本文選題：股票期權(quán) + 民營(yíng)上市公司��； 參考：《首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：上世紀(jì)三十年代中期，經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)與所有權(quán)慢慢分離；六十年代中后期，在信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)情況下，所有者與經(jīng)營(yíng)者的目標(biāo)出現(xiàn)了不一致；踏入八十年代，隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化，許多跨國(guó)公司開(kāi)始采用新的薪酬激勵(lì)模式（即股票期權(quán)）以挽留和激勵(lì)公司的中高層經(jīng)理人，以統(tǒng)一所有者與經(jīng)營(yíng)者的目標(biāo)；發(fā)展到九十年代，，經(jīng)理股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)制度已成為西方發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家給予職業(yè)經(jīng)理人的的主要報(bào)酬方式并被廣泛采用，諸如英國(guó)、德國(guó)等老牌強(qiáng)國(guó)也開(kāi)始使用股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)這一新興激勵(lì)制度。但是，在上世紀(jì)末的后期，美國(guó)一些跨國(guó)公司所出現(xiàn)的財(cái)務(wù)丑聞讓人們對(duì)這一制度產(chǎn)生懷疑。 上世紀(jì)末，全國(guó)一些上市企業(yè)開(kāi)始實(shí)施經(jīng)理股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)，限于宏觀因素及法律法規(guī)的不完善，在實(shí)施形式及數(shù)量上均達(dá)不到預(yù)期設(shè)想，股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)也無(wú)法發(fā)揮其應(yīng)有的作用。相反，卻帶來(lái)諸多惡性事件并影響到了根本的誠(chéng)信危機(jī)。再加上經(jīng)理股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)本身的設(shè)計(jì)方面還存在著缺陷，大多數(shù)民營(yíng)上市公司只是將作為一種形式上的激勵(lì)方案并沒(méi)有深入慣徹到實(shí)際經(jīng)營(yíng)中。然而，應(yīng)客觀看待股票期權(quán)這一激勵(lì)手段，將其比做一把“雙刃劍”，既要關(guān)注其所帶來(lái)的正面效應(yīng)，也要重視其負(fù)面效應(yīng)。2006年，我國(guó)市場(chǎng)在股權(quán)分置改革完成后迎來(lái)了轉(zhuǎn)機(jī)，相關(guān)法律法規(guī)得到了健全和完善，正是基于這個(gè)原因，本文所選擇的民營(yíng)上市公司都是公布股改后實(shí)施股票期權(quán)的企業(yè)。 本文通過(guò)對(duì)經(jīng)理股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)進(jìn)行理論探討，以我國(guó)民營(yíng)上市公司為研究客體，對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)外文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行梳理，之后對(duì)實(shí)施經(jīng)理股票期權(quán)的部分民營(yíng)上市公司進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析，針對(duì)我國(guó)民營(yíng)上市公司實(shí)施過(guò)程中遇到的一些問(wèn)題提出相關(guān)建議以修正我國(guó)民營(yíng)上市公司實(shí)施股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)方面所存在的缺陷并積極推進(jìn)其的健康發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:In the mid-thirties of the last century, the rights of management and ownership were slowly separated; in the mid-and late 1960s, when the information was asymmetrical, the objectives of the owners and the operators were inconsistent; and in the 1980s, with the globalization of the economy, Many multinationals began to adopt a new compensation incentive model (stock options) to retain and motivate the company's middle and senior managers, in order to unify the goals of owners and managers. Executive stock option incentive system has become the main way of reward to professional managers in western developed countries, and has been widely used, such as Britain, Germany and other old powerful countries also began to use stock option incentive this new incentive system. But in the late last century, financial scandals at some U.S. multinationals cast doubt on the system. At the end of last century, some listed enterprises in China began to implement executive stock option incentive, which was limited to macro factors and imperfect laws and regulations, and could not reach the expected expectation in the form and quantity of implementation. Stock option incentive can not play its due role. On the contrary, it has brought many vicious events and affected the fundamental integrity crisis. In addition, there are still some defects in the design of the executive stock option incentive itself. Most private listed companies just take it as a formal incentive scheme and do not get used to the actual operation. However, the stock option should be regarded objectively as a kind of incentive means, and it should be compared as a "double-edged sword". It is necessary to pay attention to both the positive and negative effects brought about by the stock option. In 2006, after the completion of the reform of the split share structure, the market of our country ushered in a turning point. The relevant laws and regulations have been perfected and perfected. For this reason, the private listed companies selected in this paper are the enterprises that implement the stock option after the announcement of the stock reform. This paper makes a theoretical discussion on the incentive of executive stock option, taking the private listed companies as the research object, combing the literature at home and abroad, and then carries on the empirical analysis to some private listed companies that implement the executive stock option. In view of some problems encountered in the implementation of private listed companies in China, this paper puts forward some relevant suggestions in order to correct the defects existing in the implementation of stock option incentives for private listed companies in China and actively promote their healthy development.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F272.92;F832.51;F276.6

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