股權(quán)分置改革影響控股股東持現(xiàn)偏好嗎？
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-07-13 21:51
【摘要】：現(xiàn)有關(guān)于現(xiàn)金持有水平影響因素的研究主要集中在公司特征、行業(yè)特征、宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)因素等方面,關(guān)于決策者特征因素還存在很多研究空間。尤其是在股權(quán)分置改革對(duì)主要決策者(控股股東)的行為產(chǎn)生深刻影響的情況下,這種影響是否改變了控股股東在現(xiàn)金持有行為上的特點(diǎn)?目前尚沒有學(xué)者研究這個(gè)問題,本文試圖對(duì)這一問題進(jìn)行回答。 本文從表層股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)角度,以股權(quán)分置改革事件為起因,以上市公司現(xiàn)金持有行為作為觀察媒介,研究了控股股東現(xiàn)金積累偏好在股權(quán)分置改革前后的差異,研究結(jié)論同時(shí)為股權(quán)分置改革成效的研究和代理問題在現(xiàn)金持有行為中的作用研究提供了新的實(shí)證證據(jù)支持。 本文采用實(shí)證研究方法,以第一大股東作為控股股東的代表,以第一大股東持股比例、第一大股東是否控股為第一大股東的特征變量,以股改事件的發(fā)生與否與發(fā)生時(shí)間為股權(quán)分置改革的特征變量,考察了第一大股東對(duì)現(xiàn)金持有水平的影響在股改前后的變化。研究結(jié)論表明,非國有企業(yè)控股股東的現(xiàn)金積累偏好在股改后明顯減弱,而國有企業(yè)前后沒有明顯變化。 在樣本構(gòu)建上,本文以截至2011年底完成股權(quán)分置改革的(以對(duì)價(jià)股票上市為標(biāo)識(shí))、滿足一定條件的788家上市公司為研究樣本,以2004年到2011年作為時(shí)間窗口,得到6304個(gè)觀察值,構(gòu)建了一個(gè)對(duì)特定研究對(duì)象的持續(xù)觀察實(shí)驗(yàn)。 開展實(shí)證研究的主要思路是分組對(duì)比研究,包括按照股權(quán)性質(zhì)分組(各組通過設(shè)置交叉變量來實(shí)現(xiàn)對(duì)股改前后差異的考察),按照股改批次分組,分別采用組間比較分析、多元線型回歸分析進(jìn)行研究,并設(shè)計(jì)了多角度的穩(wěn)健性檢驗(yàn)驗(yàn)證結(jié)論的可靠性。 本文結(jié)構(gòu)安排如下。 第一部分是緒論。首先介紹本文研究的理論和制度背景、提出本文所要回答的問題；繼而對(duì)已有理論基礎(chǔ)與實(shí)證研究成果進(jìn)行回顧；最后在此基礎(chǔ)上提出本文的研究思路及創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)。 第二部分是理論分析和假設(shè)推導(dǎo)。該部分首先對(duì)相關(guān)理論進(jìn)行分析,隨后按照股權(quán)性質(zhì)、股改批次分組分別進(jìn)行了本文主要觀點(diǎn)的推導(dǎo),由此得到本文的五個(gè)假設(shè)。 第三部分是實(shí)證研究設(shè)計(jì)過程,包括模型雛形構(gòu)建、模型中各類變量的選取及定義、樣本的選取及分析所用數(shù)據(jù)來源的說明。 第四部分是實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)主體部分。首先按照股權(quán)性質(zhì)將全部觀察值分成國有樣本和非國有樣本,分別檢驗(yàn)股權(quán)分置改革對(duì)第一大股東作用的效果；再按照股改批次將全部觀察值分成7個(gè)處在不同股改階段的子樣本,構(gòu)建模型對(duì)不區(qū)分股權(quán)性質(zhì)的混合樣本進(jìn)行回歸分析,檢驗(yàn)股改前后控股股東現(xiàn)金偏好的變化。 第五部分是穩(wěn)健性檢驗(yàn)。首先改變對(duì)股改事件的計(jì)量方法,結(jié)論保持不變,證明主體部分的檢驗(yàn)方法是穩(wěn)健的；其次改變判定第一大股東是否達(dá)到控制的標(biāo)準(zhǔn),結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn),在設(shè)置不同標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的情況下,結(jié)論有差異,由此指出,我們可以說第一大股東持股比例是否達(dá)到某種程度,公司現(xiàn)金持有水平將產(chǎn)生顯著區(qū)別,但是無法絕對(duì)地說當(dāng)?shù)谝淮蠊蓶|是否達(dá)到控制,公司現(xiàn)金持有水平會(huì)顯著不同,因?yàn)閱螒{第一大股東持股比例無法嚴(yán)格推導(dǎo)出其是否控股；再次改變現(xiàn)金持有比率的計(jì)量方法,重新檢驗(yàn)全部假設(shè),結(jié)果表明上述結(jié)論是穩(wěn)健的。 第六部分是對(duì)全文的總結(jié)與反思,指出本文可以重新以大股東解禁為標(biāo)志性事件,繼續(xù)研究其對(duì)控股股東現(xiàn)金偏好的影響。同時(shí),本文雖然研究了控股股東代理問題對(duì)現(xiàn)金持有的影響,但是僅僅在表層股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)層面,并沒有涉及終極控制人。
[Abstract]:The existing research on the factors affecting the level of cash holdings is mainly focused on the characteristics of the company, the industry characteristics and the macroeconomic factors. There are still many research spaces on the characteristic factors of the decision-makers, especially if the reform of the share ownership reform has a profound influence on the main decision-makers (controlling shareholders). The characteristics of controlling shareholders in cash holding behavior have changed. At present, no scholar has studied this problem. This paper attempts to answer this question.
This paper, from the angle of the surface ownership structure, takes the split share reform event as the cause, and takes the cash holding behavior of the listed company as the observation medium, and studies the difference between the cash accumulation preference of the controlling shareholders before and after the reform of the share share, and the research conclusions are also the research on the effectiveness of the split share reform and the agency problem in the cash holding behavior. The research provides new empirical evidence support.
Taking the first big shareholder as the representative of the controlling shareholder, this paper takes the first big shareholder as the shareholding ratio, and whether the first big shareholder is the characteristic variable of the first large shareholder or not, taking the occurrence and the occurrence time of the stock reform as the characteristic variable of the split share reform, inspects the level of the first big shareholder to the cash holding level. The results show that the cash accumulation preference of the controlling shareholders of non-state-owned enterprises is obviously weakened after the stock reform, and there is no obvious change in the state-owned enterprises before and after the stock reform.
On the basis of the sample construction, this paper, by the end of 2011, completed the split share reform (which is marked by the listed stock market), and 788 listed companies that meet certain conditions as the research samples, and get 6304 observation values from 2004 to 2011 as the time window, and build a continuous observation experiment on the specific research object.
The main idea of carrying out the empirical study is group comparison research, including the grouping of stock ownership in accordance with the ownership nature (each group sets cross variables to study the difference before and after the stock reform). According to the group of stock reform batch, the intergroup comparison analysis, multiple linear regression analysis are used respectively, and the multi angle robustness test verification node is designed. The reliability of the theory.
The structure of this article is arranged as follows.
The first part is the introduction. First, it introduces the theoretical and institutional background of this study, puts forward the questions to be answered in this paper, and then reviews the existing theoretical basis and empirical research results, and finally puts forward the research ideas and innovation points on this basis.
The second part is the theoretical analysis and hypothesis derivation. This part first analyzes the relevant theories, and then according to the nature of the stock right, the main points of this paper are derived from the group of stock reform batches, thus the five hypotheses of this paper are obtained.
The third part is the design process of the empirical research, including the prototype of the model, the selection and definition of various variables in the model, the selection of samples and the explanation of the data sources used in the analysis.
The fourth part is the main part of the empirical test. First, the whole observation value is divided into state-owned and non-state-owned samples according to the nature of equity, and the effect of the split share reform on the role of the first major shareholders is examined respectively. Then the whole observation value is divided into 7 sub samples in different stages of the stock reform in accordance with the stock reform batch. The mixed sample of the right nature is used to conduct regression analysis to test the change of cash preference of controlling shareholders before and after the reform.
The fifth part is the robustness test. First, change the measurement method of the stock reform event, the conclusion remains the same, it proves that the test method of the main part is robust; secondly, it changes the standard of deciding whether the first big shareholder can reach the control, and the result is that the conclusion is different under the circumstances of setting different standards, so we can say that we can say the first. If the share ratio of large shareholders reaches a certain degree, the level of corporate cash holding will have a significant difference, but it is impossible to say that the level of cash holding will be significantly different when the first largest shareholder is controlled or not, because the holding ratio of the first largest shareholder can not be strictly deduced, and the cash holding ratio will be changed again. The method of measuring the rate and re testing all the hypotheses show that the above conclusion is robust.
The sixth part is the summary and reflection of the full text. It is pointed out that this article can continue to study the influence on the cash preference of the controlling shareholders by taking the big shareholders' ban as the landmark event again. At the same time, this paper has studied the influence of the controlling shareholder's agency problem on the cash holdings, but only on the surface ownership structure, it does not involve the ultimate control. Make people.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51;F224
本文編號(hào)：2120848
[Abstract]:The existing research on the factors affecting the level of cash holdings is mainly focused on the characteristics of the company, the industry characteristics and the macroeconomic factors. There are still many research spaces on the characteristic factors of the decision-makers, especially if the reform of the share ownership reform has a profound influence on the main decision-makers (controlling shareholders). The characteristics of controlling shareholders in cash holding behavior have changed. At present, no scholar has studied this problem. This paper attempts to answer this question.
This paper, from the angle of the surface ownership structure, takes the split share reform event as the cause, and takes the cash holding behavior of the listed company as the observation medium, and studies the difference between the cash accumulation preference of the controlling shareholders before and after the reform of the share share, and the research conclusions are also the research on the effectiveness of the split share reform and the agency problem in the cash holding behavior. The research provides new empirical evidence support.
Taking the first big shareholder as the representative of the controlling shareholder, this paper takes the first big shareholder as the shareholding ratio, and whether the first big shareholder is the characteristic variable of the first large shareholder or not, taking the occurrence and the occurrence time of the stock reform as the characteristic variable of the split share reform, inspects the level of the first big shareholder to the cash holding level. The results show that the cash accumulation preference of the controlling shareholders of non-state-owned enterprises is obviously weakened after the stock reform, and there is no obvious change in the state-owned enterprises before and after the stock reform.
On the basis of the sample construction, this paper, by the end of 2011, completed the split share reform (which is marked by the listed stock market), and 788 listed companies that meet certain conditions as the research samples, and get 6304 observation values from 2004 to 2011 as the time window, and build a continuous observation experiment on the specific research object.
The main idea of carrying out the empirical study is group comparison research, including the grouping of stock ownership in accordance with the ownership nature (each group sets cross variables to study the difference before and after the stock reform). According to the group of stock reform batch, the intergroup comparison analysis, multiple linear regression analysis are used respectively, and the multi angle robustness test verification node is designed. The reliability of the theory.
The structure of this article is arranged as follows.
The first part is the introduction. First, it introduces the theoretical and institutional background of this study, puts forward the questions to be answered in this paper, and then reviews the existing theoretical basis and empirical research results, and finally puts forward the research ideas and innovation points on this basis.
The second part is the theoretical analysis and hypothesis derivation. This part first analyzes the relevant theories, and then according to the nature of the stock right, the main points of this paper are derived from the group of stock reform batches, thus the five hypotheses of this paper are obtained.
The third part is the design process of the empirical research, including the prototype of the model, the selection and definition of various variables in the model, the selection of samples and the explanation of the data sources used in the analysis.
The fourth part is the main part of the empirical test. First, the whole observation value is divided into state-owned and non-state-owned samples according to the nature of equity, and the effect of the split share reform on the role of the first major shareholders is examined respectively. Then the whole observation value is divided into 7 sub samples in different stages of the stock reform in accordance with the stock reform batch. The mixed sample of the right nature is used to conduct regression analysis to test the change of cash preference of controlling shareholders before and after the reform.
The fifth part is the robustness test. First, change the measurement method of the stock reform event, the conclusion remains the same, it proves that the test method of the main part is robust; secondly, it changes the standard of deciding whether the first big shareholder can reach the control, and the result is that the conclusion is different under the circumstances of setting different standards, so we can say that we can say the first. If the share ratio of large shareholders reaches a certain degree, the level of corporate cash holding will have a significant difference, but it is impossible to say that the level of cash holding will be significantly different when the first largest shareholder is controlled or not, because the holding ratio of the first largest shareholder can not be strictly deduced, and the cash holding ratio will be changed again. The method of measuring the rate and re testing all the hypotheses show that the above conclusion is robust.
The sixth part is the summary and reflection of the full text. It is pointed out that this article can continue to study the influence on the cash preference of the controlling shareholders by taking the big shareholders' ban as the landmark event again. At the same time, this paper has studied the influence of the controlling shareholder's agency problem on the cash holdings, but only on the surface ownership structure, it does not involve the ultimate control. Make people.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51;F224
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