【摘要】：投資者保護(hù)問題一直以來都是公司治理的核心所在,在我國(guó)股權(quán)相對(duì)集中的環(huán)境下,掌握著公司控制權(quán)的大股東能通過影響公司決策的制定而有效保護(hù)自身利益,故廣大的中小投資者面臨著管理層和控股股東侵害的雙重威脅,其利益的保護(hù)更為迫切。作為投資資金的接受者,上市公司應(yīng)承擔(dān)起保護(hù)外部中小投資者利益的責(zé)任,在相關(guān)決策中考慮其利益。而當(dāng)企業(yè)發(fā)展到一定階段為加速自身成長(zhǎng)和擴(kuò)張性經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng),很重要的手段就是利用自身的資源優(yōu)勢(shì)通過并購(gòu)、重組等手段從事多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)。那么,這一重大經(jīng)營(yíng)決策會(huì)如何影響中小投資者的利益呢?本文試圖通過我國(guó)2007年至2009年的上市公司數(shù)據(jù)檢驗(yàn)了多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)對(duì)兩類代理成本的影響,考察非理性多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)對(duì)中小投資者利益的影響問題,為規(guī)范我國(guó)上市公司的多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)行為,保護(hù)廣大中小投資者利益提出了相關(guān)建議。 多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)可區(qū)分為理性和非理性兩種,非理性多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)并沒有站在公司發(fā)展的角度,無法獲得規(guī)模與范圍經(jīng)濟(jì)、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)降低、交易成本優(yōu)勢(shì)等多元化利益,更多的是加劇了代理成本、內(nèi)部資本市場(chǎng)無效所產(chǎn)生的巨大成本等,這些成本可能會(huì)影響企業(yè)價(jià)值,進(jìn)而會(huì)損害股東的利益。本文首先以ROE、EPS、市價(jià)比率和托賓Q值四項(xiàng)指標(biāo)來度量公司價(jià)值,檢驗(yàn)我國(guó)上市公司整體上的多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)對(duì)公司價(jià)值的影響,結(jié)果證實(shí)了多元化折價(jià)的存在,表明了我國(guó)上市公司的多元化決策中非理性的成分居多,造成了公司價(jià)值的減損。然后基于兩類代理問題解釋非理性多元化折價(jià)的成本承擔(dān)問題,在區(qū)分實(shí)際控制人的產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)的基礎(chǔ)上,分別以管理費(fèi)用率和資金占用指標(biāo)來衡量管理層的代理成本和控股股東的代理成本,檢驗(yàn)了非理性多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)對(duì)兩類代理成本的影響。結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)非理性多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)伴隨著管理層和控股股東兩方面的自利行為的加劇,表明我國(guó)的多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)淪為了公司內(nèi)部人侵害中小投資者的渠道,中小投資者實(shí)際上成為了非理性多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)的最終成本承擔(dān)者。同時(shí)發(fā)現(xiàn)地方國(guó)有控股公司的這種成本轉(zhuǎn)嫁行為最為嚴(yán)重,私人控股企業(yè)次之,而中央國(guó)有控制公司對(duì)中小投資者相對(duì)較負(fù)責(zé)。最后進(jìn)一步檢驗(yàn)了非理性多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)對(duì)上市公司的盈余管理和信息披露質(zhì)量的影響,表明自利動(dòng)機(jī)下的非理性多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)加劇了盈余操縱和信息披露質(zhì)量的降低。從而印證了我國(guó)上市公司的多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)更多地表現(xiàn)為管理層和控股股東的侵占工具,并通過掩飾公司真實(shí)業(yè)績(jī)將價(jià)值減損成本轉(zhuǎn)嫁給了中小投資者。
[Abstract]:The problem of investor protection has always been the core of corporate governance. In the environment of relatively concentrated equity in our country, the major shareholders who control the company can effectively protect their own interests by influencing the decision-making of the company. Therefore, the majority of small and medium investors are faced with the double threat of abuse by management and controlling shareholders, and the protection of their interests is more urgent. As the recipient of investment funds, listed companies should assume the responsibility of protecting the interests of small and medium-sized external investors and consider their interests in relevant decisions. When the enterprise develops to a certain stage to speed up its own growth and expansionary business activities, the most important means is to use its own resource advantages to engage in diversified management through M & A, reorganization and other means. So, how will this major business decision affect the interests of small and medium-sized investors? This paper attempts to examine the impact of diversification on the two types of agency costs through the data of Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2009, and to examine the impact of irrational diversification on the interests of small and medium-sized investors. In order to standardize the diversification of listed companies and protect the interests of small and medium-sized investors, this paper puts forward some relevant suggestions. Diversification can be divided into rational and irrational. Irrational diversification does not stand in the perspective of the development of the company, and can not obtain diversified benefits such as economy of scale and scope, reduction of risk, advantage of transaction cost, etc. The agency cost and the huge cost caused by the invalidation of the internal capital market may affect the value of the enterprise and then damage the interests of the shareholders. In this paper, we first measure the company value by the ROE,EPS, market price ratio and Tobin Q value, and test the influence of diversification on the company value. The results prove the existence of diversification discount. It shows that the irrational elements in the diversification decision of listed companies in our country are mostly, resulting in the loss of corporate value. Then it explains the cost bearing problem of irrational diversification discount based on two kinds of agency problems, on the basis of distinguishing the property right nature of actual controller. The agency cost of management and the agency cost of controlling shareholder are measured by the ratio of management cost and the capital occupation index, and the influence of irrational diversification on the two kinds of agency cost is tested. The results show that the irrational diversification is accompanied by the intensification of the self-interest behavior of both management and controlling shareholders, which indicates that the diversification of our country has become the channel for corporate insiders to infringe on small and medium-sized investors. Small and medium investors have actually become the ultimate cost bearing of irrational diversification. At the same time, it is found that the cost transfer behavior of local state-owned holding companies is the most serious, followed by private holding enterprises, while the central state-owned control companies are relatively responsible for small and medium-sized investors. Finally, the influence of irrational diversification on earnings management and information disclosure quality of listed companies is further examined, which indicates that irrational diversification under self-interest motivates the deterioration of earnings manipulation and information disclosure quality. Thus, the diversification of listed companies in our country is more manifested as the usurpation tools of management and controlling shareholders, and the cost of value reduction is passed on to the small and medium-sized investors by disguising the real performance of the company.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江財(cái)經(jīng)學(xué)院
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51;F224

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本文編號(hào)：2294311