本文選題：風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資 + IPO抑價(jià)　； 參考：《西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：首次公開(kāi)發(fā)行股票(IPO)的抑價(jià)現(xiàn)象是IPO研究領(lǐng)域的三大熱點(diǎn)問(wèn)題。我國(guó)股票發(fā)行市場(chǎng)長(zhǎng)期存在抑價(jià)程度相對(duì)西方成熟市場(chǎng)偏高的現(xiàn)象,研究者結(jié)合中國(guó)股票發(fā)行制度的特殊性對(duì)該問(wèn)題進(jìn)行了深入的討論。創(chuàng)業(yè)板的開(kāi)板完善了我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)的結(jié)構(gòu),豐富了資本市場(chǎng)的層次,改變了過(guò)去風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資支持的高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)創(chuàng)業(yè)型中小企業(yè)通常選擇在國(guó)外上市的情況。隨著風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)在資本市場(chǎng)上的活躍,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資對(duì)IPO抑價(jià)的影響越來(lái)越受到關(guān)注。 關(guān)于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資支持對(duì)發(fā)行上市公司IPO抑價(jià)的影響,目前主要有兩種假說(shuō)：“認(rèn)證監(jiān)督假說(shuō)”認(rèn)為風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)作為第三方,有助于消除發(fā)行過(guò)程中的信息不對(duì)稱,使投資的企業(yè)抑價(jià)程度更低；“聲譽(yù)效應(yīng)假說(shuō)”認(rèn)為風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)迫于投資基金到期清算和后續(xù)融資的壓力,將推動(dòng)企業(yè)過(guò)早上市,因此IPO抑價(jià)率會(huì)更高。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)兩種情況都可能發(fā)生,取決于所考察IPO數(shù)據(jù)的制度背景和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)的發(fā)展階段。 本文以截至2012年底成功在中國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板發(fā)行上市的全部355家公司(其中有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資支持的公司有191家)為研究樣本,主要研究分析三方面的內(nèi)容：(1)基于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資聲譽(yù)的角度,分析不同聲譽(yù)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)的支持對(duì)企業(yè)IPO抑價(jià)程度的影響；(2)通過(guò)對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)聲譽(yù)影響公司發(fā)行前盈余管理的研究,以及對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)聲譽(yù)影響公司上市等待期和發(fā)行費(fèi)用的比較,探索不同聲譽(yù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)在投資企業(yè)發(fā)行上市過(guò)程中的作用；(3)基于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)從業(yè)時(shí)間、進(jìn)入投資企業(yè)時(shí)間和持股比例的角度,分析不同的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資特征對(duì)企業(yè)IPO抑價(jià)程度的影響,并分析不同聲譽(yù)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)的投資特征的差異,揭示不同聲譽(yù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)在投資企業(yè)發(fā)行上市過(guò)程中發(fā)揮不同作用的原因。 研究發(fā)現(xiàn)在創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市樣本中,高聲譽(yù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)支持的企業(yè)IPO抑價(jià)率較低,低聲譽(yù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)支持的企業(yè)IPO抑價(jià)率較高。說(shuō)明風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司IPO抑價(jià)的影響既存在符合“認(rèn)真監(jiān)督假說(shuō)”的情況,也存在符合“聲譽(yù)效應(yīng)假說(shuō)”的情況。對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資在企業(yè)上市過(guò)程中的作用的研究發(fā)現(xiàn),低聲譽(yù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)的支持與公司發(fā)行前正向盈余管理的程度正相關(guān)。進(jìn)一步對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資特征的研究發(fā)現(xiàn),風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)從業(yè)時(shí)間和進(jìn)入投資企業(yè)的時(shí)間越長(zhǎng),則所支持的企業(yè)IPO抑價(jià)率越低,同時(shí)高聲譽(yù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)從業(yè)時(shí)間和進(jìn)入投資企業(yè)的時(shí)間顯著長(zhǎng)于低聲譽(yù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu),說(shuō)明高聲譽(yù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)具有發(fā)揮認(rèn)證監(jiān)督作用的條件,“認(rèn)證監(jiān)督假說(shuō)”可以解釋其對(duì)IPO抑價(jià)的影響。而更多的低聲譽(yù)機(jī)構(gòu)對(duì)投資企業(yè)IPO抑價(jià)的影響符合“聲譽(yù)效應(yīng)假說(shuō)”的預(yù)測(cè),并且上市過(guò)程中低聲譽(yù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)主要幫助企業(yè)進(jìn)行了正向的盈余管理。特別地,我們將券商直接投資看作一類特殊聲譽(yù)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資,發(fā)現(xiàn)這類特殊聲譽(yù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資支持的企業(yè)IPO抑價(jià)偏高,這一影響與低聲譽(yù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資相同。對(duì)券商直接投資在企業(yè)發(fā)行過(guò)程中的主要作用的研究發(fā)現(xiàn),券商直接投資的企業(yè)發(fā)行過(guò)程中上市等待期較短而發(fā)行費(fèi)用較高,暗示券商直接投資可能促使企業(yè)進(jìn)行了更多的尋租行為以求成功發(fā)行。同樣,券商直接投資的從業(yè)時(shí)間和進(jìn)入投資企業(yè)的時(shí)間相對(duì)高聲譽(yù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資都較短。 由此,我們得出結(jié)論：高聲譽(yù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資從業(yè)時(shí)間長(zhǎng),擁有豐富的投資經(jīng)驗(yàn),傾向于在創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)發(fā)展的早期進(jìn)入,通過(guò)戰(zhàn)略決策、公司治理、資本結(jié)構(gòu)和人力資源安排等專業(yè)化管理幫助企業(yè)提升價(jià)值,在發(fā)行上市過(guò)程中起到認(rèn)證監(jiān)督的作用,減弱了信息不對(duì)稱的影響,因而企業(yè)IPO抑價(jià)率較低；而低聲譽(yù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資和券商直接投資從業(yè)時(shí)間較短,尚未積累起豐富的投資經(jīng)驗(yàn),在為企業(yè)提供專業(yè)化管理方面較弱,因此這兩類風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資傾向與在企業(yè)即將成熟的階段進(jìn)入企業(yè),為企業(yè)提供資金的同時(shí)主要起到幫助企業(yè)成功上市的作用。其中低聲譽(yù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資對(duì)企業(yè)上市前進(jìn)行盈余管理提供了支持,于是企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)信息質(zhì)量降低,信息不對(duì)稱程度提高,而券商直接投資則增加了企業(yè)在發(fā)行過(guò)程中的尋租行為,尋租的成本包括直接成本即發(fā)行費(fèi)用和間接成本即IPO抑價(jià),因此這兩類風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資支持的企業(yè)IPO抑價(jià)程度都偏高。 本文的研究發(fā)現(xiàn)不同聲譽(yù)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)在投資企業(yè)在創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市過(guò)程中所起的作用不同,原因一方面在于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資行業(yè)尚處于發(fā)展階段,相對(duì)不成熟,項(xiàng)目管理和專業(yè)化服務(wù)有待提高,另一方面在于當(dāng)前政府管制為主的IPO發(fā)行審核制度下的廣泛存在的尋租行為�；谶@些考慮,本文對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資行業(yè)的發(fā)展和IPO審核制度的完善提出了相應(yīng)的建議。 本文的主要貢獻(xiàn)在于：(1)本文選取創(chuàng)業(yè)板開(kāi)板至2012年底在創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市的全部355家公司作為研究樣本,數(shù)據(jù)為同類研究中比較完備的；(2)本文將券商直接投資機(jī)構(gòu)單獨(dú)作為一類進(jìn)行研究,并通過(guò)對(duì)企業(yè)上市過(guò)程中的尋租行為的分析,拓展了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資參與對(duì)IPO抑價(jià)影響的研究的方向；(3)本文對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資背景對(duì)上市公司IPO抑價(jià)的影響的內(nèi)在機(jī)理進(jìn)行了研究,深化了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資參與對(duì)IPO抑價(jià)影響的研究。
[Abstract]:The pricing of IPO is one of the three hot issues in IPO research field . In our country , the stock issue market has a long - standing phenomenon , which is relatively high relative to the mature market in the west . In combination with the particularity of China ' s stock issuance system , researchers have discussed the problem in depth . The opening of the GEM has improved the capital market structure , enriched the capital market , and changed the situation of the venture capital support high - risk startup type small and medium - sized enterprises . With the active investment of venture capital institutions in the capital market , the influence of venture capital on IPO underpricing is more and more attention .

As to the effect of venture capital support on IPO underpricing of listed companies , there are two main hypotheses : " Certification Supervision Hypothesis " believes that the venture capital institution is regarded as a third party , which helps to eliminate the information asymmetry in the issuance process , so that the price of the investment is lower ;
The " reputation effect hypothesis " holds that venture capital institutions are under the pressure of investment fund ' s maturity liquidation and follow - up financing , which will promote the premature listing of the enterprises , so the IPO underpricing rate will be higher . The research finds that both cases may occur , depending on the system background of IPO data and the development stage of venture capital institutions .

In the end of 2012 , all 355 companies ( including 191 companies with venture capital support ) successfully listed in China ' s GEM have been the research samples . The main research and analysis are as follows : ( 1 ) Based on the angle of venture capital reputation , the influence of the support of venture capital institutions with different reputation on IPO underpricing is analyzed .
( 2 ) To explore the role of different reputation venture capital institutions in the listing process of investment enterprises through the research on the pre - issuance earnings management of venture capital institutions and the comparison between the listing waiting period and the issuing cost of the company ' s reputation .
( 3 ) Based on the time of venture capital institution , the time of entering the investment enterprise and the proportion of shareholding , the influence of different venture capital characteristics on IPO underpricing degree is analyzed , and the difference of investment characteristics of venture capital institutions with different reputation is analyzed , and the reason why different reputation venture capital institutions play different roles in the listing process of investment enterprises is revealed .

It is found that the IPO underpricing rate of venture capital is higher than that of low reputation venture capital . The research on the role of venture capital in the IPO process of venture capital is the same as that of low reputation venture capital .

Therefore , we draw the conclusion that high reputation venture capital has long history and abundant investment experience , which tends to enter in the early stage of venture enterprise development , helps enterprises to improve the value through specialized management such as strategic decision - making , corporate governance , capital structure and human resources arrangement , and plays the role of authentication and supervision during the issuance of the listing process , weakens the influence of information asymmetry , and thus the IPO underpricing rate of the enterprise is low ;
The low - reputation venture capital has not accumulated abundant investment experience , has not accumulated abundant investment experience , and has been weak in providing specialized management for enterprises . The low - reputation venture capital has provided support for the earnings management before the enterprises are listed . The cost of seeking rent includes direct cost , issuance expense and indirect cost , namely IPO underpricing , so the IPO underpricing of both types of venture capital is high .

In this paper , it is found that venture capital institutions with different reputation play different roles in the listing process of venture capital . The reason is that venture capital industry is still in development stage , relatively immature , project management and specialized services are to be improved . On the other hand , there are extensive rent - seeking behaviors under the IPO issuance examination system based on the current government control . Based on these considerations , the paper puts forward some suggestions on the development of venture capital industry and the improvement of IPO auditing system .

The main contribution of this paper is : ( 1 ) The paper selects all 355 companies listed in GEM as the research samples at the end of 2012 , and the data is complete in the same kind of research ;
( 2 ) In this paper , the direct investment institutions of securities firms are studied separately as a kind of research , and through the analysis of the rent - seeking behavior in the listing process of the enterprises , the research direction of the participation of venture capital in IPO underpricing is expanded ;
( 3 ) The paper studies the internal mechanism of the influence of venture capital on IPO underpricing of listed companies , and further studies the impact of venture capital participation on IPO underpricing .
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F224

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