【摘要】：上市公司的關(guān)聯(lián)交易一直是我國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)中引人關(guān)注的熱點(diǎn)問題，如何將關(guān)聯(lián)交易規(guī)范化對(duì)于證券市場(chǎng)政策制定者與管理者來說，既是難點(diǎn)又是重點(diǎn)問題。關(guān)聯(lián)交易作為一種市場(chǎng)資源配置形式，具有兩面性：一方面既能為上市公司降低交易成本，提升公司的經(jīng)營(yíng)能力，從而提高公司價(jià)值，改善公司績(jī)效水平；另一方面又能成為大股東侵占中小投資者利益的有力手段。從最近十幾年我國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)的實(shí)際發(fā)展情況來看，關(guān)聯(lián)交易逐年地頻繁發(fā)生，而且很多關(guān)聯(lián)交易已然成為上市公司控股股東侵占中小投資者利益或掏空上市公司的重要工具，不僅侵害了廣大中小投資者的利益，也損害了發(fā)生關(guān)聯(lián)交易上市公司本身的利益。 本文首先通過對(duì)關(guān)聯(lián)交易界定、分類和特征入手，分析關(guān)聯(lián)交易的成因和影響，并重點(diǎn)分析了非公允關(guān)聯(lián)交易的成因與對(duì)上市公司價(jià)值影響，還對(duì)我國(guó)滬深兩市所有上市公司的關(guān)聯(lián)交易發(fā)生的總體狀況進(jìn)行了全貌性的分析。并在全面分析我國(guó)上市公司關(guān)聯(lián)交易總體狀況的基礎(chǔ)上，選取凈資產(chǎn)收益率和托賓Q值作為公司績(jī)效的衡量指標(biāo)，對(duì)我國(guó)上市公司關(guān)聯(lián)交易對(duì)公司績(jī)效的影響進(jìn)行了實(shí)證研究，其表明：相對(duì)于未發(fā)生關(guān)聯(lián)交易的上市公司，發(fā)生關(guān)聯(lián)交易的上市公司的績(jī)效水平要差，并且關(guān)聯(lián)交易發(fā)生規(guī)模與公司績(jī)效水平呈現(xiàn)負(fù)相關(guān)性。本文認(rèn)為關(guān)聯(lián)交易特別是非公允性關(guān)聯(lián)交易存在的根源在于所有權(quán)集中，股權(quán)越集中，關(guān)聯(lián)交易的規(guī)模和發(fā)生次數(shù)就越多，對(duì)公司的價(jià)值和績(jī)效水平都會(huì)產(chǎn)生影響。因此，為了改變關(guān)聯(lián)交易的不利影響，本文提出了推行并購(gòu)與重組，優(yōu)化股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)，消除非公允性關(guān)聯(lián)交易，，同時(shí)還應(yīng)該加強(qiáng)關(guān)聯(lián)交易的界定和審核，完善上市公司信息披露制度，加大監(jiān)管的力度等政策建議。
[Abstract]:The related party transaction of listed companies has always been a hot issue in the securities market of our country. How to standardize the related party transaction is a difficult and important problem for the policy makers and managers of the securities market. As a form of allocation of market resources, related party transaction has two sides: on the one hand, it can reduce transaction cost and enhance the management ability of listed companies, so as to improve the value of companies and improve the level of corporate performance; On the other hand, it can become a powerful means for large shareholders to encroach on the interests of small and medium investors. In view of the actual development of China's securities market in the past ten years, related party transactions occur frequently year by year, and many related party transactions have become an important tool for controlling shareholders of listed companies to encroach on the interests of small and medium-sized investors or to empty the listed companies. It not only infringes the interests of small and medium investors, but also damages the interests of listed companies. First of all, this paper analyzes the causes and effects of related party transactions by defining, classifying and characteristics of related party transactions, and focuses on the causes of unfair related party transactions and the impact on the value of listed companies. It also analyzes the overall situation of affiliated transactions of all listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets. On the basis of comprehensive analysis of the overall situation of related party transactions of listed companies in China, the paper selects the return on net assets and Tobin Q as the measure of corporate performance, and makes an empirical study on the impact of related party transactions on corporate performance of listed companies in China. It shows that the performance of listed companies with related party transactions is worse than that of listed companies without related party transactions, and the scale of related party transactions has a negative correlation with the level of corporate performance. This paper argues that the existence of related party transactions, especially non-fair related party transactions, is rooted in ownership concentration. The more concentrated equity, the more related party transactions scale and occurrence times, which will have an impact on the company's value and performance level. Therefore, in order to change the adverse effects of related party transactions, this paper proposes to promote mergers and acquisitions and reorganization, optimize equity structure, eliminate unfair related party transactions, at the same time, we should strengthen the definition and review of related party transactions. Improve the information disclosure system of listed companies, strengthen supervision and other policy recommendations.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51;F224

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