發(fā)布時間：2018-04-26 06:12

  本文選題：上市公司 + 關聯(lián)交易　； 參考：《天津財經(jīng)大學》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：1997年瓊民源公司的董事在操縱股市使股價異常升高后卷資集體辭職,經(jīng)過長達一年的調查發(fā)現(xiàn)瓊民源公司利用與關聯(lián)方公司簽訂無效合同虛構5.4億元利潤,調查結果引起社會一片嘩然,影響極其惡劣。據(jù)統(tǒng)計,每年有90%左右的上市公司存在關聯(lián)交易行為,為了引導關聯(lián)交易公平進行,防止上市公司利用不公允的關聯(lián)交易操縱利潤、公司被內(nèi)部人控制、公司資產(chǎn)流失,保護股東的權益,1997年5月財政部頒布的《企業(yè)會計準則-關聯(lián)方關系及其交易的披露》應運而生。此后,稅務部門、證券交易所和證監(jiān)會等監(jiān)管部門都陸續(xù)出臺了對關聯(lián)方交易披露的規(guī)定,同時上市公司內(nèi)部也通過改善公司治理結構,逐漸加強了對關聯(lián)交易的監(jiān)管。 首先,論文在對關聯(lián)交易監(jiān)管的目標、體系以及現(xiàn)在我國關聯(lián)交易監(jiān)管中存在的問題進行分析的基礎上,通過對2003-2010年滬深兩市A股上市公司關聯(lián)方交易的信息披露情況、交易方向、事項分類及行業(yè)特征等進行描述性統(tǒng)計,根據(jù)其變化規(guī)律分析外部法律法規(guī)對關聯(lián)交易的監(jiān)管效果,得出90%以上的公司存在關聯(lián)交易行為、信息披露情況得到改善但是涉及交易的最關鍵的定價方法披露情況還有待改進、交易事項中擔保、資金及商品交易所占比重較大、工業(yè)行業(yè)所占比重最大的結論。然后,論文對2010年滬深兩市A股制造業(yè)公司的關聯(lián)交易規(guī)模與第一大股東持股比例、董事會、監(jiān)事會、獨立董事規(guī)模、股權制衡度等分別進行多元回歸,分析公司內(nèi)部治理機構對關聯(lián)交易的監(jiān)管效果。得出第一大股東持股比例、董事會與關聯(lián)交易的規(guī)模正相關。股權制衡度與關聯(lián)交易的規(guī)模負相關、獨立董事和監(jiān)事會不能顯著影響關聯(lián)交易的結論。最后,論文針對研究發(fā)現(xiàn)的問題提出了完善會計信息披露制度、重點監(jiān)管重大交易事項、加大違規(guī)成本、提高董事會、獨立董事和監(jiān)事會獨立性、鼓勵自愿披露關聯(lián)交易信息等建議,以期減少不公允的關聯(lián)交易發(fā)生,為相關監(jiān)管部門提供理論建議與數(shù)據(jù)支持。
[Abstract]:In 1997, the directors of Qiong Minyuan Company resigned collectively after manipulating the stock market and causing the stock price to rise unusually. After a year's investigation, it was found that Qiong Minyuan Company used an invalid contract with a related party company to fabricate 540 million yuan of profits. The results of the investigation caused a social uproar and an extremely bad impact. According to statistics, about 90% of listed companies have related party transactions every year. In order to guide the fair conduct of related party transactions and prevent listed companies from manipulating profits through unfair related party transactions, companies are controlled by insiders and their assets are lost. To protect the rights and interests of shareholders, the Accounting Standards for Enterprises-Disclosure of Relational parties and their transactions, issued by the Ministry of Finance in May 1997, emerged as the times require. Since then, the tax authorities, stock exchanges and the Securities Regulatory Commission and other regulatory authorities have issued regulations on the disclosure of related party transactions. At the same time, through improving the corporate governance structure, the listed companies have gradually strengthened the supervision of related party transactions. First of all, based on the analysis of the target, system and existing problems in the supervision of related party transactions in China, the information disclosure of related party transactions in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2010 is analyzed. According to the analysis of the regulatory effect of external laws and regulations on related party transactions, it is concluded that more than 90% of companies have related party transactions. The disclosure of information is improved but the most critical pricing method involved in the transaction is still to be improved. The conclusion is that the guarantee, capital and commodity exchanges account for a large proportion of the transactions, and the largest proportion of the industrial industry. Then, the paper carries on the multivariate regression to the related party transaction scale of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share manufacturing companies in 2010 and the proportion of the largest shareholders, the board of directors, the board of supervisors, the scale of independent directors, the degree of equity balance and so on. Analysis of the regulatory effect of internal corporate governance on related party transactions. The proportion of the largest shareholders, the board of directors and the scale of related party transactions are positively related. The degree of equity balance is negatively related to the scale of related party transactions, and independent directors and board of supervisors can not significantly affect the conclusion of related party transactions. Finally, the paper proposes to improve the accounting information disclosure system, focus on the supervision of major transactions, increase the cost of violations, improve the independence of the board of directors, independent directors and the board of supervisors, and improve the independence of the board of directors, independent directors and the board of supervisors. Suggestions such as voluntary disclosure of related party transaction information are encouraged in order to reduce the occurrence of unfair related party transactions and provide theoretical advice and data support for relevant regulatory authorities.
【學位授予單位】：天津財經(jīng)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F832.51;F224

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本文編號：1804820