【摘要】：現(xiàn)代公司的發(fā)展使得公司的所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營權(quán)出現(xiàn)了分離。股權(quán)激勵計(jì)劃是解決由此帶來的委托代理問題最有效、最重要的手段之一。 本文選取了2006年至今的宣布股權(quán)激勵計(jì)劃的全部公司樣本。首先,我們運(yùn)用全部樣本,研究股權(quán)激勵計(jì)劃宣布的短期股價(jià)效應(yīng)。這一部分主要采用的是事件研究法。然后我們使用實(shí)施了股權(quán)激勵計(jì)劃的那些公司作為樣本,研究股權(quán)激勵計(jì)劃在長期是否能提升公司業(yè)績。如果認(rèn)同市場有效(只要弱有效),股價(jià)長期來看能夠反映公司的業(yè)績,那么長期來看,實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵計(jì)劃的公司的股票是不是有超額正收益。我們用編制股權(quán)激勵組合的指數(shù)的方法來看股權(quán)激勵在長期是否能夠激勵公司的股價(jià),給股東或者投資者帶來超額收益。 研究發(fā)現(xiàn)我國在市場上,當(dāng)宣布股權(quán)激勵計(jì)劃的時候,該公司的股票是有超額正收益的,并且這種超額正收益在統(tǒng)計(jì)上是顯著的。我們還發(fā)現(xiàn)不同類別的公司的超額收益是有差別的,我們對這些差異的成因做了一定的研究和討論。 在長期的效應(yīng)中,業(yè)績效應(yīng)方面,我們發(fā)現(xiàn)實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵計(jì)劃后,公司業(yè)績往往有一個略微下調(diào)的過程,我們認(rèn)為可能是上市公司盈余管理,通過“藏業(yè)績”或者“平滑業(yè)績”以使自己在將來市場環(huán)境不好的時候也能達(dá)到行權(quán)的業(yè)績條件。經(jīng)過這個短暫的下調(diào)之后,長期來看,股權(quán)激勵計(jì)劃可能是會提高公司的業(yè)績的。由于數(shù)據(jù)不夠多,我們的研究只是弱支持這個結(jié)論。 在股價(jià)效應(yīng)方面,我們編制的股權(quán)激勵指數(shù)能夠遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)的跑贏大盤,股權(quán)激勵能夠激勵公司股價(jià)是肯定的。不過,由于一種逆向選擇現(xiàn)象的存在,即在中國是一般都是好公司才實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵計(jì)劃,而即便股權(quán)激勵在長期來看不能帶來業(yè)績的明顯提升的話,他們業(yè)績?nèi)匀皇呛芎玫?從而他們的股票有遠(yuǎn)超大盤的收益率。因此,即便股價(jià)提升,也不一定就是股權(quán)激勵的實(shí)施造成的公司業(yè)績提升造成的。 綜合來看的話,我們認(rèn)為股權(quán)激勵長期來看能夠激勵公司的業(yè)績和股價(jià)。
[Abstract]:The development of modern companies makes the separation of ownership and management rights. Equity incentive plan is one of the most effective and important means to solve the principal-agent problem. This paper selects all the company samples of the announced equity incentive plan from 2006 to present. First of all, we use all samples to study the short-term stock price effect of equity incentive plan announcement. This part mainly adopts the event research method. Then we use the companies that have implemented the equity incentive plan as a sample to study whether the equity incentive plan can improve the company's performance in the long run. If you agree that markets are efficient (as long as they are weak) and share prices reflect the company's performance in the long run, then in the long run, whether or not the stock of the company implementing the equity incentive plan has an excess positive return. We use the method of compiling the index of equity incentive portfolio to see whether equity incentive can stimulate the stock price of the company in the long run and bring excess return to shareholders or investors. It is found that in our country, when the equity incentive plan is announced, the stock of the company has excess positive returns, and this excess positive return is statistically significant. We also find that there are differences in the excess returns of different types of companies, and we have done some research and discussion on the causes of these differences. In the long-term effect, the performance effect, we found that after the implementation of equity incentive plan, the performance of the company often has a slightly downward process, we think it may be listed company earnings management, Through the "hide performance" or "smooth performance" so that in the future when the market environment is not good, can also achieve the performance conditions of the exercise of power. After this brief downgrade, in the long run, equity incentives may improve the company's performance. Due to insufficient data, our study only weakly supports this conclusion. In terms of stock price effect, the stock incentive index we compiled can far outperform the market, and the equity incentive can stimulate the stock price of the company for sure. However, because of the existence of adverse selection, which is generally good companies in China to implement equity incentive plan, and even if equity incentive can not bring about a significant improvement in performance in the long run, their performance is still very good. As a result, their stocks yield far more than the market. Therefore, even if the stock price rise, it is not necessarily caused by the implementation of equity incentives to improve corporate performance. On the whole, we believe that equity incentive can stimulate the company's performance and stock price in the long run.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F832.51;F276.6

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