本文選題：風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資聲譽(yù) + 首次公開發(fā)行　； 參考：《上海師范大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：本文以“資本市場是否需要風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的參與”這樣一個(gè)問題為切入點(diǎn)，從交易費(fèi)用理論、信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)和聲譽(yù)的作用角度結(jié)合我國中小企業(yè)板發(fā)行的公司的表現(xiàn)探討了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資在上市公司的業(yè)績中的作用，研究了聲譽(yù)對風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資“信息鑒證”職能的重要性，分析了聲譽(yù)機(jī)制對風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資產(chǎn)業(yè)的重要意義。本文運(yùn)用中國證券市場的數(shù)據(jù)資料，實(shí)證分析了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的聲譽(yù)與上市企業(yè)的業(yè)績的相互關(guān)系，并從中探討了我國風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資產(chǎn)業(yè)在對上市公司的中長期業(yè)績方面缺乏顯著影響的原因。 本文認(rèn)為，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的存在的重要性不僅僅是體現(xiàn)在加快產(chǎn)業(yè)升級和科技生產(chǎn)力轉(zhuǎn)化，更為重要的是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資為資本市場提供了重要的“信息鑒證”功能。企業(yè)對自身的情況最為了解，而作為二級市場上的投資者由于缺乏專業(yè)的知識和足夠的資源去了解企業(yè)，往往很難獲得關(guān)于企業(yè)完備的信息而進(jìn)行理性的投資。正是基于這種風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的存在，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的這種功能大大緩解了證券市場中投資者與上市企業(yè)之間的信息不對稱以及由此而導(dǎo)致逆向選擇。 從理論上來說，在一個(gè)證券市場中，如果聲譽(yù)機(jī)制能夠發(fā)揮充分的作用，則可以內(nèi)生如下關(guān)系：首先，擁有風(fēng)投背景的企業(yè)將比沒有風(fēng)投背景的企業(yè)擁有更高的初始回報(bào)和中長期回報(bào)。只有在這種情況下，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家才能在整個(gè)證券市場中起到正向的作用和聲譽(yù)機(jī)制才能發(fā)揮作用。其次，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家聲譽(yù)等級與上市企業(yè)質(zhì)量正相關(guān)，即高聲譽(yù)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家所投的企業(yè)表現(xiàn)要優(yōu)于中等聲譽(yù)的企業(yè)的表現(xiàn)。這是因?yàn)椋诼曌u(yù)機(jī)制有效的情況下，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家的聲譽(yù)代表了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家的能力，優(yōu)秀的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家往往能證明其對企業(yè)的未來發(fā)展的預(yù)測的正確性，，能更好的監(jiān)督和促進(jìn)企業(yè)的良性發(fā)展。因此風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家的聲譽(yù)與發(fā)行企業(yè)的質(zhì)量應(yīng)該正相關(guān)，也只有存在這種關(guān)系時(shí)，才能降低企業(yè)和投資者之間的信息不對稱的程度。 基于以上的觀點(diǎn)，本文對我國風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的聲譽(yù)進(jìn)行了實(shí)證分析，分析的結(jié)果表明有無風(fēng)投的上市企業(yè)在初始回報(bào)方面有顯著的差別，但在長期業(yè)績方面卻沒有表現(xiàn)出不同，而高聲譽(yù)的風(fēng)投所支持的企業(yè)相對于低聲譽(yù)的風(fēng)投支持的企業(yè)，在初始回報(bào)方面并沒有顯著差別，但在中長期業(yè)績方面擁有更優(yōu)的表現(xiàn)。 那么，導(dǎo)致我國風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資中聲譽(yù)機(jī)制弱化的原因是什么呢？本文認(rèn)為原因是多方面的，有市場結(jié)構(gòu)上的調(diào)整問題，監(jiān)管方面證券發(fā)行制度缺乏市場化，政府引導(dǎo)基金的過多參與，監(jiān)管當(dāng)局監(jiān)管不力和監(jiān)管過度并存等原因。
[Abstract]:Based on the question of whether the capital market needs the participation of venture capital investment, this paper takes the transaction cost theory as the starting point. From the perspective of information economics and reputation, this paper discusses the role of venture capital in the performance of listed companies, and studies the importance of reputation to the function of "information verification" of venture capital. The importance of reputation mechanism to venture capital industry is analyzed. This paper analyzes the relationship between the reputation of venture capital and the performance of listed enterprises by using the data of Chinese securities market. The paper also discusses the reasons why the venture capital industry has no significant influence on the medium and long term performance of listed companies. This paper holds that the existence of venture capital is not only reflected in accelerating the upgrading of industry and the transformation of scientific and technological productive forces, but also in providing an important function of "information verification" for the capital market. Enterprises know their own situation the most, and as investors in the secondary market lack of professional knowledge and sufficient resources to understand the enterprise, it is often difficult to obtain complete information about the enterprise and make rational investment. Based on the existence of this kind of risk, the function of venture capital greatly alleviates the asymmetry of information between investors and listed enterprises in the stock market, and thus leads to adverse selection. In theory, in a securities market, if the reputation mechanism can play a full role, it can be endogenous as follows: first, Companies with VC background will have higher initial and medium-term returns than those with no VC background. Only in this case, venture capitalists can play a positive role in the entire securities market and reputation mechanism can play a role. Secondly, the reputation level of venture capitalists is positively related to the quality of listed enterprises, that is, the performance of venture capitalists with high reputation is better than that of those with medium reputation. This is because, when the reputation mechanism is effective, the reputation of the venture capitalist represents the ability of the venture capitalist, and good venture capitalists are often able to prove the correctness of their predictions of the future development of the enterprise. Can better supervise and promote the healthy development of enterprises. Therefore, the reputation of venture capitalists should be positively related to the quality of issuing enterprises, and only when there is such a relationship, can the degree of information asymmetry between enterprises and investors be reduced. Based on the above views, this paper makes an empirical analysis of the reputation of venture capital in China. The results show that there are significant differences in initial returns of listed companies with or without venture capital, but there is no difference in long-term performance. There is no significant difference in initial returns between firms backed by high-reputation VCs and those supported by low-reputable VCs, but they have better performance in the medium and long term. So, what are the reasons that lead to the weakening of reputation mechanism in venture capital in our country? This paper holds that there are many reasons, such as the adjustment of market structure, the lack of marketization of securities issuance system in supervision, the excessive participation of government-guided funds, the weak supervision and excessive supervision of regulatory authorities, and so on.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：上海師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F832.51;F276.6;F224

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 段貴恒;基于投資者關(guān)系戰(zhàn)略的上市公司聲譽(yù)模式構(gòu)建[D];天津大學(xué);2007年

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