【摘要】：高管（董事長(zhǎng)或總經(jīng)理）在大股東單位兼職是我國(guó)上市公司普遍存在的一個(gè)現(xiàn)象，，這一現(xiàn)象受到了監(jiān)管部門、媒體和社會(huì)的廣泛關(guān)注。大家關(guān)于高管在大股東單位兼職對(duì)上市公司價(jià)值影響的觀點(diǎn)不盡相同。本文認(rèn)為高管在大股東單位兼職作為一種公司治理現(xiàn)象，必然會(huì)與一些公司治理特征相聯(lián)系。所以，本文從公司治理的角度出發(fā)，首先分析是那些因素可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致高管在大股東單位兼職現(xiàn)象的發(fā)生，然后從大股東的“侵占效應(yīng)”和“監(jiān)督效應(yīng)”兩方面分析了上市公司高管在大股東單位兼職對(duì)公司價(jià)值的影響。 本論文以上市公司2010年的數(shù)據(jù)為基礎(chǔ)，分別選取了1312個(gè)董事長(zhǎng)樣本和1234個(gè)總經(jīng)理樣本進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析。本文首先分析了公司治理的相關(guān)因素（所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、性質(zhì)等）對(duì)上市公司高管在大股東單位兼職的影響，本文的分析發(fā)現(xiàn)：大股東的兩權(quán)分離度越高、股權(quán)制衡度越低的上市公司高管（董事長(zhǎng)或總經(jīng)理）越有可能在大股東單位兼職。此外，相對(duì)于非國(guó)有控股的上市公司，國(guó)有控股的上市公司的董事長(zhǎng)更有可能在大股東單位兼職，而總經(jīng)理在大股東單位兼職的概率卻要低于前者（非國(guó)有控股的上市公司）。 本為的進(jìn)一步分析了發(fā)現(xiàn)，上市公司的董事長(zhǎng)在大股東單位兼職會(huì)同時(shí)產(chǎn)生“掏空效應(yīng)”和“監(jiān)督效應(yīng)”，而這一現(xiàn)象主要存在于低治理水平的上市公司。在低治理水平的上市公司，董事長(zhǎng)在大股東單位兼職所產(chǎn)生的“掏空效應(yīng)”要大于“監(jiān)督效應(yīng)”，從而使得董事長(zhǎng)在大股東單位兼職的上市公司的價(jià)值要小于董事長(zhǎng)不在大股東單位兼職的上市公司。本文還發(fā)現(xiàn)總經(jīng)理在大股東單位兼職現(xiàn)象的數(shù)量和對(duì)公司價(jià)值的影響都要比董事長(zhǎng)小得多。
[Abstract]:It is a common phenomenon for senior executives (chairman or general manager) to work part-time in large shareholder units of listed companies in China, which has been widely concerned by the regulatory authorities, the media and the society. There are different views on the effect of executives' part-time work in large shareholders on the value of listed companies. As a phenomenon of corporate governance, executives' part-time work in large shareholder units is bound to be associated with some corporate governance characteristics. Therefore, from the perspective of corporate governance, the first analysis is that these factors may lead to the occurrence of part-time jobs in large shareholder units. Then, the paper analyzes the influence of senior executives' part-time jobs on the value of listed companies from the two aspects of "encroachment effect" and "supervision effect" of large shareholders. Based on the data of listed companies in 2010, this paper selects 132 chairman samples and 1234 general manager samples for empirical analysis. This paper first analyzes the influence of the related factors of corporate governance (ownership structure, nature, etc.) on the part-time work of executives in large shareholder units in listed companies, and finds that the higher the separation of the two rights of large shareholders, the higher the degree of separation between the two rights of large shareholders. Listed company executives (chairman or general manager) with lower equity checks are more likely to work part-time in large-shareholder units. In addition, the chairman of a publicly controlled company is more likely to work part-time in a large shareholder unit than a non-state-controlled listed company, while the probability of the general manager taking a part-time job in a large shareholder unit is lower than that of the former (non-state-controlled listed company). After further analysis, it is found that the chairman of the listed company will have "tunneling effect" and "supervision effect" at the same time in the majority shareholder unit, which mainly exists in the listed company with low governance level. In a listed company with a low level of governance, the "tunneling effect" caused by the chairman's part-time work in a large shareholder unit is greater than the "supervisory effect". Therefore, the value of the listed company in which the chairman of the board of directors is part-time is smaller than that of the listed company in which the chairman of the board is not in the majority shareholder unit. It is also found that the number of part-time jobs in large shareholders and the influence on company value are much smaller than that of chairman.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：新疆財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51;F224

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