本文選題：控制權(quán)私人收益　切入點(diǎn)：影響因素　出處：《北京交通大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：公司所有權(quán)的集中治理結(jié)構(gòu)以及公司內(nèi)部大股東的普遍存在使得公司治理研究的焦點(diǎn)由Berle和Means(1932)所強(qiáng)調(diào)的傳統(tǒng)意義上的股東與經(jīng)理之間的委托代理問題轉(zhuǎn)向大股東與中小股東之間的代理問題,大股東利用手中的控制權(quán)采取有利于自己從而獨(dú)享不能為中小股東享受的額外利益即控制權(quán)私人收益。 本文以我國股權(quán)分置改革完成為契機(jī),利用2008-2011年度我國上市公司公開披露的數(shù)據(jù)為基礎(chǔ),對(duì)我國A股上市公司的控制權(quán)私人收益的整體概況以及控制權(quán)私人收益的影響因素進(jìn)行了實(shí)證研究,得到以下結(jié)論： (1)股權(quán)分置改革以后,控制權(quán)發(fā)生變更的股份的轉(zhuǎn)讓價(jià)格比相應(yīng)的控制權(quán)未發(fā)生變更的股份的轉(zhuǎn)讓價(jià)格高出4%,即公司控制權(quán)的私人收益依然存在。 (2)公司控股股東的控制力與控制權(quán)私人收益之間存在顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系,即公司大股東的控制力越強(qiáng),受到外部的控制權(quán)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)將越小,控制權(quán)私人收益水平將越高。 (3)公司的財(cái)務(wù)杠桿與控制權(quán)私人收益之問存在顯著的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系,即債權(quán)人的監(jiān)督和債務(wù)的約束可以抑制大股東的私利行為。 (4)公司的規(guī)模與控制權(quán)私人收益之間無顯著的相關(guān)關(guān)系,即公司規(guī)模并不是我國大股東購買控制權(quán)時(shí)主要關(guān)注的因素。 (5)公司的財(cái)務(wù)狀況與控制權(quán)私人收益之間呈顯著的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系,即大股東更傾向于購買財(cái)務(wù)狀況較差的上市公司的控制權(quán),因?yàn)槠涓冻龅某杀镜?而且獲取潛在的改善公司資產(chǎn)管理效率的收益較大,控制權(quán)私人收益水平較高。
[Abstract]:The centralized governance structure of corporate ownership and the widespread existence of large shareholders within the company make the focus of corporate governance research shift from the traditional principal-agent problem between shareholders and managers emphasized by Berle and means 1932) to the majority shareholders. Agency issues with minority shareholders, Large shareholders use the control right in their hands to take advantage of their own interests, which can not be enjoyed by small and medium shareholders, namely, private benefits of control rights. This paper takes the completion of the reform of China's split share structure as an opportunity to use the publicly disclosed data of China's listed companies in 2008-2011 as the basis. This paper makes an empirical study on the general situation of the private income of the control right and the influencing factors of the private income of the control right of the A-share listed companies in China, and draws the following conclusions:. 1) after the reform of split share structure, the transfer price of the shares whose control right has changed is 4% higher than that of the shares whose control right has not changed, that is, the private income of the control right of the company still exists. 2) there is a significant positive correlation between the controlling power of the controlling shareholder and the private income of the control right, that is, the stronger the controlling power of the majority shareholder, the smaller the external competition of the control right, and the higher the level of the private income of the control right. 3) there is a significant negative correlation between the financial leverage of the company and the private income of control, that is, the supervision of creditors and the restraint of debt can restrain the self-interest behavior of large shareholders. 4) there is no significant correlation between the size of the company and the private income of the control right, that is, the size of the company is not the main factor that the major shareholders pay attention to when buying the control right in our country. 5) there is a significant negative correlation between the financial status of the company and the private income of control, that is, the majority shareholders are more inclined to buy the control rights of the listed companies with poor financial position because of their low cost. Moreover, the potential gains of improving the efficiency of asset management are higher, and the level of private income of control is higher.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F276.6;F832.51;F224

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