本文選題：資本市場　切入點：機構(gòu)投資者　出處：《河北經(jīng)貿(mào)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著生產(chǎn)力的發(fā)展、社會分工的進一步細化,所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營權(quán)發(fā)生分離。中小投資者將資金交由機構(gòu)投資者代理理財,通過組合投資、分散投資的投資方式,可以有效地規(guī)避風(fēng)險,實現(xiàn)最大化的投資回報；同時,為企業(yè)的發(fā)展提供長期、穩(wěn)定的資金支持,滿足企業(yè)的融資需求。由于機構(gòu)投資者具有資金優(yōu)勢、信息優(yōu)勢,在沒有有效的制度安排下,可能會出現(xiàn)機構(gòu)投資者濫用權(quán)利的行為。由于我國資本市場先天的制度性、結(jié)構(gòu)性缺陷,資本市場要求的公開、公平、公正的市場環(huán)境并沒有真正建立,信息傳導(dǎo)不流暢、監(jiān)管不到位、激勵與懲戒制度不足、市場主體間相互制約的功能未能得到充分發(fā)揮,導(dǎo)致機構(gòu)投資者誠信缺失現(xiàn)象嚴重。機構(gòu)投資者信用制度的構(gòu)建,能夠有效地規(guī)制和防范機構(gòu)投資者失信失范行為的發(fā)生,穩(wěn)定資本市場秩序,完善資本市場的信用環(huán)境,對促進資本市場健康發(fā)展具有重要作用。 文章分為三個部分： 第一章介紹了機構(gòu)投資者、信用制度的相關(guān)概念以及機構(gòu)投資者信用制度構(gòu)建對我國資本市場的重要意義。機構(gòu)投資者是具有資金和信息優(yōu)勢、代理中小投資者理財?shù)姆ㄈ私M織,指出目前我國典型的機構(gòu)投資者是證券投資基金。信用是市場經(jīng)濟的基石,信用的建立是市場經(jīng)濟的要求。資本市場的有序運行需要制度化的信用予以保證,信用制度是對信用以及信用活動的制度安排,是約束人們信用活動和關(guān)系的行為規(guī)則。針對我國機構(gòu)投資者典型的失信行為,進行機構(gòu)投資者信用制度的構(gòu)建,能夠有效的規(guī)制機構(gòu)投資者的失信行為,減少機構(gòu)投資者失信行為的發(fā)生,保護中小投資者的利益,為企業(yè)發(fā)展提供資金支持以及完善資本市場的信用環(huán)境,是資本市場健康發(fā)展的重要保證。 第二章分析了我國機構(gòu)投資者失信行為的現(xiàn)狀和根源。我國資本市場中機構(gòu)投資者的失信行為表現(xiàn)為：操縱股價,通過短線操作造成股價波動,從中謀取利益；“老鼠倉”行為,是指機構(gòu)投資者的從業(yè)人員對其企業(yè)的失信行為,利用內(nèi)幕信息以及委托人的資金,通過操縱股價從而謀取私利的行為,損害了廣大中小投資者的利益；介紹了羊群行為和短視行為,指出我國機構(gòu)投資者存在羊群行為,相對于個人投資者更容易造成股價波動,沒有起到引導(dǎo)中小投資者理性投資的作用。機構(gòu)投資者失信行為的原因主要在于制度的缺失,包括主體內(nèi)部約束制度不足、機構(gòu)投資者的信息披露義務(wù)不完善、對機構(gòu)投資者的監(jiān)管不足、機構(gòu)投資者的信用規(guī)定不足、對機構(gòu)投資者的法律責(zé)任規(guī)定不足、機構(gòu)投資者信用制度構(gòu)建的外部環(huán)境缺失等幾個方面。 第三章通過借鑒美國對機構(gòu)投資者的相關(guān)制度的規(guī)定,試提出我國機構(gòu)投資者信用制度構(gòu)建的設(shè)想。投資基金是我國主要的機構(gòu)投資者,因此通過借鑒美國對共同基金監(jiān)管的制度安排,結(jié)合我國基金是契約型基金的現(xiàn)狀,試提出從加強內(nèi)部約束、加強機構(gòu)投資者相關(guān)信息披露、協(xié)調(diào)監(jiān)管、加強機構(gòu)投資者信用規(guī)定以及完善外部環(huán)境等方面對機構(gòu)投資者失信行為進行規(guī)制,從而構(gòu)建我國資本市場機構(gòu)投資者的信用制度。
[Abstract]:With the development of productive forces, further refinement of the social division of labor, ownership and management separation. Small and medium-sized investor funds by institutional investors agency financial management, through portfolio investment, diversify investment, can effectively avoid the risk and maximize return on investment; at the same time, the development of enterprises to provide long-term stable funding. Support to meet the financing needs of enterprises. Due to institutional investors with capital advantage, information advantage, in the absence of effective institutional arrangements, there may be institutional investors abuse behavior. Because the system of China's capital market inherent structural defects, the requirements of the capital market open, fair, fair market environment and not really establishment of information transmission is not smooth, the regulation is not in place, lack of incentive and disciplinary system, the main body of the market function failed to restrict each other and give full play to, Leading to the phenomenon of lack of investor credit agencies seriously. Construction of institutional investors credit system, effectively preventing and regulating institutional investors dishonesty anomie behavior, the stability of capital market order, improve the capital market credit environment, to promote the healthy development of the capital market plays an important role.
The article is divided into three parts:
The first chapter introduces the significance of institutional investors, the capital market of our country construction related concepts of the credit system and credit system. Institutional investors, institutional investors are with capital and information, the medium and small investors financial legal organization, pointed out that at present our national type of institutional investors is the securities investment fund. Credit is the cornerstone of the market economy. Credit establishment is the requirement of market economy. The orderly operation of the capital market to institutional credit guarantee, credit system is the institutional arrangement of credit and credit activities, is bound by people credit activities and the rules of conduct. The dishonest behavior of institutional investors in China are typical, build institutional investors of the credit system the regulation of institutional investors can effectively reduce dishonesty, dishonest behavior of institutional investors, the protection of small investors. It is an important guarantee for the healthy development of the capital market to provide financial support for the development of enterprises and to improve the credit environment of the capital market.
The second chapter analyzes the current situation and causes of dishonest behavior of institutional investors in China. Dishonesty Behavior of institutional investors in the capital market of China: the manipulation of stock prices, short-term operation caused by the fluctuation of stock price, the benefit from it; the "rat" behavior, is dishonest behavior refers to the institutional investors of its employees of the enterprise, the use of insider information and client funds through the manipulation of stock prices to seek private interests, damage the interests of small investors; the herding behavior and short-sighted behavior, pointed out that China's institutional investors are herd behavior, relative to the individual investors are more likely to cause price fluctuations, did not play a guiding role. The medium and small investors rational investment reason dishonest behavior of institutional investors mainly lies in the lack of the system, including the internal restriction system of the main issues, institutional investors, information disclosure obligations Imperfect, institutional investors' supervision is insufficient, institutional investors' credit regulations are not enough, institutional investors' legal liability is not enough, and institutional investors' credit system's external environment is missing.
The third chapter by referring to relevant regulations of the institutional investors, try to put forward a proposal on the construction of credit system's institutional investors in China. The investment fund is the main investors in our country, therefore by referring to the American system of mutual fund supervision arrangements, combined with China's current situation is the fund contract fund, put forward from the strengthening of internal constraints, strengthen institutional investors to disclose relevant information, coordination and supervision, strengthen institutional investors and improve the external environment of credit provisions on the regulation of dishonest behavior of institutional investors, so as to construct the stock market's institutional investors in China's credit system.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：河北經(jīng)貿(mào)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F832.51;D922.28

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