發(fā)布時間：2018-03-13 12:18

  本文選題：內(nèi)部控制　切入點：內(nèi)部控制信息披露　出處：《江蘇科技大學》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：近年來一系列因內(nèi)部控制信息披露不完善曝光的財務丑聞層出不窮，這不僅大大挫傷了市場的信心，也不斷的提醒人們加強內(nèi)部控制規(guī)范的重要性。財政部會同證監(jiān)會、審計署、銀監(jiān)會、保監(jiān)會于2008年6月制定頒發(fā)的《企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制基本規(guī)范》以及2010年4月發(fā)布的《企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制配套指引》要求上市公司年底隨年報一同披露內(nèi)部控制自我評價報告和會計師事務所出具的鑒證報告。內(nèi)部控制信息披露是否可以降低代理成本？本文以此為背景，考察了內(nèi)部控制信息披露質量和代理成本間的關系。在研究和評述了國內(nèi)外相關文獻的基礎上，本文沿著相關研究路徑做了更進一步演進拓展。首先，運用有效市場假說理論、契約理論以及信號傳遞理論對企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制信息披露做理論分析，基于信號傳遞理論并運用層次分析法構建了用于測度內(nèi)部控制信息披露質量的內(nèi)部控制信息披露質量系數(shù)，運用內(nèi)部控制信息披露質量系數(shù)作為解釋變量進行了實證研究；其次，本文區(qū)分了代理成本中的股權代理成本、債權代理成本以及大股東與中小股東之間代理成本。最后，本文基于2009年深市A股數(shù)據(jù)考察了內(nèi)部控制信息披露質量系數(shù)和代理成本間的關系。結果發(fā)現(xiàn)，我國上市公司內(nèi)部控制信息披露質量水平不太高，，差別較大。研究結果還顯示，股權代理成本與內(nèi)部控制信息披露質量存在負相關關系；內(nèi)部控制信息披露質量越高，大股東與中小股東之間的代理成本就會越低；債權代理成本與內(nèi)部控制信息披露質量也同樣存在負相關關系。
[Abstract]:In recent years, a series of financial scandals, which have been exposed because of incomplete disclosure of internal control information, have emerged in an endless stream, which has not only dampened the confidence of the market, but also constantly reminded people of the importance of strengthening internal control norms. The Ministry of Finance, together with the Securities Regulatory Commission, The Audit Office, the Banking Regulatory Commission, The basic Standards for Internal Control of Enterprises issued by the Insurance Regulatory Commission on June 2008 and the supporting guidelines on Internal Control of Enterprises issued on April 2010 require listed companies to disclose the internal control self-evaluation report together with the annual report at the end of the year. Certification report issued by the accounting firm. Can disclosure of internal control information reduce agency costs? Based on this background, this paper examines the relationship between the quality of internal control information disclosure and agency cost. Based on the research and review of domestic and foreign related literature, this paper further evolves along the relevant research path. First of all, The theory of efficient market hypothesis, contract theory and signal transmission theory are used to analyze the disclosure of internal control information. Based on the signal transfer theory and AHP, the internal control information disclosure quality coefficient is constructed to measure the quality of internal control information disclosure, and the internal control information disclosure quality coefficient is used as the explanatory variable for empirical research. Secondly, this paper distinguishes the cost of equity agency, the cost of debt agency and the cost of agency between the majority shareholder and the minority shareholder in the agency cost. This paper investigates the relationship between the quality coefficient of internal control information disclosure and agency cost based on the A share data of Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2009. The results show that the quality level of internal control information disclosure of listed companies in China is not very high, and the difference is great. The higher the disclosure quality of internal control information, the lower the agency cost between the major shareholders and the minority shareholders. There is also a negative correlation between the cost of debt agency and the quality of internal control information disclosure.
【學位授予單位】：江蘇科技大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F275;F832.51;F224

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本文編號：1606374