本文選題：創(chuàng)業(yè)板 + 高管離職��； 參考：《貴州財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：在經(jīng)濟(jì)快速發(fā)展的要求下,我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板于2009年10月23日正式開板成立。經(jīng)過三年多的茁壯成長,創(chuàng)業(yè)板上已有上市公司355家(截止2012年12月31日),已初具規(guī)模。創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場并不是次于主板市場的低級市場,也不是專門為一些朝向主板市場上市公司的“跳板”市場,它是和其他市場一樣有著融資功能的并行市場。改革開放三十多年來,中國經(jīng)濟(jì)突飛猛進(jìn),已躍居全球第二大經(jīng)濟(jì)體,而在中國經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展過程中,中國的民營企業(yè)做出了不可磨滅的貢獻(xiàn)。但是,民營企業(yè)有著自己的發(fā)展瓶頸,融資困難。創(chuàng)業(yè)板的成立滿足了一部分規(guī)模小但發(fā)展快的中小企業(yè)的融資需求,有力的支撐了中國經(jīng)濟(jì)的持續(xù)發(fā)展。 然而伴隨創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場高速發(fā)展的同時(shí),一系列問題也浮出了水面。其中,高管離職潮的現(xiàn)象始終是彌散在市場上的陰霾。根據(jù)深圳證券交易所公告顯示,截止2012年12月31日,創(chuàng)業(yè)板高管離職公告已達(dá)434份,而2010年一年還不到50份。高管離職潮對創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司是否有影響?究竟有多大影響?這就是本文所要研究的問題。 本文主要以實(shí)證方法來研究創(chuàng)業(yè)板高管離職對公司的影響,選取2010年至2011年作為樣本區(qū)間,運(yùn)用事件分析法,通過建立以辭職高管的創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司股票價(jià)格為基礎(chǔ)的計(jì)量經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)模型,研究不同樣本歸類下公司股價(jià)的變動(dòng)規(guī)律,得出了以下結(jié)論：1、創(chuàng)業(yè)板高管離職只對一小部分企業(yè)產(chǎn)生重大的影響,而很大一部分高管離職是公司一種正常的人員流動(dòng)現(xiàn)象,市場并沒有引起強(qiáng)烈的反應(yīng)；2、在一定條件下,一部分公司當(dāng)中,高管離職對公司股價(jià)會(huì)產(chǎn)生重要的影響。 本文加上緒論共分為五個(gè)部分。第一部分：緒論。主要說明本文的研究意義、研究思路、研究方法、現(xiàn)階段國內(nèi)外對創(chuàng)業(yè)板高管離職潮的研究現(xiàn)狀及本文的創(chuàng)新之處。第二部分：主要分析了創(chuàng)業(yè)板高管離職的相關(guān)理論。在理論分析中,首先列舉了企業(yè)高管激勵(lì)機(jī)制及相關(guān)理論,其次分析了創(chuàng)業(yè)板高管離職的動(dòng)機(jī)及其效應(yīng)。第三部分：研究方法設(shè)計(jì)。首先對本文的研究做了一個(gè)假設(shè),然后詳細(xì)介紹了本文所使用的研究方法—事件分析法,最后確立了本文最終的研究步驟。第四部分：實(shí)證過程與分析。該部分是本文的主體部分,首先根據(jù)描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析,得出了創(chuàng)業(yè)板高管離職對公司影響的初步結(jié)論,然后通過顯著性單變量T檢驗(yàn)分析進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析來驗(yàn)證結(jié)論,最后以高管離職前后公司股價(jià)的變化程度來測度創(chuàng)業(yè)板高管離職對公司的影響程度。第五部分：根據(jù)實(shí)證分析結(jié)果,得出結(jié)論并提出政策性建議,為將來制定適宜市場發(fā)展的政策提供依據(jù)。 本文采用了創(chuàng)業(yè)板高管離職最新又最全的數(shù)據(jù)來進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析,所得出的創(chuàng)業(yè)板高管離職對公司未產(chǎn)生顯著的影響而很大一部分是公司人員的正常流動(dòng)這一結(jié)論也是本文的一大亮點(diǎn)。然而,由于時(shí)間和資源的有限,本文沒有將持股高管離職作為單獨(dú)一部分研究。比起固定薪酬的高管,持股高管的活動(dòng)更能激起公司股價(jià)的波動(dòng),因此,持股高管的離職對公司的影響相對較大。如果以后關(guān)于創(chuàng)業(yè)板高管離職的研究能以持股高管離職為重點(diǎn),更加深入地揭開其對公司的影響規(guī)律,不僅對創(chuàng)業(yè)板的健康發(fā)展有所幫助,也可以為公司治理提供理論和實(shí)踐上的經(jīng)驗(yàn)。
[Abstract]:Under the demand of rapid economic development, China's GEM board was formally opened in October 23, 2009. After more than three years of vigorous growth, there have been 355 listed companies on the gem (as of December 31, 2012), and have begun to take shape. The GEM market is not a lower level market inferior to the main board market, and it is not specially directed to the main board market. The "springboard" market of the listed company is a parallel market which has the same financing function as other markets. Since the reform and opening up for more than thirty years, China's economy has leaped into the second largest economy in the world. In the course of China's economic development, Chinese private enterprises have made indelible contributions. However, private enterprises have their own own. The establishment of the gem has met the financing needs of small and fast small and medium sized enterprises, which strongly supports the sustainable development of China's economy.
However, along with the rapid growth of the gem, a series of problems have come to the surface. Among them, the phenomenon of high executive turnover has always been a haze on the market. According to the Shenzhen stock exchange bulletin, by December 31, 2012, 434 copies of gem executives have been resigned and less than 50 in 2010. Does tide have an impact on GEM companies? What are the major implications?
In this paper, we mainly study the impact of the turnover of gem executives on the company, select the sample interval from 2010 to 2011, and use the event analysis method to establish the econometric model based on the stock price of the gem company, which is based on the resignation of the executive board, and study the change law of the stock price under the same classification. The following conclusions: 1, the turnover of the gem executives only has a significant impact on a small number of enterprises, and a large part of the senior executive turnover is a normal turnover of the company, the market does not cause a strong reaction. 2, under certain conditions, the turnover of a part of the company will have an important impact on the company's stock price.
This article plus the introduction is divided into five parts. The first part is the introduction. It mainly explains the significance of the research, the research ideas, the research methods, the current research status and innovation of the turnover tide at home and abroad at home and abroad. The second part mainly analyzes the related theories of the high management turnover of the gem. In the theoretical analysis, the first part is the theoretical analysis. This paper enumerates the incentive mechanism and related theories of enterprise executives, then analyzes the motivation and effect of the turnover of gem executives. The third part: research method design. First, a hypothesis is made on the study of this paper, and then the method of event analysis used in this paper is introduced in detail, and finally the final research steps are established. The fourth part: the empirical process and analysis. This part is the main part of this paper. Firstly, according to the descriptive statistical analysis, we get the preliminary conclusions of the impact of the turnover of gem executives on the company, and then verify the conclusion through the significant single variable T test analysis to verify the conclusion, and the change degree of the stock price of the company before and after the executive turnover is the most. The fifth part: according to the results of the empirical analysis, the conclusion is drawn and the policy suggestions are put forward to provide the basis for the future policy for the development of the market.
This paper uses the latest and the most complete data to analyze the turnover of the gem executives. The conclusion is that the turnover of the gem executives has not had a significant impact on the company and a large part is the normal flow of the company personnel. However, because of the limited time and resources, this paper does not hold high stock. Management turnover is a separate part of the study. Compared to the fixed salary executives, the activity of holding executives can arouse the volatility of the company's share price. Therefore, the turnover of the shareholding executives has a relatively large impact on the company. The law of influence not only helps the healthy development of gem, but also provides theoretical and practical experience for corporate governance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：貴州財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F832.51;F272.91

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