding restrictive role. Executive compensation plays an important role in governing compensation, and reduces the overinvestment caused by agency relationship.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京航空航天大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F406.7;F832.51

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本文編號(hào)：2317928