本文選題：地方政府 + 債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)�。� 參考：《復(fù)旦大學(xué)》2012年博士論文

【摘要】：20世紀(jì)80年代,拉美的債務(wù)危機(jī)以后,政府債務(wù)問題開始引起世界關(guān)注。而20世紀(jì)90年代末期東南亞金融危機(jī)爆發(fā)后,政府債務(wù)危機(jī)再次吸引了世界的目光。而本輪始于2009年11月的迪拜主權(quán)債務(wù)危機(jī)的歐洲和美國(guó)主權(quán)債務(wù)危機(jī)更是引發(fā)了世界各國(guó)的高度關(guān)注。 在中國(guó),由于地方政府利用其控制的融資平臺(tái)不規(guī)范地對(duì)外大肆舉債,最終給地方政府造成了巨額的債務(wù)規(guī)模,由于該債務(wù)規(guī)模大大超過了地方政府的財(cái)力,從而使地方政府面臨著巨大的債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。由于這種風(fēng)險(xiǎn)可能引起中國(guó)政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)與社會(huì)的災(zāi)難,所以,中國(guó)中央政府和社會(huì)各界高度關(guān)注,地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)成為中國(guó)亟待解決的重大問題。 綜上所述,政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)這個(gè)重大的經(jīng)濟(jì)社會(huì)問題已成為包括中國(guó)在內(nèi)的世界各國(guó)的關(guān)注焦點(diǎn)。對(duì)地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問題加以研究,對(duì)中國(guó)學(xué)者而言更是有著重大的現(xiàn)實(shí)意義,事實(shí)上近兩年為數(shù)眾多的專家學(xué)者對(duì)這個(gè)問題進(jìn)行了廣泛的研究,并形成了一些研究結(jié)論,然而本人認(rèn)為,這些研究結(jié)論沒有能夠循著地方政府債務(wù)這個(gè)具有涉及政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)、法律、社會(huì)、文化等社會(huì)各個(gè)系統(tǒng)特點(diǎn)的問題進(jìn)行系統(tǒng)全面的研究,因而也沒有能夠揭示地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)產(chǎn)生的根本原因,從而亟待深入。 本文基于經(jīng)濟(jì)社會(huì)學(xué)的視角,也即將地方政府債務(wù)嵌入到社會(huì)大系統(tǒng)中去,同時(shí)考慮政治制度、法律、社會(huì)、文化等社會(huì)構(gòu)成要素對(duì)它的影響,對(duì)地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問題進(jìn)行了研究。 本文的分析思路是這樣安排的：首先提出問題,通過對(duì)研究背景的介紹和分析提出了本文的論題——中國(guó)地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問題,同時(shí)通過對(duì)地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)跨領(lǐng)域、跨學(xué)科特征的分析提出了經(jīng)濟(jì)社會(huì)學(xué)的分析思路；然后正式開始問題的分析,文章采用經(jīng)濟(jì)社會(huì)學(xué)的視角分別從風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的識(shí)別、現(xiàn)狀、形成原因及演進(jìn)機(jī)制等各個(gè)層面對(duì)地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問題進(jìn)行了分析；最后分技術(shù)和制度兩個(gè)層面,也即治標(biāo)和治本兩個(gè)角度,提出了關(guān)于中國(guó)地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的治理對(duì)策。 根據(jù)這樣的分析思路,我們把全文分為七章,各章主要內(nèi)容如下： 第一章為導(dǎo)論部分,主要是提出問題,說明研究目標(biāo)、研究意義、研究方法及論文結(jié)構(gòu),同時(shí)為確定研究范圍還對(duì)有關(guān)概念進(jìn)行了界定。 第二章主要對(duì)本文選題的相關(guān)研究文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行了回顧和評(píng)述,同時(shí)對(duì)本文所需采用的經(jīng)濟(jì)社會(huì)學(xué)的相關(guān)理論進(jìn)行了分析和介紹,然后在此基礎(chǔ)上,提出了本文的地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)相關(guān)問題的經(jīng)濟(jì)社會(huì)學(xué)研究方法。 第三章主要運(yùn)用經(jīng)濟(jì)社會(huì)學(xué)的相關(guān)理論和方法對(duì)地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的識(shí)別標(biāo)準(zhǔn)問題進(jìn)行了研究。我們認(rèn)為,地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)識(shí)別的定性標(biāo)準(zhǔn)應(yīng)該是：地方政府因無力履行其未來應(yīng)當(dāng)承擔(dān)的債務(wù)償還責(zé)任和義務(wù),以至于引發(fā)對(duì)本地政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)、法律等制度變化、或者對(duì)本地經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展、社會(huì)穩(wěn)定乃至國(guó)家層面的政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)、法律等制度變化、經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展以及社會(huì)穩(wěn)定等構(gòu)成強(qiáng)大消極壓力的可能性,傳統(tǒng)的定性標(biāo)準(zhǔn)實(shí)際上屬于財(cái)政風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的范疇。考慮一個(gè)國(guó)家的政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)、法制、文化等復(fù)雜的制度性因素的影響,我們認(rèn)為簡(jiǎn)單地采用政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)判別的國(guó)際警戒線指標(biāo)是不合適的,一個(gè)全球通用的確定的數(shù)量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)并不存在。我們需要在參考債務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)的基礎(chǔ)上,綜合考察各國(guó)或各地區(qū)具體的制度環(huán)境,并根據(jù)其相應(yīng)的的制度或經(jīng)濟(jì)、社會(huì)敏感性標(biāo)準(zhǔn)對(duì)地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的存在與否進(jìn)行判斷。 第四章對(duì)地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行了分析。本部分在研究國(guó)內(nèi)各方面調(diào)查研究成果和筆者深度訪談的基礎(chǔ)上,采用國(guó)際權(quán)威的債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)矩陣工具,對(duì)我國(guó)地方政府債務(wù)總體規(guī)模進(jìn)行了估算,估算的結(jié)果是我國(guó)的地方政府債務(wù)規(guī)模至少達(dá)到158813.89億元。接著我們根據(jù)我們建立的債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)識(shí)別標(biāo)準(zhǔn),對(duì)地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行了具體分析,我們發(fā)現(xiàn)如此巨額的債務(wù)規(guī)模確實(shí)對(duì)中國(guó)地方政府構(gòu)成了巨大的風(fēng)險(xiǎn),因?yàn)樗鼘?duì)中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展、金融穩(wěn)定,社會(huì)穩(wěn)定、社會(huì)信任及政府形象確實(shí)可能產(chǎn)生危害,同時(shí)它還將可能倒逼中國(guó)相關(guān)財(cái)政經(jīng)濟(jì)制度或法律的改變,這符合在第三章中我們構(gòu)建的地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的識(shí)別標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。 第五章對(duì)地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的成因及演進(jìn)機(jī)制進(jìn)行了經(jīng)濟(jì)社會(huì)學(xué)視角的分析。分析發(fā)現(xiàn)：日益發(fā)展的市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)以及由市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)造成的以自我意識(shí)和利己思想為特征的社會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu),與中國(guó)的自建國(guó)以來沒有什么顯著變化的根本政治經(jīng)濟(jì)制度及其要求的正式的社會(huì)規(guī)則產(chǎn)生矛盾,這種矛盾同時(shí)造成大量可供政府官員尋租的體制環(huán)境(比如說政府的強(qiáng)勢(shì)地位、民間經(jīng)濟(jì)活躍且弱勢(shì)、法制建設(shè)不完善、國(guó)民弱勢(shì)等)；新的以利己意識(shí)為特征的社會(huì)意識(shí)形態(tài)作用下形成的非正式規(guī)則逐漸取代黨和政府要求的正式規(guī)則而對(duì)人們包括對(duì)地方官員的行為選擇起主導(dǎo)作用,結(jié)果導(dǎo)致中央政府對(duì)地方政府的控制力日益削弱,并且對(duì)地方政府的各種行為,包括舉債行為,面臨著日益嚴(yán)重的信息不對(duì)稱和逐漸無能為力的局面；人民缺乏對(duì)政府行為的有效監(jiān)督機(jī)制和權(quán)力。于是根本性的制度性不一致以及由這個(gè)不一致造成的中央政府作為委托人地位的削弱,加上人民缺乏對(duì)政府官員有效監(jiān)督權(quán)力,三者共同作用造成了地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的產(chǎn)生。 第五章還從制度嵌入的委托代理的角度對(duì)上述結(jié)論進(jìn)行了理論論證,同時(shí)還通過案例分析的方法對(duì)它們進(jìn)行了實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。 關(guān)于地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的演進(jìn),第五章認(rèn)為,地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的演進(jìn)是中央政府和地方政府基于各自利益相互博弈的結(jié)果。在中國(guó)的根本性制度環(huán)境沒有得到解決之前,地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)仍然會(huì)以各種不同的形式演進(jìn)、發(fā)展。但是由于政府可能采取的各種技術(shù)性對(duì)策會(huì)在一定階段對(duì)債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)起到一定的遏制或緩和作用,所以地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的演進(jìn)、發(fā)展可能會(huì)是一種波浪式的模式。 第六章在地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)產(chǎn)生原因和演進(jìn)機(jī)制分析的基礎(chǔ)上,提出了地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)治理的技術(shù)性對(duì)策和制度性對(duì)策,其中技術(shù)性對(duì)策是指即使在現(xiàn)有制度條件下也可以發(fā)生作用的對(duì)策；而制度性對(duì)策則是一種根治地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的思考。制度性對(duì)策的實(shí)施通常是一個(gè)長(zhǎng)期性的漸進(jìn)的過程。 第七章在總結(jié)了全文的主要觀點(diǎn)的同時(shí),重點(diǎn)指出了本文創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)以及存在的不足,并對(duì)有待深入的研究領(lǐng)域進(jìn)行了一個(gè)展望。
[Abstract]:After Latin America ' s debt crisis in the 1980s and Latin America , the government ' s debt crisis began to attract the attention of the world . And after the Southeast Asian financial crisis broke out in the late 1990s , the government ' s debt crisis once again attracted the world ' s attention . The crisis in Europe and the United States , which began in Dubai ' s sovereign debt crisis in November 2009 , has raised the world ' s attention .

In China , the local government has caused huge debt to the local government because the local government uses its controlled financing platform to raise its debts without regulating the external debt . As the scale of the debt greatly exceeds the financial resources of the local government , the local government faces a huge debt risk . As such risks may cause the political , economic and social disasters in China , the central government and the community of China are highly concerned , and the risk of local government debt becomes a major problem that China needs to solve urgently .

To sum up , the major economic and social problems of government debt risk have become the focus of attention of all countries , including China . In fact , the study of local government debt risk is of great practical significance . In fact , many experts and scholars have conducted extensive research on this problem in recent two years , and have formed some research conclusions . However , I believe that these conclusions are not able to reveal the root cause of local government debt risk , and thus need to be deepened .

On the basis of the angle of economic sociology , we also put the local government debt into the system of society , taking into account the influence of political system , law , society , culture and other social factors on it , and studied the problem of local government debt risk .

In this paper , the author put forward the problem , and put forward the subject of this paper by introducing and analyzing the background of the research . The paper puts forward the analysis thought of economic sociology through the analysis of the cross - disciplinary characteristics of local government debt risk .
Then formally begin the analysis of the problem , the paper uses the angle of economic sociology to analyze the risk of local government debt from the risk identification , the present situation , the formation reason and the evolution mechanism , etc .
At last , two aspects of technology and system , namely , the two aspects of governance and governance , put forward the countermeasures of governance of local government debt risk in China .

According to this analysis , we divide the whole text into seven chapters , the main contents of each chapter are as follows :

The first chapter is the introduction part , mainly raises the question , explains the research goal , the research significance , the research method and the paper structure , and also defines the relevant concepts for the purpose of determining the scope of the study .

In the second chapter , the author reviews and comments on the relevant research literature in this paper . At the same time , the relevant theories of economic sociology adopted in this paper are analyzed and introduced . Then , the economic sociology research method of local government debt risk related problems is put forward .

The third chapter mainly applies the relevant theories and methods of economic sociology to study the recognition standard of local government debt risk . We believe that the qualitative criterion of local government debt risk identification should be : the local government can not carry out the system changes such as local politics , economy , law , etc .

In chapter 4 , the present situation of local government debt risk is analyzed . Based on the study of domestic research achievements and the author ' s deep interview , this part estimates the overall scale of local government debt by using the international authoritative debt risk matrix tool . We find that such a huge debt scale does harm to China ' s local government . We find that such a huge debt scale does harm to Chinese local government , and it will also push China ' s relevant financial and economic system or law to change , which is in line with the recognition standard of the local government debt risk in chapter 3 .

The fifth chapter analyzes the causes and evolution mechanism of local government debt risk from the angle of economic sociology . It is found that the increasingly developing market economy and the social structure characterized by self - consciousness and egoism caused by market economy are inconsistent with China ' s fundamental political and economic system which has not changed significantly since the founding of the Republic of China .
The informal rules formed by the new social ideology characterized by egoism gradually replace the formal rules required by the Party and the government . The result has led to the weakening of the central government ' s control over the local government , and the various acts of the local government , including the debt - raising behavior , and the increasingly serious information asymmetry and the gradual inability to do so ;
The lack of effective supervision mechanism and power for the government ' s actions . The fundamental institutional inconsistency and the weakening of the central government as the client ' s status caused by this inconsistency , together with the lack of effective supervision of the power of the government officials , have caused the local government debt risk .

The fifth chapter also proves the above conclusion from the perspective of the principal agent embedded in the system , and also makes an empirical test on them through case analysis .

With regard to the evolution of local government debt risk , the fifth chapter believes that the evolution of the local government debt risk is the result of the mutual game between the central government and the local government . Until the fundamental institutional environment in China has not been resolved , the local government debt risk will evolve and develop in a variety of different forms . However , the development of the local government debt risk may be a wave mode because the government may take various technical countermeasures to restrain or mitigate the debt risk in a certain stage .

In the sixth chapter , on the basis of the analysis of the causes and the evolution mechanism of the local government ' s debt risk , the paper puts forward the technical countermeasures and the institutional countermeasures of the local government debt risk management , in which the technical countermeasures refer to the countermeasures which can also occur even under the existing system conditions ;
The institutional response is a reflection of local government debt risk . The implementation of institutional countermeasure is usually a long - term gradual process .

Chapter 7 summarizes the main viewpoints of the text , points out the innovation points in this paper as well as the deficiency existing in this paper , and makes a prospect in the field of research to be in - depth .
【學(xué)位授予單位】：復(fù)旦大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F812.5

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前4條

1 馬改艷;;我國(guó)地方債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)隱患、成因及化解對(duì)策[J];西部論壇;2014年02期

2 路文婷;;地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)防范與治理探討[J];合作經(jīng)濟(jì)與科技;2014年04期

3 李經(jīng)緯;唐鑫;;地方政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)演進(jìn)機(jī)制分析——一個(gè)基于網(wǎng)絡(luò)嵌入的博弈視角[J];社會(huì)科學(xué)家;2013年01期

4 李經(jīng)緯;唐鑫;;中國(guó)地方政府債券發(fā)行制度設(shè)計(jì)思考——基于國(guó)際經(jīng)驗(yàn)和新經(jīng)濟(jì)社會(huì)學(xué)視角[J];社會(huì)科學(xué)家;2014年06期

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 李陽子;Y縣地方政府性債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分析[D];蘭州商學(xué)院;2014年

，

本文編號(hào)：2018267