【摘要】：生產(chǎn)力發(fā)展使得社會(huì)分工進(jìn)一步細(xì)化,企業(yè)的所有者由于知識(shí)、能力和精力的原因不具備最優(yōu)的經(jīng)營(yíng)企業(yè)的實(shí)力,而專(zhuān)業(yè)化分工產(chǎn)生了一大批具有專(zhuān)業(yè)知識(shí)的代理人,他們有精力、有能力代理行使好被所有者委托的工作。但在委托代理的關(guān)系當(dāng)中,由于委托人與代理人的效用函數(shù)不一樣,委托人追求的是自己的財(cái)富最大化,而代理人則是追求自己的工資收入、在職消費(fèi)和閑暇時(shí)間最大化,這必然導(dǎo)致兩者的利益沖突。在沒(méi)有有效的制度安排下代理人的行為很可能最終損害委托人的利益,這便是委托代理問(wèn)題產(chǎn)生的根源。 管理層在現(xiàn)代企業(yè)所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)分離的狀態(tài)下扮演著重要的角色,他們雖然未能擁有企業(yè),但卻站在企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)決策的最前線,股東如何監(jiān)督管理層,讓其行為和股東利益保持一致,是所有企業(yè)共同面臨的難題,由于股東不參與公司日常經(jīng)營(yíng)決策,因此難免和管理層之間存在信息不對(duì)稱(chēng),道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和逆向選擇問(wèn)題造成的代理成本不可避免。對(duì)于追求公司價(jià)值最大化的股東來(lái)說(shuō),為了最大程度增加公司價(jià)值,就需要激勵(lì)管理層在日常經(jīng)營(yíng)決策上與股東利益保持一致。股權(quán)激勵(lì)給予了管理層對(duì)于公司價(jià)值的剩余索取權(quán),將管理層的利益與股東的利益綁在了一起,在管理層利益與公司績(jī)效之間建立了一個(gè)正相關(guān)的關(guān)系,這樣能夠有效的激發(fā)管理層的敬業(yè)精神、降低代理成本、改善公司經(jīng)營(yíng)管理機(jī)制以及增加公司的績(jī)效水平。 自上世紀(jì)五十年代的美國(guó)開(kāi)始,股權(quán)激勵(lì)作為針對(duì)管理層和員工的長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)制度開(kāi)始在實(shí)踐中萌芽,在發(fā)展初期這種激勵(lì)制度并沒(méi)有引起人們的廣泛關(guān)注,直到上世紀(jì)六十年代,美國(guó)硅谷的一些高科技、高成長(zhǎng)性的公司,由于創(chuàng)業(yè)初期缺乏資金,在保持核心人員穩(wěn)定性并確保公司在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中保持優(yōu)勢(shì)的壓力之下,大規(guī)模的對(duì)管理層等核心人員實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)以留住優(yōu)秀人才,在接下來(lái)的七十年代,職業(yè)經(jīng)理人賣(mài)方市場(chǎng)得到進(jìn)一步強(qiáng)化,高級(jí)人才的流動(dòng)性日趨增大,這些現(xiàn)象也給企業(yè)造成了威脅,同時(shí),由于股權(quán)激勵(lì)不計(jì)入會(huì)計(jì)成本,不會(huì)降低企業(yè)的賬面利潤(rùn),因此這種激勵(lì)方式尤其受到處在成長(zhǎng)期且現(xiàn)金流吃緊的創(chuàng)新型公司的青睞,由此,股權(quán)激勵(lì)迅速發(fā)展成為歐美發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家施行管理層激勵(lì)的重要工具。 為提升經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī),完善治理結(jié)構(gòu),我國(guó)上市公司在管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)方面借鑒西方經(jīng)驗(yàn)并進(jìn)行了積極的探索,然而,由于市場(chǎng)環(huán)境和制度環(huán)境的缺陷,股權(quán)激勵(lì)曾面臨諸多障礙,特別是我國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)所獨(dú)有的股權(quán)分置問(wèn)題,它造成了我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)國(guó)有股一股獨(dú)大、流通股比例偏小,股價(jià)不能充分反映公司的價(jià)值,因此以股權(quán)對(duì)管理層進(jìn)行激勵(lì)顯然缺乏現(xiàn)實(shí)邏輯的支撐,同時(shí),市場(chǎng)化程度的不足和公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的不完善導(dǎo)致企業(yè)經(jīng)理人員受行政任命的現(xiàn)象比較普遍,他們更關(guān)心自己的行政地位等非經(jīng)濟(jì)因素以及是否能夠足額完成上級(jí)給定的指標(biāo)任務(wù),而不愿承擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn),盡管這些風(fēng)險(xiǎn)可能給企業(yè)帶來(lái)巨大的收益,因此,對(duì)此類(lèi)管理者實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)并不能達(dá)到理想的效果,2005年股權(quán)分置改革的開(kāi)展為上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)的實(shí)施創(chuàng)造了良好的條件,2005年12月,證監(jiān)會(huì)頒布《上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)管理辦法(試行)》(以下簡(jiǎn)稱(chēng)《管理辦法》),監(jiān)管層的推動(dòng)也成為我國(guó)上市公司實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的一針強(qiáng)心劑,自此,越來(lái)越多的上市公司開(kāi)始在公司治理實(shí)務(wù)中使用股權(quán)激勵(lì)這一“金手銬”。 國(guó)外對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)相關(guān)的研究起步很早,也比較成熟,因此相關(guān)研究結(jié)論對(duì)本文有一定的參考作用,但由于我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)起步較晚,法律制度和公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)亦不完善,與西方發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家成熟的資本市場(chǎng)體系存在很大差距,因此國(guó)外學(xué)者在股權(quán)激勵(lì)相關(guān)領(lǐng)域得出的結(jié)論并不能照搬到我國(guó)的市場(chǎng)環(huán)境當(dāng)中,中國(guó)正處在經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型期,2006年1月《管理辦法》開(kāi)始實(shí)施,我國(guó)上市公司從這個(gè)時(shí)候才開(kāi)始真正意義上的實(shí)行股權(quán)激勵(lì),目前,相關(guān)的實(shí)證研究比較有限,我國(guó)學(xué)者對(duì)于股權(quán)激勵(lì)能否真正提高公司績(jī)效還未形成一致觀點(diǎn)。 本研究的總體目標(biāo)是考察我國(guó)上市公司實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)公司績(jī)效是否具有正面影響,以及這種影響得到顯現(xiàn)的時(shí)間跨度,《管理辦法》和股權(quán)分置改革之前實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)還面臨許多制度和法律法規(guī)上的障礙,因此相關(guān)的研究文獻(xiàn)都是將管理層持股比例等同為股權(quán)激勵(lì)比例,而我國(guó)上市公司真正意義上開(kāi)始實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)是06年以后的事情,因此目前國(guó)內(nèi)研究真正意義上股權(quán)激勵(lì)的文獻(xiàn)并不是很多,本文選取2006年至2009年實(shí)施了股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的滬深兩市A股138家上市公司作為樣本,考察真正意義上的管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)公司績(jī)效的影響。 本文的結(jié)構(gòu)大致如下： 第一章,導(dǎo)論部分,這章闡述了管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)的選題背景；研究的意義、思路及方法。 第二章,文獻(xiàn)綜述部分,這章首先闡述了“委托—代理”理論等股權(quán)激勵(lì)相關(guān)的四個(gè)經(jīng)典理論,接著闡述與股權(quán)激勵(lì)效果有關(guān)的兩個(gè)假說(shuō)：利益趨同假說(shuō)以及管理者防御假說(shuō),然后對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)外關(guān)于股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)證研究的相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行分析、總結(jié)與評(píng)述。 第三章,闡述管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)的概念,比較各種股權(quán)激勵(lì)模式的優(yōu)點(diǎn)與缺點(diǎn),并就管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)在我國(guó)的發(fā)展做一個(gè)整體的回顧。 第四章,管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)的實(shí)證部分,本章選擇2006年至2009年實(shí)施了股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的滬深兩市138家A股上市公司作為樣本,通過(guò)構(gòu)建多元回歸計(jì)量模型來(lái)研究我國(guó)A股上市公司績(jī)效和股權(quán)激勵(lì)之間的關(guān)系,將經(jīng)行業(yè)均值調(diào)整后的公司ROE作為因變量,并全面考察滯后期為0年、1年、2年、3年的ROE情況,以期全面分析股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)公司績(jī)效影響的時(shí)滯性,模型選擇股權(quán)激勵(lì)股本占公司總股本的比例SRAT以及它的平方SRAT2作為自變量,控制變量選擇企業(yè)性質(zhì)、股權(quán)集中度、股權(quán)制衡度、公司規(guī)模、資本結(jié)構(gòu)、公司成長(zhǎng)性、高管薪酬、獨(dú)立董事占董事會(huì)成員比例、監(jiān)事會(huì)成員占整個(gè)公司管理層的比例,研究股權(quán)激勵(lì)與公司績(jī)效之間的關(guān)系。 第五章,就實(shí)證部分的成果得出結(jié)論：①管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)具有增進(jìn)公司績(jī)效的時(shí)滯性；②管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)與公司績(jī)效之間存在“倒U”關(guān)系：③股權(quán)集中度、企業(yè)規(guī)模以及監(jiān)事人數(shù)占管理層的比例與公司績(jī)效負(fù)相關(guān)；④高管薪酬與公司績(jī)效正相關(guān)。同時(shí),根據(jù)實(shí)證結(jié)果提出相關(guān)建議： 本文的創(chuàng)新之處主要在于：一是本文全面考察股權(quán)激勵(lì)的時(shí)滯性,和以往大部分文獻(xiàn)僅考察滯后0年和1年的ROE不同,本文全面考察滯后期為0年、1年、2年、3年的ROE情況,從更加長(zhǎng)的時(shí)間跨度內(nèi)把握股權(quán)激勵(lì)與公司績(jī)效的關(guān)系,而且實(shí)證的結(jié)果也表明,股權(quán)激勵(lì)的對(duì)公司績(jī)效的時(shí)滯性影響確實(shí)存在,并且比普遍認(rèn)為的1年時(shí)間還要長(zhǎng),達(dá)到了2年甚至3年；二是本文采用的數(shù)據(jù)處理方式較好的將各年樣本整合到了一起,本文將樣本根據(jù)證監(jiān)會(huì)的行業(yè)分類(lèi)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)分為13個(gè)行業(yè),分別將各企業(yè)每年的ROE減去其所屬行業(yè)當(dāng)年平均ROE,得到經(jīng)過(guò)每年的行業(yè)均值調(diào)整后的ROE。調(diào)整后的ROE反映單個(gè)企業(yè)自身所特有的ROE,不受行業(yè)和年份等因素的影響,只受到該企業(yè)自身因素的影響,因?yàn)槲覈?guó)A股上市公司在06年以后才開(kāi)始真正意義上的實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì),每年的樣本容量數(shù)較小,采用此種方式可以將各年的樣本整合到一起以獲得更好的參數(shù)估計(jì)值。 本文的不足之處在于：一是本文考察了管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)公司績(jī)效的時(shí)滯性影響,但是對(duì)什么因素影響股權(quán)激勵(lì)這個(gè)變量卻沒(méi)有進(jìn)一步考察,即沒(méi)有對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)的內(nèi)生性問(wèn)題做進(jìn)一步探討,未來(lái)筆者會(huì)試著站在這個(gè)角度對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)問(wèn)題做一個(gè)更加全面的考察；二是本文雖然采取了合理的方式整合各年的樣本數(shù)據(jù),但由于截止本論文定稿之日,大部分上市公司的2011年年報(bào)還未公布,因此考察股權(quán)激勵(lì)時(shí)滯性影響的時(shí)候樣本稍顯不足,相信隨著樣本數(shù)據(jù)的越發(fā)充分,未來(lái)的研究成果會(huì)得到更好的數(shù)據(jù)支撐；三是影響公司績(jī)效的因素非常多,本文在選取解釋變量的時(shí)候可能遺漏了某些比較重要的變量,希望在日后的研究當(dāng)中,能夠更加全面的選擇相關(guān)變量進(jìn)行分析,以期得到更好的實(shí)證結(jié)果。
[Abstract]:The development of productive forces further refines the division of labor in society. Owners of enterprises do not possess the best strength of operating enterprises because of their knowledge, ability and energy. Professional division of labor produces a large number of agents with professional knowledge. They have the energy and ability to perform well the work entrusted by owners. Because the utility function of the principal and the agent is different, the principal pursues the maximization of his own wealth, while the agent pursues his own salary and income, and maximizes his in-service consumption and leisure time, which will inevitably lead to the conflict of interests between them. Finally, it will damage the interests of the principal, which is the root cause of the agency problem.
Management plays an important role in the separation of ownership and management rights of modern enterprises. Although they can not own the enterprise, they stand at the forefront of enterprise management decision-making. How to supervise and manage the shareholders and keep their behavior in line with the interests of shareholders is a common problem faced by all enterprises, because shareholders do not participate in the company day It is inevitable that there is information asymmetry between management and management, and the agency cost caused by moral hazard and adverse selection is inevitable. Equity incentive gives the management residual claim to the company's value, binds the interests of the management and the shareholders together, and establishes a positive correlation between the interests of the management and the company's performance. This can effectively stimulate the management's professionalism, reduce agency costs, and improve the company's management mechanism. And increase the performance level of the company.
Since the 1950s in the United States, equity incentive as a long-term incentive system for management and employees began to germinate in practice, in the early development of this incentive system did not cause widespread concern until the 1960s, the United States Silicon Valley, some of the high-tech, high-growth companies due to the early start-up stage. Lack of funds, under the pressure of maintaining the stability of the core personnel and ensuring the company's competitive edge, large-scale equity incentives were implemented to the core personnel such as management to retain outstanding personnel. In the following 1970s, the professional manager seller market was further strengthened and the mobility of senior personnel was increasing. This phenomenon also poses a threat to enterprises. At the same time, because equity incentive does not include accounting costs, it will not reduce the book profits of enterprises, so this incentive method is especially favored by innovative companies in the growing period and cash flow is tight. Therefore, equity incentive has rapidly developed into an important incentive for management in developed countries in Europe and the United States. Tools.
In order to improve business performance and improve governance structure, listed companies in China have learned from western experience and made active exploration in the management of equity incentives. However, due to the defects of market environment and institutional environment, equity incentives have faced many obstacles, especially the unique equity division in China's securities market, which has caused the capital of China. In this market, the state-owned shares are dominant, the proportion of circulating shares is small, and the stock price can not fully reflect the value of the company. Therefore, it is obviously lack of practical and logical support to encourage the management with equity. At the same time, the lack of market-oriented degree and the imperfection of corporate governance structure lead to the phenomenon that managers are appointed by the administration is more common. More concerned about their administrative status and other non-economic factors as well as whether they can fulfil the target task given by their superiors in full, and are unwilling to take risks, although these risks may bring enormous benefits to the enterprise, therefore, the implementation of equity incentives for such managers can not achieve the desired results. The implementation of the split share structure reform in 2005 is the top priority. The implementation of equity incentive in listed companies has created favorable conditions. In December 2005, the SFC promulgated the Measures for the Management of Equity Incentive in Listed Companies (Trial Implementation). The promotion of the regulatory authorities has become a stimulant to the implementation of equity incentive in Listed Companies in China. Since then, more and more listed companies have begun to implement corporate governance. The "golden handcuffs" are used in stock affairs.
The research on equity incentive abroad started very early and is relatively mature, so the relevant conclusions have a certain reference for this paper. However, due to the late start of China's capital market, the imperfect legal system and corporate governance structure, there is a big gap with the mature capital market system of western developed countries, foreign scholars in The conclusions drawn in the related fields of equity incentive can not be transferred to the market environment of our country. China is in the period of economic transformation. The implementation of "Management Measures" began in January 2006. The listed companies in our country began to implement equity incentive in real sense only at this time. At present, the relevant empirical research is limited, and the scholars in China have limited knowledge about equity. Whether incentive can really improve corporate performance has not yet reached a consensus.
The overall objective of this study is to examine whether the implementation of equity incentives by Listed Companies in China has a positive impact on corporate performance, and the time span of this impact. Before the reform of "management measures" and non-tradable shares, there are still many institutional and legal barriers to the implementation of equity incentives. The proportion of managerial ownership is the same as that of equity incentive, and it is after 2006 that listed companies in China begin to implement equity incentive in a real sense. So there are not many literatures about equity incentive in China. This paper selects 138 A-shares listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets which implemented equity incentive plan from 2006 to 2009. As a sample, the company examines the impact of managerial equity incentive on corporate performance in real sense.
The structure of this article is as follows:
The first chapter, the introduction part, this chapter elaborated the management stock right incentive topic background; The research significance, the mentality and the method.
In the second chapter, literature review, this chapter first expounds four classical theories related to equity incentive, such as principal-agent theory, and then elaborates two hypotheses related to equity incentive effect: interest convergence hypothesis and managerial defense hypothesis. Summary and comment.
In the third chapter, the concept of management equity incentive is expounded, the advantages and disadvantages of various equity incentive modes are compared, and the development of management equity incentive in China is reviewed as a whole.
In the fourth chapter, the empirical part of managerial equity incentives, this chapter chooses 138 A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2006 to 2009 which have implemented equity incentive plans as samples, and studies the relationship between performance and equity incentives of A-share listed companies in China by constructing a multiple regression econometric model. The ROE of listed companies adjusted by industry mean is taken as the example. As a dependent variable, ROE with a lag of 0 years, 1 year, 2 years and 3 years is comprehensively investigated in order to comprehensively analyze the time lag of the impact of equity incentives on corporate performance. The model chooses SRAT and its square SRAT2 as independent variables, and controls the choice of corporate nature, ownership concentration and equity checks and balances. This paper studies the relationship between equity incentive and corporate performance.
In the fifth chapter, the results of the empirical study are summarized as follows: (1) management equity incentives have time lag to improve corporate performance; (2) there is a "inverted U" relationship between management equity incentives and corporate performance; (3) ownership concentration, enterprise size and the proportion of supervisors in management are negatively correlated with corporate performance; (4) executive compensation and corporate performance are negatively correlated. The company's performance is positively correlated.
The main innovations of this paper are as follows: firstly, this paper comprehensively examines the time lag of equity incentive, which is different from the previous literature which only examines the ROE lagging behind 0 years and 1 year. This paper comprehensively examines the ROE situation with lag of 0 years, 1 year, 2 years and 3 years, and grasps the relationship between equity incentive and corporate performance from a longer time span, and it is empirical. The results also show that the delayed impact of equity incentives on corporate performance does exist, and it is longer than the one year generally believed, reaching 2 years or even 3 years; second, the data processing method used in this paper is better to integrate the samples of each year together, the sample is divided into 13 industries according to the industry classification standards of the SFC. The adjusted ROE reflects the unique ROE of a single enterprise, which is not affected by the factors of industry and year. It is only affected by the factors of the enterprise itself, because the A-share listed companies in China only opened after 2006. In the real sense of equity incentive, the sample size per year is small, which can be used to integrate the samples of each year to obtain better parameter estimates.
The shortcomings of this paper are as follows: Firstly, this paper examines the delayed effect of managerial equity incentives on corporate performance, but it does not further investigate what factors affect the variable of equity incentives, that is, there is no further discussion on the endogenous issues of equity incentives, the future author will try to stand in this perspective on equity incentives. Second, although this paper has adopted a reasonable way to integrate the sample data of each year, as the date of finalization of this paper, most of the annual reports of Listed Companies in 2011 have not been published, so the sample is slightly inadequate when investigating the impact of equity incentive delay, I believe that with the sample data become more and more abundant. Third, there are many factors that affect corporate performance. This paper may omit some important variables when choosing the explanatory variables. We hope that in the future research, we can choose the relevant variables more comprehensively to analyze in order to get better empirical results.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F832.51;F272.92;F224

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