本文選題：保薦制度　切入點(diǎn)：保薦人　出處：《武漢理工大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：保薦制度是旨在規(guī)范上市公司信息披露行為的制度安排,對(duì)證券市場(chǎng)的健康發(fā)展意義重大。作為破解我國中小型企業(yè)融資困境的重要手段,中小板、創(chuàng)業(yè)板等市場(chǎng)發(fā)揮的作用也日益深遠(yuǎn)。然而,在具體實(shí)踐過程中,我國的保薦制度在保薦機(jī)構(gòu)與保薦代表人權(quán)責(zé)分配等方面出現(xiàn)了一些問題,給投資者埋下了巨大隱患,也使得我國現(xiàn)行保薦制度面臨現(xiàn)實(shí)拷問。從海外實(shí)踐來看,英國、美國、香港等地區(qū)已在保薦制度安排上積累了重要經(jīng)驗(yàn),這為我國推進(jìn)保薦制度建設(shè)提供了寶貴的借鑒價(jià)值,但必須認(rèn)識(shí)到,保薦制度要從基本國情出發(fā),因地制宜地進(jìn)行合理設(shè)計(jì),只有如此才能使創(chuàng)設(shè)保薦制度的預(yù)期目的得以實(shí)現(xiàn)。本文正是以此為邏輯起點(diǎn),在回顧了我國現(xiàn)行保薦制度運(yùn)行狀況的基礎(chǔ)上,通過構(gòu)建動(dòng)態(tài)博弈模型,嘗試找出保薦制度相關(guān)問題滋生的制度根源,同時(shí)也寄望于根據(jù)博弈模型的均衡分析結(jié)果,為證券監(jiān)管部門在改革和完善保薦制度的進(jìn)程中提供一些合理的建議。 本文在第一部分著重論述了選題的背景和意義,并對(duì)國內(nèi)外相關(guān)研究文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行了系統(tǒng)梳理,并從中為本文的寫作奠定了邏輯起點(diǎn)；第二部分則在介紹了保薦制度基本內(nèi)容的基礎(chǔ)上,以制度經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)為主要依托,探究了保薦制度的制度起源,并對(duì)保薦制度的基本特征和制度價(jià)值進(jìn)行了全面論述；第三部分對(duì)我國現(xiàn)行保薦制度的運(yùn)行狀況進(jìn)行了較為系統(tǒng)的剖析,并從中挖掘出了我國保薦制度亟待解決的三個(gè)主要問題,即違規(guī)識(shí)別、違規(guī)責(zé)任劃分和違規(guī)處罰三方面的問題；第四部分是本文的比較分析部分,筆者在介紹美國、英國和香港各自采用的保薦制度后,從監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)作用、制度實(shí)施范圍和雙重制三個(gè)方面總結(jié)了我國保薦制度的主要不同點(diǎn)；第五部分是本文的創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)和重點(diǎn)所在,本部分主要運(yùn)用了博弈論的研究方法,通過構(gòu)建和分析IPO申報(bào)與審核的博弈模型,找出了影響發(fā)行申報(bào)與審核過程中的參與方?jīng)Q策的主要因素,進(jìn)而為監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)的最優(yōu)監(jiān)管策略提供了參考依據(jù);第六部分則是以博弈分析的基本結(jié)論為依據(jù),嘗試性地為我國現(xiàn)行保薦制度的進(jìn)一步完善提出了若干建議,本文認(rèn)為,只有從提高保薦人的準(zhǔn)入資格、建立督導(dǎo)期更長的信息跟蹤監(jiān)督制度、完善保薦人的責(zé)任追究機(jī)制、促成“保薦單保制”以及推行強(qiáng)制責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)制度這五個(gè)方面著手,才能深入挖掘保薦制度的制度效能；在本文的第七部分,筆者對(duì)論文的主要結(jié)論進(jìn)行了回顧,同時(shí)也歸納和總結(jié)了本文的創(chuàng)新之處以及進(jìn)一步研究的方向。
[Abstract]:The recommendation system is a system arrangement aimed at standardizing the information disclosure behavior of listed companies, which is of great significance to the healthy development of the securities market. However, in the concrete practice process, the recommendation system of our country has some problems in the distribution of the rights and responsibilities between the sponsor organization and the sponsor representative, which has laid a huge hidden danger to the investors. From overseas practice, Britain, the United States, Hong Kong and other regions have accumulated important experience in the arrangements of the sponsorship system, which has provided valuable reference value for our country to promote the construction of the sponsorship system. However, we must realize that the sponsor system should be reasonably designed according to the basic national conditions, and only in this way can the expected purpose of establishing the sponsorship system be realized. This paper takes this as the logical starting point. On the basis of reviewing the current operating conditions of the sponsor system in China, this paper attempts to find out the institutional root of the problems related to the sponsorship system by constructing a dynamic game model, and at the same time hopes to find out the results of the equilibrium analysis according to the game model. It provides some reasonable suggestions for the securities supervision department in the process of reforming and perfecting the recommendation system. In the first part of this paper, the background and significance of the topic are discussed, and the related research literature at home and abroad is systematically combed, which lays a logical starting point for the writing of this paper. In the second part, on the basis of introducing the basic contents of the recommendation system, based on the institutional economics, the author probes into the origin of the sponsorship system, and comprehensively discusses the basic characteristics and the system value of the sponsorship system. The third part has carried on the comparatively systematic analysis to our country present sponsor system movement condition, and has excavated out our country sponsor system urgently needs to be solved three main problems, namely the violation identification, The 4th part is the comparative analysis part of this paper. After introducing the recommendation system adopted by the United States, Britain and Hong Kong, the author starts with the role of the regulatory body. Three aspects of system implementation scope and dual system summarized the main differences of the sponsorship system in China. Part 5th is the innovation and focus of this paper, this part mainly uses the research methods of game theory. By constructing and analyzing the game model of IPO declaration and auditing, this paper finds out the main factors that affect the decision of the participants in the process of issuing declaration and auditing, and then provides a reference for the optimal regulatory strategy of the regulatory body. The 6th part is based on the basic conclusion of the game analysis, and puts forward some suggestions for the further improvement of the current sponsor system in our country. Only by establishing the information tracking and supervising system with a longer supervision period, perfecting the accountability mechanism of the sponsor, promoting the "recommendation order guarantee system" and carrying out the compulsory liability insurance system, can the system efficiency of the recommendation system be excavated deeply; In the 7th part of this paper, the author reviews the main conclusions of the paper, and summarizes the innovation of this paper as well as the direction of further research.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：武漢理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51

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