本文選題：承銷商聲譽(yù)　切入點(diǎn)：創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)　出處：《大連理工大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)設(shè)立至今,使諸多處于成長(zhǎng)期的中小企業(yè)通過發(fā)行上市,解決了融資約束的難題。出于獲取發(fā)行上市資格,操縱股票發(fā)行價(jià)格等目的,企業(yè)在IPO市場(chǎng)中具有盈余管理的動(dòng)機(jī),這不僅對(duì)投資者利益造成損害,也影響著資本的有效配置。承銷商具有降低證券市場(chǎng)信息不對(duì)稱程度、抑制發(fā)行企業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)主義行為的作用,而聲譽(yù)機(jī)制是其職能作用發(fā)揮的保證。 本文以創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)為研究背景,結(jié)合該板塊成長(zhǎng)性要求,從資本市場(chǎng)角度解讀了企業(yè)進(jìn)行盈余管理的動(dòng)機(jī),以承銷商的作用為出發(fā)點(diǎn),探討了聲譽(yù)機(jī)制在發(fā)揮其“信息生產(chǎn)者”和“認(rèn)證中介”職能中的重要性,并對(duì)承銷商聲譽(yù)在抑制IPO公司的盈余管理行為中的作用進(jìn)行了理論探討和實(shí)證研究。通過對(duì)“認(rèn)證中介理論”和承銷商監(jiān)管職責(zé)的深入分析,本文從理論角度,梳理了承銷商聲譽(yù)與發(fā)行企業(yè)盈余管理程度之間的相關(guān)關(guān)系。同時(shí),以2009-2011年在創(chuàng)業(yè)板進(jìn)行IPO的283家公司為研究對(duì)象,采用修正的Jones-CFO模型計(jì)量其盈余管理程度,選取M-W法對(duì)承銷商聲譽(yù)進(jìn)行綜合計(jì)分和排名,通過獨(dú)立樣本T檢驗(yàn)、相關(guān)性分析、多元回歸分析等方法,得出以下研究結(jié)論： (1)在IPO前一年和當(dāng)年,創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司普遍存在著正向,即調(diào)增應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn)的盈余管理行為。(2)當(dāng)前我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)中,承銷商聲譽(yù)并不是影響公司在IPO前后進(jìn)行盈余管理的顯著因素。該結(jié)論從側(cè)面表明,在我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)中,承銷商無法有效發(fā)揮其“信息生產(chǎn)者”和“第三方認(rèn)證中介”的職能作用,承銷商聲譽(yù)機(jī)制在我國(guó)尚有待形成及完善。
[Abstract]:The GEM market since its establishment, many in the growth stage of the small and medium-sized enterprises through issuing and listing, to solve the problem of financing constraints. In order to obtain the listing qualification, manipulation of the stock issue price, enterprises have the motivation of earnings management in the IPO market, which not only harms the interests of investors, but also affects the efficiency of capital allocation. The underwriter can reduce the stock market. The degree of information asymmetry, inhibit the issuer's opportunism behavior, and the reputation mechanism play its role is the guarantee.
In this paper, the gem as the research background, combined with the plate growth requirements, from the capital market perspective of enterprise earnings management motivation, the underwriter's role as the starting point, discusses the importance of the reputation mechanism in the play "information producer" and "certification" process in, and on earnings management the behavior of underwriter reputation in the inhibition of IPO's role in the theoretical discussion and empirical research. Through in-depth analysis of the "authentication agency theory" and the underwriter's function of supervision, from the theoretical point of view, sort out the relationship between underwriter reputation and the issuance of enterprise earnings management level. At the same time, 283 companies IPO in the gem in 2009-2011 years as the research object, using Jones-CFO model to measure the correction of the degree of earnings management, select the M-W method on underwriter's reputation for comprehensive score and ranking, only through the T test, correlation analysis, multiple regression analysis and other methods were used to draw the following conclusions:
(1) IPO in the previous year and year, the GEM companies generally have a positive, that is to increase the earnings management behavior of accruals. (2) the current China's GEM market, underwriter reputation does not affect the company are significant factors of earnings management before and after IPO. The conclusion shows that from the side in our country, the GEM market, the function of the underwriter can not effectively play its "information producer" and "third party certification agency", the underwriter reputation mechanism in our country remains to be formed and perfected.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：大連理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51;F224

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