【摘要】：隨著相關(guān)學(xué)者對(duì)調(diào)整成本的深入研究,動(dòng)態(tài)權(quán)衡理論逐漸成為資本結(jié)構(gòu)動(dòng)態(tài)調(diào)整的主流理論。然而,在集中的所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和弱的制度環(huán)境下,沒有有效的監(jiān)督機(jī)制可以確保動(dòng)態(tài)權(quán)衡理論的基本假設(shè)(管理者以企業(yè)價(jià)值最大化為目標(biāo)進(jìn)行融資決策)成立。因此,結(jié)合我國的制度環(huán)境和企業(yè)的所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu),來分析終極控制股東和外部投資者之間的代理沖突與區(qū)域制度環(huán)境差異對(duì)企業(yè)目標(biāo)資本結(jié)構(gòu)和調(diào)整速度的影響,具有重要的理論意義和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。
[Abstract]:With the in-depth study of adjustment cost, dynamic tradeoff theory has gradually become the mainstream theory of capital structure dynamic adjustment. However, under the centralized ownership structure and weak institutional environment, there is no effective supervision mechanism to ensure that the basic hypothesis of dynamic tradeoff theory (managers' financing decision to maximize the value of enterprises) is established. Therefore, combining the institutional environment of our country and the ownership structure of the enterprise, this paper analyzes the influence of the agency conflict between the ultimate controlling shareholder and the external investor and the difference of the regional institutional environment on the target capital structure and the adjustment speed of the enterprise. It has important theoretical and practical significance.
【作者單位】： 西南交通大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)管理學(xué)院;
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51

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本文編號(hào)：2216843