本文選題：會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性 + 董事會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)　； 參考：《安徽工業(yè)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：董事會(huì)是企業(yè)的權(quán)力執(zhí)行機(jī)關(guān)，對(duì)企業(yè)的管理層進(jìn)行監(jiān)督，在會(huì)計(jì)政策的選擇上，管理層也會(huì)受其影響。本文正是在借鑒國(guó)內(nèi)外獨(dú)立董事制度、非執(zhí)行董事制度的研究成果和有關(guān)認(rèn)定經(jīng)驗(yàn)和研究方法的基礎(chǔ)上，運(yùn)用法學(xué)、會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)、審計(jì)學(xué)、經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)等學(xué)科的相關(guān)理論，以中國(guó)上市公司為參照系，以獨(dú)立董事、非執(zhí)行董事為主要視角，對(duì)公司穩(wěn)健性進(jìn)行系統(tǒng)的研究。立足于中國(guó)的當(dāng)前發(fā)展的實(shí)際國(guó)情，結(jié)合國(guó)際發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的發(fā)展經(jīng)驗(yàn)，論證了在我國(guó)建立和完善獨(dú)立董事制度和非執(zhí)行董事的必要性和可行性。當(dāng)前，無論是理論界，還是實(shí)務(wù)界，他們都有一個(gè)共同的觀點(diǎn)，即董事會(huì)的構(gòu)成與會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性有著密切的關(guān)聯(lián)。由于內(nèi)部董事與管理人員有著密不可分的職業(yè)利益關(guān)系，在一定程度上難以實(shí)施有效的監(jiān)督。而非執(zhí)行董事則不同，他們與經(jīng)理人員沒有直接的利益沖突，，加之考慮到聲譽(yù)等方面的影響因素，從而能夠有效地對(duì)管理層實(shí)施監(jiān)督。本文選取非執(zhí)行董事比例、獨(dú)立董事比例設(shè)置董事會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)與會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性相關(guān)關(guān)系，實(shí)證研究考察董事會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)與會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性之間的關(guān)系，對(duì)董事會(huì)制度的優(yōu)化及投資者利益的保護(hù)等，提出一些合理化的政策建議。非執(zhí)行董事、獨(dú)立董事的設(shè)立，對(duì)于上市公司的日常經(jīng)營(yíng)和資金運(yùn)作都有直接的制約。 會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性是財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告中一項(xiàng)非常重要的原則，是對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)所處環(huán)境中的不確定性所作的反映。穩(wěn)健性對(duì)于會(huì)計(jì)理論和實(shí)務(wù)發(fā)展具有深遠(yuǎn)而重要的影響，貫徹實(shí)施好穩(wěn)健性原則是我國(guó)在會(huì)計(jì)改革上與國(guó)際接軌的一個(gè)非常顯著的特征。本文運(yùn)用委托代理理論、契約理論、信息不對(duì)稱理論，采用數(shù)理統(tǒng)計(jì)描述的方法，并通過實(shí)證分析的方法建立計(jì)量模型，來綜合分析、闡述和考察公司董事會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)與會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的相互關(guān)系，從而得出相應(yīng)的結(jié)論，提出相關(guān)政策建議。
[Abstract]:The board of directors is the executive authority of the enterprise. It supervises the management of the enterprise, and the management is also influenced by the choice of accounting policy. Based on the research results of independent director system and non-executive director system at home and abroad, and on the basis of relevant experience and research methods, this paper applies the relevant theories of law, accounting, auditing, economics and so on. Taking the listed companies in China as the reference frame and taking the independent director and the non-executive director as the main visual angle, this paper makes a systematic study on the corporate stability. Based on the actual situation of China's current development and the development experience of developed countries, this paper demonstrates the necessity and feasibility of establishing and perfecting the independent director system and non-executive director system in China. At present, both theorists and practitioners have a common view that the composition of the board of directors is closely related to accounting conservatism. Due to the close relationship between internal directors and managers, it is difficult to implement effective supervision to some extent. The non-executive directors, on the other hand, have no direct conflict of interest with the managers, and take into account the influence factors such as reputation, so they can supervise the management effectively. This paper selects the proportion of non-executive directors and the proportion of independent directors to set up the relationship between the structure of the board of directors and accounting conservatism, and investigates the relationship between the structure of the board of directors and the accounting conservatism. Some rational policy suggestions are put forward for the optimization of the board of directors system and the protection of investors' interests. The establishment of non-executive director and independent director directly restricts the daily operation and capital operation of listed company. Accounting conservatism is a very important principle in financial report, which reflects the uncertainty of accounting environment. Conservatism has a profound and important influence on the development of accounting theory and practice. Implementing conservatism principle is a remarkable feature of our accounting reform in line with the international standards. This paper uses the principal-agent theory, the contract theory, the information asymmetry theory, uses the mathematical statistics description method, and establishes the econometric model through the empirical analysis method, to analyze synthetically. The relationship between the structure of the board of directors and the accounting conservatism is discussed and the corresponding conclusions are drawn and the relevant policy suggestions are put forward.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：安徽工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51;F224

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本文編號(hào)：1962035