本文選題：機(jī)構(gòu)投資者 + 持股比例��； 參考：《安徽大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：在二十年的發(fā)展歷程中,中國資本市場一直深受公司治理問題的困擾。雖然從90年代開始,我國在轉(zhuǎn)變政府職能、完善法律和監(jiān)管等方面取得了很大的進(jìn)步,但是仍然存在很多的問題,比如控股股東為獲取控制權(quán)私有收益而干涉上市公司包括資本支出決策在內(nèi)的投資決策的問題等。這些問題的存在必然會影響到上市公司的資本支出。同時,隨著我國市場經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展和資本市場改革的不斷推進(jìn),機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的發(fā)展非常迅速,已成為資本市場上的重要參與者。機(jī)構(gòu)投資者作為介于控股股東和中小股東之間的第三方力量,在規(guī)模、信息獲取、信息分析以及人員結(jié)構(gòu)等方面相對于中小股東有其獨特優(yōu)勢。這些優(yōu)勢使機(jī)構(gòu)投資者完全有能力有效的監(jiān)督控股股東為獲取控制權(quán)私有收益而對上市公司投資決策進(jìn)行干涉的行為,有利于提高上市公司的資本支出的合理性。另外,隨著持股數(shù)量增加,出于對成本和收益以及避免流動性損失的考慮,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者也有動力積極地履行監(jiān)督職能。因此,從理論上講,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者確實有能力且有動力對控股股東及公司管理層進(jìn)行監(jiān)管,提升上市公司的資本支出,但是考慮到我國資本市場上行政干預(yù)和業(yè)務(wù)聯(lián)系等情況的存在,我國機(jī)構(gòu)投資者是否能夠起到改善上市公司資本支出的作用還有待考證。 本文總共分為五個部分,第一部分為引言,主要介紹本文的研究背景、研究意義和研究方法,概括總結(jié)國內(nèi)外學(xué)者的主要研究觀點。第二部分為相關(guān)基礎(chǔ)理論和概念界定,該部分在對委托代理理論、信息不對稱理論及現(xiàn)代產(chǎn)權(quán)理論進(jìn)行闡述的基礎(chǔ)上對機(jī)構(gòu)投資者及資本支出等相關(guān)概念進(jìn)行了界定,并對機(jī)構(gòu)投資者特征及分類進(jìn)行詳細(xì)論述,然后分析了我國上市公司機(jī)構(gòu)持股及資本支出的現(xiàn)狀。第三部分首先論述了機(jī)構(gòu)持股的股份性質(zhì),其次分析了上市公司機(jī)構(gòu)持股對資本支出的影響,最后又從機(jī)構(gòu)持股對公司治理的影響機(jī)理出發(fā),詳細(xì)分析了機(jī)構(gòu)持股影響資本支出的機(jī)理。第四部分是實證分析部分,通過樣本數(shù)據(jù)的選擇和變量指標(biāo)的選取,構(gòu)建兩個方面的多元回歸模型,運(yùn)用SPSS軟件對模型進(jìn)行了相關(guān)性研究。實證研究結(jié)果表明,獨立機(jī)構(gòu)持股比例與上市公司資本支出存在顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系,而非獨立機(jī)構(gòu)持股比例與上市公司資本支出之間不存在明顯的相關(guān)性。第五部分概括了研究結(jié)論,提出政策建議,并展望了未來研究方向。 本文的創(chuàng)新及特色之處在于,在以前理論研究的基礎(chǔ)上,結(jié)合我國機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的異質(zhì)性,運(yùn)用委托代理理論、現(xiàn)代產(chǎn)權(quán)理論及信息不對稱理論等系統(tǒng)研究不同類型機(jī)構(gòu)持股對資本支出的影響。目前國內(nèi)少有的關(guān)于機(jī)構(gòu)持股對資本支出影響的研究多是從機(jī)構(gòu)投資者整體或“一方獨大”的證券投資基金出發(fā)研究其對資本支出的影響,幾乎沒有文獻(xiàn)在系統(tǒng)分析機(jī)構(gòu)投資者異質(zhì)性的基礎(chǔ)上做這方面的研究。本文在理論分析的基礎(chǔ)上通過設(shè)計相關(guān)變量,并建立關(guān)系模型對樣本公司機(jī)構(gòu)持股比例對資本支出的影響進(jìn)行實證研究,有針對性地提出了有利于優(yōu)化我國上市公司資本支出決策的政策建議。
[Abstract]:In the course of the development of twenty years, China's capital market has been plagued by the problem of corporate governance. Although since 90s, China has made great progress in transforming government functions and perfecting law and supervision, but there are still a lot of problems, such as the holding stock East is interfering with the listed companies in order to obtain the private income of control rights. The existence of these problems will inevitably affect the capital expenditure of the listed companies. At the same time, with the development of the market economy and the continuous advance of the reform of capital market, the development of institutional investors is very rapid and has become an important participant in the capital market. As the third party force between the controlling shareholders and the small and medium shareholders, it has its unique advantages over the size, information acquisition, information analysis and personnel structure. These advantages make the institutional investors fully capable of supervising the investment decision of the listed companies to obtain the control private income. The behavior of interference is beneficial to the rationality of capital expenditure of listed companies. In addition, as the number of stocks increases, institutional investors are also motivated to perform supervisory functions in terms of cost and income and avoid liquidity loss. Therefore, institutional investors are theoretically capable and motivated to control the holding. The shareholders and the management of the company are supervised to improve the capital expenditure of the listed companies. However, considering the existence of administrative intervention and business connection in the capital market of China, it is still to be tested whether the institutional investors in our country can play a role in improving the capital expenditure of the listed companies.
This article is divided into five parts. The first part is the introduction, which mainly introduces the research background, research significance and research methods, summarizes the main research views of scholars at home and abroad. The second part is the related basic theory and concept definition, and this part expounds the theory of principal-agent, the theory of information asymmetry and the modern property right theory. On the basis of this, the related concepts of institutional investors and capital expenditure are defined, and the characteristics and classification of institutional investors are discussed in detail. Then the status of institutional shareholding and capital expenditure of Listed Companies in China is analyzed. The third part first discusses the share property of institutional ownership and then analyzes the institutional shareholding of listed companies. On the basis of the influence of capital expenditure, the mechanism of institutional holding on corporate governance is finally analyzed in detail. The fourth part is the empirical analysis part. Through the selection of sample data and the selection of variable index, the multiple regression model of two aspects is constructed, and the model is carried out by using SPSS software. The results of the empirical study show that there is a significant positive correlation between the proportion of independent institutions and the capital expenditure of listed companies, and there is no obvious correlation between the proportion of the independent institutions and the capital expenditure of the listed companies. The fifth part summarizes the conclusions of the research, puts forward the policy suggestions, and looks forward to the future research parties. Direction.
The innovation and characteristic of this paper is that, on the basis of previous theoretical research, combining with the heterogeneity of institutional investors in China, the influence of different types of institutional Shareholding on capital expenditure is studied by using principal-agent theory, modern property theory and information asymmetry theory. Most of the research is about the impact on capital expenditure from the institutional investors or the "one party independent" securities investment fund. There is almost no literature on the basis of systematic analysis of institutional investors' heterogeneity. Based on the theoretical analysis, the design related variables are passed and the relationship model is established. The impact of the shareholding ratio of the Sample Firms on capital expenditure is empirically studied, and the policy suggestions are put forward to optimize the capital expenditure decision of the listed companies in China.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：安徽大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F275;F832.51;F224

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