發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-08-30 10:33

【摘要】：契約型證券投資基金作為一種財(cái)產(chǎn)管理制度,曾極大地促進(jìn)了我國(guó)基金市場(chǎng)的繁榮。但是契約型基金是一種特殊信托，所有權(quán)與受益權(quán)分離的本質(zhì)，致使內(nèi)部主體之間利益沖突不斷。我國(guó)契約型投資基金以基金管理人為權(quán)力核心，由其掌握基金財(cái)產(chǎn)的投資運(yùn)作，基金托管人負(fù)責(zé)保管與監(jiān)督基金財(cái)產(chǎn)。這種特殊的制度安排，導(dǎo)致基金持有人地位弱化，權(quán)利受損，，致使契約型基金偏離基金業(yè)的正常發(fā)展。實(shí)踐中，基金持有人大會(huì)形式化，投資者普遍存在“理性冷漠”及“搭便車”心理；基金管理人違規(guī)操作，違反職業(yè)道德，進(jìn)行關(guān)聯(lián)交易；基金托管人缺乏獨(dú)立性，監(jiān)督動(dòng)力不足，這些都將致使基金投資者無(wú)法得到最大化的回報(bào)。契約型基金治理結(jié)構(gòu)的缺陷嚴(yán)重?fù)p害了基金投資者的利益，直接制約了我國(guó)基金業(yè)的正常發(fā)展。 為了實(shí)現(xiàn)基金持有人利益最大化,我國(guó)應(yīng)從立法上完善契約型投資基金的治理結(jié)構(gòu)尤其內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)。具體的途徑是引入大股東制度使投資者有便車可搭，降低投資者參與基金持有人大會(huì)的門檻，充分實(shí)現(xiàn)投資者對(duì)管理人的監(jiān)督權(quán)利；構(gòu)建基金管理人的約束與激勵(lì)機(jī)制，如引入聲譽(yù)機(jī)制，鼓勵(lì)基金經(jīng)理人擁有基金長(zhǎng)期控制權(quán),實(shí)施員工持股，實(shí)現(xiàn)股權(quán)激勵(lì)；規(guī)范基金托管人的監(jiān)督制度，改變托管人的產(chǎn)生方式，建議在托管人內(nèi)部引入獨(dú)立受托委員會(huì)，賦予托管人獲得基金信息的權(quán)利。完善的契約型證券投資基金治理結(jié)構(gòu)是保護(hù)投資者利益的關(guān)鍵，是促進(jìn)基金業(yè)健康發(fā)展的重要途徑。我國(guó)的證券投資基金治理結(jié)構(gòu)應(yīng)與國(guó)際接軌，這樣才能促進(jìn)基金業(yè)的發(fā)展和證券市場(chǎng)的繁榮。
[Abstract]:As a property management system, contractual securities investment funds have greatly promoted the prosperity of fund market in China. However, contractual fund is a special kind of trust, the essence of separation of ownership and beneficial right leads to conflicts of interest between internal subjects. China's contractual investment funds take the fund manager as the core of power, by which they control the investment operation of the fund property, and the fund custodian is responsible for the custody and supervision of the fund property. This special institutional arrangement leads to the weakening of the position of the fund holder and the impairment of the right, which leads to the deviation of the contractual fund from the normal development of the fund industry. In practice, the fund holders' meeting formalizes that investors are generally "rational apathy" and "hitchhiking" psychology; fund managers operate illegally, violate professional ethics and conduct related transactions; fund custodians lack independence. The lack of oversight power will prevent fund investors from maximising returns. The defects in the governance structure of contractual funds seriously damage the interests of fund investors and directly restrict the normal development of the fund industry in China. In order to maximize the interests of fund holders, our country should improve the governance structure of contractual investment funds, especially the internal governance structure. The specific approach is to introduce the large shareholder system to make investors have a free ride, reduce the threshold for investors to participate in the general meeting of fund holders, fully realize the supervision right of investors to the manager, and construct the restraint and incentive mechanism of fund managers. Such as introducing reputation mechanism, encouraging fund managers to have long-term control of the fund, implementing employee shareholding, realizing equity incentive, standardizing the supervision system of fund custodian, changing the way of producing trustee, It is suggested that an independent committee should be introduced within the custodian to give the trustee the right to obtain fund information. The perfect governance structure of contractual securities investment funds is the key to protect the interests of investors and an important way to promote the healthy development of the fund industry. In order to promote the development of the fund industry and the prosperity of the securities market, the governance structure of China's securities investment funds should be in line with the international standards.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;D922.28

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