本文選題：財政分權 + 預算軟約束�。� 參考：《安徽大學》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：債務融資是很多國家政府通行的做法,可以集約化使用資金提高公共服務的效率,也是市場經(jīng)濟條件下財政職能發(fā)揮的重要手段和表現(xiàn),其本身并沒有洪水猛獸般可怕。但地方政府負債卻成為我國目前主要的財政隱患,并且威脅著我國的經(jīng)濟安全和社會穩(wěn)定,對其原因考慮需要跳出財政學和經(jīng)濟學的界限,從多重視角來分析它產(chǎn)生的深刻背景。 對于地方債的研究一直很多,大部分觀點都是認為財權與事權的不匹配是地方負債產(chǎn)生的根源,規(guī)模龐大、績效低是債務風險的主要來源。本文是從兩個疑問入手：如果財權與事權匹配,地方政府是否就不會舉債；如果債務本身在來源上就是不合理的,僅僅從規(guī)模和效益上是否就能成為評判負債優(yōu)劣的標準。為回答上述兩個問題,文章首先從財政分權的角度研究我國地方負債產(chǎn)生的時代背景,解釋為什么在《預算法》嚴禁地方政府出現(xiàn)財政赤字和舉債的規(guī)定之下卻又無法回避地方政府大規(guī)模舉債的現(xiàn)實；再此基礎上解釋為什么在現(xiàn)行分權財政管理體制環(huán)境中產(chǎn)生的地方政府負債會產(chǎn)生如此諸多問題。通過分析認為,我國地方政府負債之所以會出現(xiàn)還有一個重要的環(huán)境背景,即集權的財政管理體制和預算軟約束。再通過對問題的總結,進而得出問題背后的主要根源是憲法和法律的缺失財政分級管理下權、責的不對等,進而出現(xiàn)“集權”和“濫權”的矛盾,矛盾的集中表現(xiàn)為財政機會主義和預算軟約束；而判斷負債是否有問題的依據(jù),主要是從它的來源是否合法、合理,使用是否經(jīng)過民主程序,管理是否嚴格規(guī)范,而不能僅僅從數(shù)量規(guī)模和經(jīng)濟效益上考慮。因此在解決問題的思路上,本文立足于從問題產(chǎn)生的原因入手而不是僅僅從問題本身來考慮,從財政分權和預算管理以及地方債發(fā)行的完善方面,根本上找出化解這些問題的方法。 通過上述分析和認識,本文立足于建立法制化的財政分級管理體制,從分權的方式上探討地方債務的形成和對債務的控制和管理,通過法制化的財政分權強化預算約束和預算管理,規(guī)范政府財政行為,控制地方政府債務,并利用地方債的發(fā)行疏導地方負債的隱性流毒。
[Abstract]:Debt financing is a common practice in many countries. It can use funds intensively to improve the efficiency of public service. It is also an important means and performance of fiscal function under the market economy. However, the debt of local governments has become the main financial hidden trouble in our country at present, and it threatens the economic security and social stability of our country. Considering the reasons, we need to jump out of the boundaries of finance and economics. From the perspective of many aspects to analyze its profound background. There is a lot of research on local debt, most of the view is that the mismatch between financial power and power is the root of local debt, the scale is large, the low performance is the main source of debt risk. This article starts with two questions: if the financial power and the power match, whether the local government will not borrow; if the debt itself is unreasonable, only from the scale and efficiency can become the standard of judging the debt. In order to answer the above two questions, this paper first studies the background of the generation of local debt in China from the perspective of fiscal decentralization. Explain why the "Budget Law" forbids the local government to appear the financial deficit and the borrowing but cannot evade the reality of the local government borrowing on a large scale; On this basis, this paper explains why the local government liabilities in the current decentralized financial management system have so many problems. Through analysis, it is concluded that there is also an important environmental background for the emergence of local government debt in China, that is, centralized financial management system and soft budgetary constraints. Then through the summary of the problem, it is concluded that the main root behind the problem is the lack of power and responsibility under the financial grading management of the constitution and law, and then the contradiction between "centralization" and "abuse of power" appears. The contradictions are mainly manifested in fiscal opportunism and soft budgetary constraints, and the basis for judging whether there is a problem with the debt is mainly whether its source is legal, reasonable, whether it is used through democratic procedures, and whether its management is strictly regulated. But not only from the quantity scale and the economic benefit consideration. Therefore, in order to solve the problem, this paper starts with the causes of the problem and not only from the problem itself, from the fiscal decentralization, budget management and the perfection of local debt issuance. Find a way to solve these problems. Through the above analysis and understanding, this paper is based on the establishment of a legalized financial hierarchical management system, from a decentralized approach to discuss the formation of local debt and the control and management of debt. Through the legalization of fiscal decentralization to strengthen the budget constraints and budget management, regulate the government financial behavior, control local government debt, and use the issue of local debt to dredge the hidden poison of local debt.
【學位授予單位】：安徽大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F812.5

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