本文選題：上市公司 + 關(guān)聯(lián)交易　； 參考：《天津財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：1997年瓊民源公司的董事在操縱股市使股價(jià)異常升高后卷資集體辭職,經(jīng)過長(zhǎng)達(dá)一年的調(diào)查發(fā)現(xiàn)瓊民源公司利用與關(guān)聯(lián)方公司簽訂無效合同虛構(gòu)5.4億元利潤(rùn),調(diào)查結(jié)果引起社會(huì)一片嘩然,影響極其惡劣。據(jù)統(tǒng)計(jì),每年有90%左右的上市公司存在關(guān)聯(lián)交易行為,為了引導(dǎo)關(guān)聯(lián)交易公平進(jìn)行,防止上市公司利用不公允的關(guān)聯(lián)交易操縱利潤(rùn)、公司被內(nèi)部人控制、公司資產(chǎn)流失,保護(hù)股東的權(quán)益,1997年5月財(cái)政部頒布的《企業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則-關(guān)聯(lián)方關(guān)系及其交易的披露》應(yīng)運(yùn)而生。此后,稅務(wù)部門、證券交易所和證監(jiān)會(huì)等監(jiān)管部門都陸續(xù)出臺(tái)了對(duì)關(guān)聯(lián)方交易披露的規(guī)定,同時(shí)上市公司內(nèi)部也通過改善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu),逐漸加強(qiáng)了對(duì)關(guān)聯(lián)交易的監(jiān)管。 首先,論文在對(duì)關(guān)聯(lián)交易監(jiān)管的目標(biāo)、體系以及現(xiàn)在我國(guó)關(guān)聯(lián)交易監(jiān)管中存在的問題進(jìn)行分析的基礎(chǔ)上,通過對(duì)2003-2010年滬深兩市A股上市公司關(guān)聯(lián)方交易的信息披露情況、交易方向、事項(xiàng)分類及行業(yè)特征等進(jìn)行描述性統(tǒng)計(jì),根據(jù)其變化規(guī)律分析外部法律法規(guī)對(duì)關(guān)聯(lián)交易的監(jiān)管效果,得出90%以上的公司存在關(guān)聯(lián)交易行為、信息披露情況得到改善但是涉及交易的最關(guān)鍵的定價(jià)方法披露情況還有待改進(jìn)、交易事項(xiàng)中擔(dān)保、資金及商品交易所占比重較大、工業(yè)行業(yè)所占比重最大的結(jié)論。然后,論文對(duì)2010年滬深兩市A股制造業(yè)公司的關(guān)聯(lián)交易規(guī)模與第一大股東持股比例、董事會(huì)、監(jiān)事會(huì)、獨(dú)立董事規(guī)模、股權(quán)制衡度等分別進(jìn)行多元回歸,分析公司內(nèi)部治理機(jī)構(gòu)對(duì)關(guān)聯(lián)交易的監(jiān)管效果。得出第一大股東持股比例、董事會(huì)與關(guān)聯(lián)交易的規(guī)模正相關(guān)。股權(quán)制衡度與關(guān)聯(lián)交易的規(guī)模負(fù)相關(guān)、獨(dú)立董事和監(jiān)事會(huì)不能顯著影響關(guān)聯(lián)交易的結(jié)論。最后,論文針對(duì)研究發(fā)現(xiàn)的問題提出了完善會(huì)計(jì)信息披露制度、重點(diǎn)監(jiān)管重大交易事項(xiàng)、加大違規(guī)成本、提高董事會(huì)、獨(dú)立董事和監(jiān)事會(huì)獨(dú)立性、鼓勵(lì)自愿披露關(guān)聯(lián)交易信息等建議,以期減少不公允的關(guān)聯(lián)交易發(fā)生,為相關(guān)監(jiān)管部門提供理論建議與數(shù)據(jù)支持。
[Abstract]:In 1997, the directors of Qiong Minyuan Company resigned collectively after manipulating the stock market and causing the stock price to rise unusually. After a year's investigation, it was found that Qiong Minyuan Company used an invalid contract with a related party company to fabricate 540 million yuan of profits. The results of the investigation caused a social uproar and an extremely bad impact. According to statistics, about 90% of listed companies have related party transactions every year. In order to guide the fair conduct of related party transactions and prevent listed companies from manipulating profits through unfair related party transactions, companies are controlled by insiders and their assets are lost. To protect the rights and interests of shareholders, the Accounting Standards for Enterprises-Disclosure of Relational parties and their transactions, issued by the Ministry of Finance in May 1997, emerged as the times require. Since then, the tax authorities, stock exchanges and the Securities Regulatory Commission and other regulatory authorities have issued regulations on the disclosure of related party transactions. At the same time, through improving the corporate governance structure, the listed companies have gradually strengthened the supervision of related party transactions. First of all, based on the analysis of the target, system and existing problems in the supervision of related party transactions in China, the information disclosure of related party transactions in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2010 is analyzed. According to the analysis of the regulatory effect of external laws and regulations on related party transactions, it is concluded that more than 90% of companies have related party transactions. The disclosure of information is improved but the most critical pricing method involved in the transaction is still to be improved. The conclusion is that the guarantee, capital and commodity exchanges account for a large proportion of the transactions, and the largest proportion of the industrial industry. Then, the paper carries on the multivariate regression to the related party transaction scale of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share manufacturing companies in 2010 and the proportion of the largest shareholders, the board of directors, the board of supervisors, the scale of independent directors, the degree of equity balance and so on. Analysis of the regulatory effect of internal corporate governance on related party transactions. The proportion of the largest shareholders, the board of directors and the scale of related party transactions are positively related. The degree of equity balance is negatively related to the scale of related party transactions, and independent directors and board of supervisors can not significantly affect the conclusion of related party transactions. Finally, the paper proposes to improve the accounting information disclosure system, focus on the supervision of major transactions, increase the cost of violations, improve the independence of the board of directors, independent directors and the board of supervisors, and improve the independence of the board of directors, independent directors and the board of supervisors. Suggestions such as voluntary disclosure of related party transaction information are encouraged in order to reduce the occurrence of unfair related party transactions and provide theoretical advice and data support for relevant regulatory authorities.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F224

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