【摘要】：我國(guó)上市公司股權(quán)集中度較高,公司經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng)與大股東存在緊密聯(lián)系。內(nèi)部人一旦擁有對(duì)企業(yè)的控制權(quán),則有動(dòng)力在維持控制權(quán)的前提下,利用私有信息買賣公司股票,從而獲得超額收益。2006年至2012年間,在全部對(duì)解禁股實(shí)施減持的主體中,個(gè)人內(nèi)部人的減持規(guī)模逐年上升,交易頻率與次數(shù)均超過公司機(jī)構(gòu)類股東,成為減持解禁股的重要主體；并且,與超過半數(shù)的公司機(jī)構(gòu)類股東選擇在大宗交易平臺(tái)減持不同,絕大部分個(gè)人內(nèi)部人在二級(jí)市場(chǎng)直接減持。對(duì)于大宗交易平臺(tái)上的交易,市場(chǎng)已準(zhǔn)確推斷其折價(jià)拋售的信息含量,并反映在隨后顯著下降的超額收益中；而對(duì)于二級(jí)市場(chǎng)減持的交易,其動(dòng)機(jī)形成更為復(fù)雜�；谏鲜霈F(xiàn)象與特征,本文將個(gè)人內(nèi)部人對(duì)解禁股的減持行為作為研究主體,檢驗(yàn)了個(gè)人內(nèi)部人減持行為的信息含量、減持的影響因素、控制權(quán)持有程度對(duì)其減持的影響、減持的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果,并得出以下主要結(jié)論： 首先,個(gè)人內(nèi)部人的減持行為具有信息含量：其在減持當(dāng)日獲得顯著正超額收益,而減持后超額收益顯著下降,表明個(gè)人內(nèi)部人掌握了市場(chǎng)未知的關(guān)于公司的內(nèi)部信息；其在法規(guī)限制下的減持規(guī)模、心急程度以及身份確實(shí)預(yù)測(cè)了公司未來股價(jià)以及盈利情況。 其次,市場(chǎng)因素以及公司基本面情況均對(duì)個(gè)人內(nèi)部人的減持規(guī)模、心急程度產(chǎn)生影響。但控制權(quán)持有程度較大的個(gè)人減持比例更小、減持心急程度更高、獲得超額收益更小�？梢娬莆湛刂茩�(quán)的個(gè)人內(nèi)部人有動(dòng)機(jī)通過減持來獲得超額收益,但通常不會(huì)放棄控制權(quán),減持可能出于平衡資產(chǎn)以及流動(dòng)性方面的考慮。內(nèi)部人的多重身份的確提高了其從減持中獲得的超額收益。 第三,個(gè)人內(nèi)部人的減持行為產(chǎn)生以下經(jīng)濟(jì)后果：市場(chǎng)層面,個(gè)人內(nèi)部人的減持對(duì)公司未來股票收益產(chǎn)生負(fù)面影響：個(gè)人內(nèi)部人減持的心急程度越高、減持規(guī)模越大,公司日后股價(jià)走勢(shì)以及盈利表現(xiàn)越差。個(gè)人層面,減持受內(nèi)部人日后離職決策影響：控制權(quán)持有程度越高的個(gè)人在減持后離職越晚,減持規(guī)模越大的個(gè)人離職越早,說明個(gè)人內(nèi)部人通過減持解禁股放棄了一定的控制權(quán),以避免離職后失去私有信息而帶來的持股風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。 總結(jié)來說,個(gè)人內(nèi)部人的減持行為受以下兩個(gè)因素影響：控制權(quán)與私有信息,個(gè)人內(nèi)部人減持往往是綜合上述兩類因素后的平衡：一方面公司內(nèi)部人的身份使該類交易主體更容易獲得私有信息,從而通過減持套利超額收益。另一方面,控制權(quán)持有程度不斷提高后,掌握控制權(quán)的個(gè)人內(nèi)部人雖然有動(dòng)機(jī)通過減持來獲得超額收益,但其通常不會(huì)因此放棄控制權(quán),一旦大規(guī)模減持公司股票,則可能出于其掌握的未公開的公司負(fù)面信息或日后離職套現(xiàn)考慮。
[Abstract]:China's listed companies have a high degree of ownership concentration, and their business activities are closely related to major shareholders. Once insiders have control over the company, they have the incentive to buy and sell shares of the company with private information while maintaining control. The scale of individual insider reduction has increased year by year, the frequency and frequency of trading have exceeded the corporate institutional shareholders, and become the main body of the reduction of the shares, and, unlike more than half of the corporate institutional shareholders, they have chosen to reduce their holdings on large trading platforms. The vast majority of individual insiders in the secondary market direct reduction. For trading on big trading platforms, the market has accurately extrapolated the information content of its discount sell-off, which is reflected in subsequent significant declines in excess returns, while the motives for secondary market sell-offs have become more complex. Based on the above phenomena and characteristics, this paper takes the individual insider's behavior of reducing the prohibited shares as the main body of study, tests the information content of the individual's reduction behavior, the influencing factors of the reduction, and the influence of the degree of control right on the reduction of the shares. The economic consequences of the reduction and the following main conclusions: firstly, the behavior of the individual insider has information content: it gains significantly positive excess income on the day of the reduction, and the excess return decreases significantly after the reduction. It shows that individual insiders have information about the company that is unknown in the market; its size, urgency, and identity under regulatory restrictions do predict the company's future share price and earnings. Second, market factors and company fundamentals have an impact on the size and urgency of individual insiders. But individuals with greater degree of control are less likely to reduce their holdings, more anxious to reduce their holdings, and less able to earn excess returns. It can be seen that individual insiders with control have an incentive to reduce their holdings to obtain excess returns, but usually do not relinquish control, which may be driven by balancing assets and liquidity considerations. The multiple identities of insiders do increase the excess gains from underholdings. Third, the behavior of individual insiders has the following economic consequences: at the market level, the reduction of individual insiders has a negative impact on the company's future stock returns: the more anxious the individual insiders reduce their holdings, the larger the scale of the reduction. The company's stock price trend and earnings performance is worse. On the personal level, the reduction is influenced by the later decision of the insider: the higher the degree of control is, the later the individual leaves after the reduction, the larger the scale of the reduction, the earlier the individual leaves. It shows that individual insiders have given up some control by reducing their shares, in order to avoid the risk of losing private information after leaving their jobs. In conclusion, the behavior of individual insiders is affected by two factors: control and private information. Personal insider reduction is often the balance of the above two factors: on the one hand, the identity of the insiders of the company makes it easier for such trading parties to obtain private information, thereby reducing arbitrage excess returns. On the other hand, when the degree of control is increasing, the individual insider who has the control right has the motive to obtain the excess income by reducing the holding, but he usually does not give up the control right because of this, once the stock of the company is reduced on a large scale, It may be due to its knowledge of undisclosed negative information about the company or future termination considerations.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：復(fù)旦大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F275

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