【摘要】：股權(quán)分置改革之前,證券市場中出現(xiàn)了“一股獨大”和“同股不同權(quán)”等問題,中小股東的利益經(jīng)常受到損害。2005年,我國實行了股權(quán)分置改革,截止到2007年,股改基本完成。股改后,我國中小股東的權(quán)益侵害方式發(fā)生了哪些變化,本文通過實證分析加以說明,從理論上提出了我國的監(jiān)管機構(gòu)還要注意哪些問題。 大小股東間的利益沖突已經(jīng)成為股權(quán)集中公司的核心代理問題。本文從契約理論出發(fā),引出中小股東權(quán)益受到嚴(yán)重?fù)p害這個問題。本文梳理了國內(nèi)外中小股東權(quán)益保護問題的文獻(xiàn)。國內(nèi)外關(guān)于投資者權(quán)益保護問題的研究主要從兩個方面進行：公司內(nèi)部治理機制和外部治理機制。然后運用理論分析法,分析了大股東侵害中小股東權(quán)益的原因,發(fā)現(xiàn)上市公司大股東對上市公司付出的隱性監(jiān)督服務(wù)沒有得到補償是大股東侵害中小股東的主要原因,同時從博弈論的角度分析了大股東對中小股東侵害的市場效應(yīng)。接下來,建立數(shù)學(xué)模型,運用主成分分析和回歸分析對大股東侵害中小股東權(quán)益進行了定量和定性研究,在本篇文章所研究的幾個因素中,現(xiàn)金流量占總資產(chǎn)比例對控制權(quán)的溢價水平影響最大,隨著期末現(xiàn)金流量占總資產(chǎn)比率的增大,控制權(quán)溢價水平增大。流通股自然對數(shù)和控制權(quán)溢價水平成正向變化關(guān)系。隨著企業(yè)規(guī)模的擴大,大股東獲得的控制權(quán)收益越少。股權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓比例和控制權(quán)溢價水平正相關(guān)。 最后,以上市公司的現(xiàn)金流量占總資產(chǎn)的比例為起點,從宏觀和微觀分析上市公司所處的環(huán)境分析,建議有關(guān)部門進行有效地激勵和監(jiān)督,促進證券市場蓬勃發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:Before the reform of split share structure, there appeared some problems in the stock market, such as "one big share" and "different rights of the same stock", and the interests of the minority shareholders were often damaged. In 2005, China carried out the reform of the split share structure, and by 2007, the reform of the shares was basically completed. After the reform of shares, what changes have taken place in the way of infringing the rights and interests of minority shareholders in our country, this article through the empirical analysis to explain, from the theoretical point of view, the regulatory authorities in our country should pay attention to what problems. The conflict of interest between large and small shareholders has become the core agency problem of equity concentration companies. Starting from the contract theory, this paper leads to the serious damage to the rights and interests of minority shareholders. This article combs the domestic and foreign minority shareholder rights and interests protection question literature. The research on the protection of investors' rights and interests at home and abroad is mainly carried out from two aspects: the internal governance mechanism and the external governance mechanism. Then it analyzes the reason why the large shareholder infringes the rights and interests of the minority shareholders, and finds that the main reason why the majority shareholder infringes on the minority shareholder is that the hidden supervision service paid by the majority shareholder to the listed company has not been compensated. At the same time, this paper analyzes the market effect of large shareholders on minority shareholders from the perspective of game theory. Then, the mathematical model is established, and the principal component analysis and regression analysis are used to study quantitatively and qualitatively the infringement of minority shareholders' rights and interests by large shareholders, among the several factors studied in this paper, The ratio of cash flow to total assets has the greatest influence on the premium level of control right, and with the increase of the ratio of cash flow to total assets at the end of the period, the level of control premium increases. The natural logarithm of circulating shares and the level of control premium change positively. With the expansion of the size of the enterprise, large shareholders gain less income from control. The proportion of equity transfer and the level of control premium are positively related. Finally, starting from the proportion of cash flow to total assets of listed companies, this paper analyzes the environment of listed companies from the macro and micro aspects, and suggests that relevant departments should effectively encourage and supervise the securities market to promote the vigorous development of the securities market.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：鄭州大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F272.92;F832.51;F224

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本文編號：2118782