發(fā)布時間：2018-04-25 04:05

  本文選題：首次公開發(fā)行限售 + 道德風(fēng)險　； 參考：《南京大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：在股權(quán)分置改革基本完成“新老劃斷”后,為了保護市場和投資者的利益,A股市場開始實施首次公開發(fā)行限售制度。其中,對發(fā)行人的主要控股股東和實際控制人所持有的股份規(guī)定了3年的限售期。該項制度旨在保持公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)和經(jīng)營管理的穩(wěn)定,防范管理團隊頻繁變動影響公司經(jīng)營管理和業(yè)務(wù)的持續(xù)性所帶來的風(fēng)險。 國外的相關(guān)研究發(fā)現(xiàn),首次公開發(fā)行限售制度通常被作為一種降低道德風(fēng)險的承諾機制,潛在的道德風(fēng)險越高的企業(yè)其原股東股份的限售期越長。不過國外的限售期限一般為12至18個月,不到A股市場控股股東股份限售期的一半。那么,中國這種由制度統(tǒng)一規(guī)范的更加嚴格的限售制度是否能更有效的解決道德風(fēng)險問題呢?公司治理的改善將有助于提升企業(yè)績效,同時內(nèi)部人為避免限售期內(nèi)的市場過度反應(yīng)可能進行正向轉(zhuǎn)移利潤的盈余管理活動。那么,首次公開發(fā)行限售制度的實施究竟是提升了企業(yè)績效還是刺激了公司的盈余管理行為?對上述問題的考察還要考慮所有權(quán)性質(zhì)的影響。 本文以A股市場2006年至2008年執(zhí)行新股發(fā)行限售制度后上市的公司為樣本,檢驗中國資本市場新股發(fā)行限售制度對公司行為以及企業(yè)績效的影響。研究結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn),首次公開發(fā)行限售制度對不同所有權(quán)性質(zhì)的公司產(chǎn)生的影響存在差異。在實施限售制度后,國有企業(yè)并未表現(xiàn)出顯著的業(yè)績變化或盈余管理行為,而非國有企業(yè)則在限售期內(nèi)的業(yè)績以及操控性應(yīng)計利潤均顯著高于限售期外的值,非國有企業(yè)的這種較高的盈利能力可能主要是盈余管理驅(qū)動的結(jié)果。本文的研究結(jié)論可以提供IPO限售制度對公司行為和業(yè)績影響的實證證據(jù),豐富了國外的相關(guān)理論,同時也為我國的新股發(fā)行政策制定提供了政策依據(jù)。 本文后續(xù)內(nèi)容安排如下：第一章為引言,闡述了研究的背景、意義以及文章的主要研究思路；第二章分別對國內(nèi)外的首次公開發(fā)行限售制度進行了介紹,并對該項制度的理論基礎(chǔ)進行了梳理；第三章為文獻回顧和假設(shè)推導(dǎo)；第四章為研究設(shè)計,包括樣本選擇、變量設(shè)計和研究方法；第五章是實證檢驗結(jié)果及分析；第六章為研究結(jié)論。
[Abstract]:In order to protect the interests of the market and investors, the A-share market began to implement the restriction system of initial public offering after the reform of split share structure basically completed the "new and old cut off" in order to protect the interests of the market and investors. Among them, the issuer's main controlling shareholder and the actual control of the shares held by the fixed period of 3 years. The purpose of this system is to maintain the stability of the corporate governance structure and management, and to prevent the risk that the frequent changes of the management team will affect the company's management and business continuity. Foreign studies have found that the initial public offering restriction system is usually used as a commitment mechanism to reduce moral hazard, and the higher the potential moral hazard is, the longer the restriction period of the original shareholders is. But foreign restrictions typically range from 12 to 18 months, less than half of those of controlling shareholders in the A-share market. So, can China's more strict restriction system, which is regulated by the unified system, solve the moral hazard problem more effectively? The improvement of corporate governance will help to improve corporate performance, while insiders may carry out positive profit transfer earnings management activities to avoid market overreaction during the restricted period. So, does the implementation of the initial public offering restriction system improve the corporate performance or stimulate the earnings management behavior of the company? The impact of the nature of ownership should also be taken into account in the examination of the above-mentioned issues. This paper takes the A share market as a sample of companies listed after implementing the IPO restriction system from 2006 to 2008 to examine the impact of the IPO restriction system on corporate behavior and firm performance in China's capital market. The results show that the initial public offering restriction system has different effects on different ownership companies. After the implementation of the restricted sale system, the state-owned enterprises did not show significant changes in performance or earnings management behavior, while the non-state-owned enterprises showed significantly higher performance and operating accrued profits during the restricted period than those outside the restricted period. The higher profitability of non-state-owned enterprises may be mainly driven by earnings management. The conclusions of this paper can provide empirical evidence of the impact of IPO restriction on corporate behavior and performance, enrich the relevant theories abroad, and provide policy basis for the formulation of new issue policy in China. The following contents are arranged as follows: the first chapter is the introduction, which describes the background, significance and main research ideas of the research; the second chapter introduces the domestic and foreign initial public offering restriction system. The third chapter is literature review and hypothesis deduction, the fourth chapter is research design, including sample selection, variable design and research methods, the fifth chapter is empirical test results and analysis; Chapter six is the conclusion of the research.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F832.51;F276.6;F224

【參考文獻】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 王華,張程睿;不對稱信息理論對“IPO折價之謎”的解析[J];財經(jīng)問題研究;2004年11期

2 陳璇;李仕明;祝小寧;;大股東性質(zhì)與企業(yè)績效——國有股減持的一個經(jīng)驗證據(jù)[J];管理學(xué)報;2006年02期

3 李善民;周木堂;余鵬翼;;最終所有權(quán)性質(zhì)、治理機制對企業(yè)績效的影響研究[J];管理科學(xué);2006年05期

4 陳小悅,徐曉東;股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、企業(yè)績效與投資者利益保護[J];經(jīng)濟研究;2001年11期

5 唐宗明,蔣位;中國上市公司大股東侵害度實證分析[J];經(jīng)濟研究;2002年04期

6 徐曉東,陳小悅;第一大股東對公司治理、企業(yè)業(yè)績的影響分析[J];經(jīng)濟研究;2003年02期

7 劉芍佳,孫霈,劉乃全;終極產(chǎn)權(quán)論、股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)及公司績效[J];經(jīng)濟研究;2003年04期

8 陳冬華,陳信元,萬華林;國有企業(yè)中的薪酬管制與在職消費[J];經(jīng)濟研究;2005年02期

9 吳聯(lián)生;王亞平;;盈余管理程度的估計模型與經(jīng)驗證據(jù):一個綜述[J];經(jīng)濟研究;2007年08期

10 薄仙慧;吳聯(lián)生;;國有控股與機構(gòu)投資者的治理效應(yīng):盈余管理視角[J];經(jīng)濟研究;2009年02期

，

本文編號：1799661