本文選題：大股東 + 增持行為　； 參考：《哈爾濱工業(yè)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：中國股票市場在股改基本完成之后開始進入全流通時代。由于限售股份的上市流通，，公司大股東自身價值最大化的考量標準也隨著發(fā)生了變化，由此導(dǎo)致其相關(guān)行為也發(fā)生了重大改變，如證券流通市場上大股東股份增減持行為的頻率顯著增加。在大股東的增減持股份行為發(fā)生的過程中，會帶來各種問題。這些問題會影響我國當(dāng)前資本市場的穩(wěn)定發(fā)展和交易的公平性。因此，深入研究大股東增減持的行為狀況以及大股東增減持行為如何影響公司價值的機理是十分必要的。本文主要研究目是通過文獻綜述與理論解釋，總結(jié)出有關(guān)大股東增減持行為在不同股東性質(zhì)和股權(quán)集中度下的不同經(jīng)濟后果；通過實證研究，驗證了大股東增減持行為是會影響公司價值的，并且在不同情況下影響程度也是不同的。在得到實證研究的結(jié)果后，針對大股東影響公司價值的實際情況，從投資者、管理層和監(jiān)管部門等角度提出政策和建議。 本文對大股東增減持行為分別進行理論分析和實證分析。在理論分析中，闡述了大股東行為對公司價值影響的兩個效應(yīng)，從大股東行為效應(yīng)的基礎(chǔ)理論角度，再借助信號傳遞理論和行業(yè)效應(yīng)理論解釋大股東增持行為對公司價值的作用機理，借助委托代理理論和公司治理理論解釋大股東減持行為對公司價值的作用機理。在實證分析中，分別運用分組回歸法和分層回歸法。對2008年到2010年滿足條件的664個樣本進行處理的結(jié)果是：國有性質(zhì)下的大股東增持行為與公司價值無關(guān)而非國有性質(zhì)下的大股東增持行為與公司價值顯著正相關(guān)；并且在實證中還得到了不同性質(zhì)下的資產(chǎn)負債率和獨立董事比例分別與公司價值有不同結(jié)論的相關(guān)性，對這一結(jié)果進行分析，可以看出不同性質(zhì)下的增持行為對公司價值影響的不同結(jié)果。大股東減持行為與公司價值顯著正相關(guān)并且大股東的持股比例抑制這種正向影響。最后結(jié)合實證分析結(jié)論，提出政策建議，并指出研究的不足和未來的方向。
[Abstract]:The Chinese stock market began to enter the full circulation era after the stock reform was basically completed. Due to the circulation of the limited shares, the standards of the maximum value of the large shareholders' own value also changed, which led to the significant changes in their related behavior, such as the frequency of the stock increase and reduction of the stock in the stock market. There will be a significant increase. There will be a variety of problems in the process of increasing and reducing the stock holding behavior of the large shareholders. These problems will affect the stable development of the current capital market and the fairness of the transaction. Therefore, it is very necessary to study the behavior of the large shareholders to increase and reduce the stock market and how the large shareholders will affect the company's value. The main purpose of this paper is to summarize the different economic consequences of the large shareholders' holding behavior under the nature of different shareholders and the degree of ownership concentration through literature review and theoretical explanation. Through empirical research, it is proved that the behavior of large shareholders will affect the value of the company, and the degree of influence in different circumstances is also different. After getting the results of the empirical study, we put forward policies and suggestions from the perspectives of investors, management and regulatory departments in view of the actual situation of the major shareholders affecting the value of the company.
In the theoretical analysis, this paper expounds the two effects of the large shareholder's behavior on the value of the company. From the basic theory of the large shareholder's behavior effect, it explains the effect of the large shareholder's holding on the value of the company by means of the theory of signal transmission and the theory of industry effect. Mechanism, with the aid of principal-agent theory and corporate governance theory to explain the mechanism of the action of the large shareholders' reduction to the value of the company. In the empirical analysis, the group regression method and the stratified regression method are used respectively. The results of the 664 samples to meet the conditions from 2008 to 2010 are: the increase of the large shareholders under the state owned property and the company There is a significant positive correlation between the increasing holding behavior of large shareholders and the value of the company under the nature of independent value and non state ownership, and the correlation between the ratio of assets and liabilities and the proportion of independent directors to different conclusions of the company value under different properties is also obtained. There is a significant positive correlation between the large shareholder's reduction behavior and the company's value, and the proportion of the shareholders' shareholding restraining this positive effect. Finally, the paper puts forward the policy suggestions, and points out the shortage of the research and the future direction.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：哈爾濱工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F275;F832.51

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