本文關(guān)鍵詞： 盈余管理 股利政策 操控性應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn) 信息傳遞　出處：《東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：隨著公司盈余管理行為的日趨頻繁,盈余管理問(wèn)題日益受到社會(huì)各方面的關(guān)注。上市公司的盈余管理行會(huì)影響會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則的制定、投資者利益的保護(hù)、監(jiān)管部門(mén)的監(jiān)管政策、甚至是證券市場(chǎng)資源優(yōu)化配置功能等諸多方面,因此對(duì)盈余管理問(wèn)題的研究有重要意義�？傮w來(lái)說(shuō),盈余管理行為可以劃分為兩種類(lèi)型,機(jī)會(huì)主義型盈余管理和傳遞私有信息型盈余管理,但是國(guó)內(nèi)外學(xué)者對(duì)于盈余管理的研究多數(shù)集中于機(jī)會(huì)主義型盈余管理,尤其是上市公司從資本市場(chǎng)融資及保牌等原因引起的盈余管理,這種盈余管理多是由監(jiān)管政策引起的,具有政策導(dǎo)向性。而本文則站在傳遞私有信息的角度,探討了股利政策對(duì)盈余管理的影響及相應(yīng)的市場(chǎng)反應(yīng)。 之前的研究文獻(xiàn)證實(shí),公司管理層有用盈余管理來(lái)傳遞積極私有信息的動(dòng)機(jī),但是市場(chǎng)往往會(huì)認(rèn)為用盈余管理工具進(jìn)行調(diào)控盈余是管理層的機(jī)會(huì)主義行為,所以公司管理層可能會(huì)將盈余管理工具與其它信息傳遞工具結(jié)合使用,來(lái)增強(qiáng)私有信息的可信性,其中一個(gè)可以選擇的信息傳遞工具就是股利政策工具。根據(jù)股利信號(hào)理論,上市公司會(huì)利用股利政策向外部投資者傳遞有關(guān)公司未來(lái)良好發(fā)展前景的私有信息。但是由于我國(guó)股票市場(chǎng)有效性水平不高,上市公司的發(fā)放股利所載有的這種管理者對(duì)未來(lái)積極預(yù)期的私有信息,不能完全被市場(chǎng)識(shí)別到。所以上市公司管理層有動(dòng)機(jī)配合其他途徑將積極的私有信息有效地傳遞出去。本文認(rèn)為,管理層會(huì)將股利政策工具與盈余管理疊加在一起使用,以強(qiáng)化私有信息傳遞效率。盈余管理行為生成的操控性應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn)會(huì)增強(qiáng)股利信號(hào)的強(qiáng)度,而發(fā)放的股利信號(hào)會(huì)增強(qiáng)操控性應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn)的可信度。從而有效降低上市公司管理層和投資者間的信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)程度,提高投資者對(duì)公司股票價(jià)值的預(yù)期。 本文的研究以2003-2010年發(fā)放股利的滬市A股上市公司為研究樣本,首先使用調(diào)整Jones(1991)模型及拓展的調(diào)整Jones(1991)模型估計(jì)出可操控性總應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn)和可操控性流動(dòng)應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn),作為盈余管理程度的替代變量,然后分別檢驗(yàn)了發(fā)放不同類(lèi)型股利的公司操控性應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn)的顯著性,實(shí)證結(jié)果顯示發(fā)放股利的公司盈余管理程度顯著為正,且發(fā)放股票股利的上市公司盈余管理程度要大于發(fā)放現(xiàn)金股利的公司。這就表明發(fā)放股利的上市公司有進(jìn)行盈余管理的動(dòng)機(jī),且不同類(lèi)型的股利政策對(duì)盈余管理造成的影響不同。 在此基礎(chǔ)上,本文還檢驗(yàn)了發(fā)放股利公司盈余管理的市場(chǎng)反應(yīng)。我們將上市公司年度分紅預(yù)案公告發(fā)布當(dāng)天及前后三天股票的累積異常收益率作為市場(chǎng)反應(yīng)的替代變量,將凈利潤(rùn)的各組成部分(操控性應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn)、非操控非預(yù)期凈利潤(rùn)、預(yù)期凈利潤(rùn))作為市場(chǎng)反應(yīng)的解釋變量,進(jìn)行回歸分析。實(shí)證結(jié)果顯示發(fā)放股利的公司,股票的累計(jì)異常收益率與操控性應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn)是顯著正相關(guān)的,且發(fā)放股票股利的公司操控性應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn)引起的市場(chǎng)反應(yīng)要大于發(fā)放現(xiàn)金股利的公司。這說(shuō)明市場(chǎng)對(duì)于上市公司的盈余管理行為是持積極態(tài)度的,并且市場(chǎng)對(duì)于發(fā)放不同股利的公司的盈余管理行為反應(yīng)是有差異的。 分析師關(guān)注度代表了一個(gè)公司的信息環(huán)境的豐富程度,本文還對(duì)分析師關(guān)注度對(duì)盈余管理市場(chǎng)反應(yīng)的影響作了實(shí)證研究。我們將發(fā)放股利的公司按分析師關(guān)注度高低程度分為兩組,并分別利用股票市場(chǎng)反應(yīng)回歸模型進(jìn)行回歸分析。實(shí)證結(jié)果顯示,相對(duì)于低分析師關(guān)注度的公司,高分析師關(guān)注度的公司盈余管理的市場(chǎng)反應(yīng)更大。這意味著證券分析師在降低上市公司管理層與中小投資者之間的信息不稱(chēng)程度、提高證券市場(chǎng)效率方面起著重要作用。 根據(jù)本文的研究角度和結(jié)論,本文從抑制上市公司的過(guò)度盈余管理行為及大力發(fā)展專(zhuān)業(yè)的投資分析機(jī)構(gòu)兩個(gè)方面提出了政策建議。
[Abstract]:With the company's earnings management behavior is becoming more frequent, the problem of earnings management has been the concern of all sectors of society. The influence of earnings management of listed companies' Guild accounting standards, to protect the interests of investors, regulators, and even many aspects of securities market resource allocation function, therefore, to study the earnings management problem is important. Overall, the behavior of earnings management can be divided into two types, the opportunistic earnings management and earnings management of private information transfer, but for the majority of domestic and foreign scholars research on earnings management focus on the opportunistic earnings management, especially the earnings management of listed companies from the capital market caused by financing and insurance cards and other reasons, the earnings management is caused by regulatory policy, with policy guidance. But this is standing on the transfer of private information of angle. The influence of dividend policy on earnings management and the corresponding market reaction.
Previous literature confirms that the management of the company use earnings management to transfer positive private information motivation, but the market will often think of earnings management tools to control the earnings management is the opportunism behavior, so the management of the company may be earnings management tools and other information tools used in combination to enhance the credibility of private information. One can choose the information transfer tool is the dividend policy tool. According to the dividend signal theory, dividend policy of listed companies will use the transfer of private information about the company's future good development prospects to external investors. But the efficiency of China's stock market is not high, the listed company dividend contained in the management of the future is expected to actively private information, can not be fully recognized by the market. So the management of listed companies have the motivation with him The way of positive private information effectively to pass out. This paper argues that the management will be the dividend policy and earnings management tools superimposed together, to signal private information. Manipulation of earnings management behavior generated accrued profits will increase the dividend signal strength, while the dividend signaling can enhance the discretionary accruals profit credibility. So as to effectively reduce the degree of information asymmetry between managers and investors of listed companies, improve the expectations of investors on the company's stock value.
This paper takes 2003-2010 years of dividend Shanghai A shares of listed companies as the research sample, the first use of adjusted Jones (1991) model and Jones (1991) to adjust the development model to estimate discretionary total accruals and discretionary accruals liquidity, as an alternative to the variable degree of earnings management, and then test the company was handling different types of payment of dividend accruals, the empirical results show that the degree of earnings management company dividend is significantly positive, the degree of earnings management of listed companies and stock dividends than the cash dividend. This shows that the dividend of the listed companies have the motivation of earnings management, influence and different types of dividend policy on earnings management caused by the different.
On this basis, this paper also examines the market reaction to earnings management issued dividend company. We will notice the cumulative abnormal returns of listed companies annual bonus plan released the same day and three days before and after the stock market reaction rate as a proxy, the net profit of each part (discretionary accruals, non discretionary non expected net profit the expected net profit), as the market reaction to explanatory variables for regression analysis. The empirical results show that the dividend of the company, the stock cumulative abnormal returns and discretionary accruals are significantly correlated, the market reaction and companies on stock dividend accruals caused greater than the cash dividend company. This shows that the market is a positive attitude to the earnings management, and the market is bad for the behavior of earnings management of the company dividend paid different reaction Different.
The richness of analyst's attention on behalf of a company's information environment, the analysts concerned about the impact of reaction degree of earnings management of the market. We will do empirical research on dividend company according to the analyst's attention level divided into two groups, and respectively use the stock market response regression model empirical. The results showed that compared with the low degree of concern, analysts, analysts are concerned about the market reaction to high degree of earnings management of the company more. This means that securities analysts in reducing between the management of listed companies and small investors the information is not known, plays an important role in improving the efficiency of the stock market.
According to the research perspective and conclusion, this paper puts forward policy recommendations from two aspects: inhibiting the excessive earnings management behavior of listed companies and vigorously developing professional investment analysis institutions.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F832.51;F275

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