本文選題：獨(dú)立性　切入點(diǎn)：壓力敏感型機(jī)構(gòu)投資者　出處：《西安電子科技大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：在中國(guó)證監(jiān)會(huì)提出超常規(guī)發(fā)展機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的戰(zhàn)略下，近年來(lái)我國(guó)以證券投資基金為代表的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者快速發(fā)展，逐漸成為我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)的主導(dǎo)力量，而且逐步形成了機(jī)構(gòu)投資者多元化格局。機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的多元化格局意味著除證券投資基金外的機(jī)構(gòu)者持股達(dá)到了一定規(guī)模，并對(duì)資本市場(chǎng)產(chǎn)生重要影響。機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的多元化發(fā)展引起了學(xué)者對(duì)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者異質(zhì)性的關(guān)注，進(jìn)一步深化到研究獨(dú)立性不同的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者。 由于我國(guó)上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)存在很多問(wèn)題，公司內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制和外部治理機(jī)制發(fā)揮的作用有限。隨著機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的迅速發(fā)展，其在上市公司中的持股比例越來(lái)越大，為實(shí)現(xiàn)股東利益最大化，機(jī)構(gòu)投資者越來(lái)越多的參與到公司治理中。相對(duì)于個(gè)人投資者，機(jī)構(gòu)投資者具備規(guī)模、信息和人員等優(yōu)勢(shì)，所以機(jī)構(gòu)投資者能夠克服個(gè)人投資者在公司治理上的搭便車問(wèn)題，從而改善公司治理和提高公司績(jī)效。但是，不同的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在諸多方面存在著重要差異，所以機(jī)構(gòu)投資者對(duì)公司治理和公司績(jī)效會(huì)產(chǎn)生不同的影響。 本文以理論分析、定量和定性分析相結(jié)合的方式研究了機(jī)構(gòu)投資者獨(dú)立性對(duì)公司績(jī)效的影響。文章首先對(duì)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者異質(zhì)性和獨(dú)立性進(jìn)行定義，在代理理論和產(chǎn)權(quán)理論的基礎(chǔ)上分析了機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與公司治理的機(jī)制。然后陳述了我國(guó)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的發(fā)展歷程，并對(duì)其現(xiàn)狀和結(jié)構(gòu)特點(diǎn)進(jìn)行具體的解析。最后實(shí)證分析了機(jī)構(gòu)投資者整體、壓力抵制型機(jī)構(gòu)投資者和壓力敏感型機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的持股比例與公司績(jī)效的關(guān)系，并進(jìn)一步實(shí)證分析股權(quán)制衡結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者獨(dú)立性與公司績(jī)效之間關(guān)系的影響。理論與實(shí)證分析表明，壓力抵制型機(jī)構(gòu)投資者比壓力敏感型機(jī)構(gòu)投資者更能積極的參與公司治理，從而更有利于公司績(jī)效的提高。而且抵制型機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在股權(quán)制衡度低的上市公司中參與公司治理的能力受到限制。本文研究豐富了機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的文獻(xiàn)，，對(duì)于正確理解機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的作用具有現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。
[Abstract]:Under the strategy of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) to develop the institutional investors, the institutional investors, represented by the securities investment funds, have developed rapidly in recent years, and gradually become the leading force in the capital market of our country.And has gradually formed the institutional investor diversification pattern.The diversified pattern of institutional investors means that the institutional holdings of institutional investors have reached a certain scale in addition to the securities investment funds and have an important impact on the capital market.The diversified development of institutional investors has aroused scholars' attention to the heterogeneity of institutional investors, and further deepened the research of institutional investors with different independence.Due to many problems in the ownership structure of listed companies in China, the internal and external governance mechanisms play a limited role.With the rapid development of institutional investors, the proportion of their shares in listed companies is increasing. In order to maximize the interests of shareholders, institutional investors are more and more involved in corporate governance.Compared with individual investors, institutional investors have the advantages of scale, information and personnel, so institutional investors can overcome the free-rider problem of individual investors in corporate governance, thereby improving corporate governance and corporate performance.However, different institutional investors have important differences in many aspects, so institutional investors will have different effects on corporate governance and corporate performance.In this paper, the influence of institutional investor independence on corporate performance is studied by theoretical analysis, quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis.This paper first defines the heterogeneity and independence of institutional investors and analyzes the mechanism of institutional investors' participation in corporate governance on the basis of agency theory and property right theory.Then the development of institutional investors in China is described, and the current situation and structural characteristics of institutional investors are analyzed in detail.Finally, the paper empirically analyzes the relationship between corporate performance and the shareholding ratio of institutional investors, pressure-resistant institutional investors and pressure-sensitive institutional investors.And further empirical analysis of the impact of equity balance structure on the relationship between institutional investor independence and corporate performance.Theoretical and empirical analysis shows that pressure-resistant institutional investors can participate in corporate governance more actively than pressure-sensitive institutional investors, which is more conducive to the improvement of corporate performance.Moreover, the ability of boycott institutional investors to participate in corporate governance in listed companies with low equity checks and balances is restricted.This study enriches the literature of institutional investors and has practical significance for the correct understanding of the role of institutional investors.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西安電子科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51

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