本文關(guān)鍵詞： 會(huì)計(jì)選擇盈余管理 真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理 大股東 兩權(quán)分離度　出處：《東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：隨著我國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)的不斷發(fā)展,公司治理問題日益受到重視。我國(guó)上市公司的大股東在企業(yè)各項(xiàng)重大決策中處于優(yōu)勢(shì)地位,能夠影響或控制上市公司。同時(shí),我國(guó)上市公司的盈余管理行為是普遍的�；诖�,我國(guó)隨后對(duì)上市公司進(jìn)行了諸如國(guó)有股減持和股權(quán)分置改革的諸多嘗試,在股權(quán)分置改革背景下大股東與盈余管理之間的關(guān)系是值得探討的。此外,盈余管理分為會(huì)計(jì)選擇盈余管理和真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理。國(guó)內(nèi)外大多從會(huì)計(jì)選擇盈余管理的角度研究大股東的公司治理效應(yīng),真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理則很少有所涉及。隨著證券監(jiān)管的不斷加強(qiáng),會(huì)計(jì)選擇盈余管理的空間越來越小,真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理隱蔽性更強(qiáng)的特點(diǎn)使其發(fā)揮的空間變大。因此,從真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理的角度研究大股東的治理效應(yīng)具有理論和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。 本文采用經(jīng)驗(yàn)研究的方法從第一大股東持股比例、性質(zhì)或身份和兩權(quán)分離度三個(gè)方面驗(yàn)證大股東與盈余管理(包括會(huì)計(jì)選擇盈余管理和真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理)的關(guān)系。全文共分為六章： 第一章簡(jiǎn)要的說明了文章的研究背景和研究意義,并提出文章的研究?jī)?nèi)容與框架。 第二章主要從第一大股東持股比例、第一大股東的性質(zhì)和兩權(quán)分離度(現(xiàn)金流量權(quán)與控制權(quán)的分離)三個(gè)方面回顧了大股東與盈余管理關(guān)系的相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)研究,并在此基礎(chǔ)對(duì)現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)做出評(píng)述。 第三章闡述了大股東與盈余管理的理論基礎(chǔ)。首先,本章從定義、手段和存在的基礎(chǔ)條件對(duì)盈余管理進(jìn)行全面解析。其次,運(yùn)用不完全契約理論、委托代理理論和控制權(quán)價(jià)值理論深度剖析大股東與盈余管理的關(guān)系。 第四章在理論分析的基礎(chǔ)上從第一大股東持股比例、性質(zhì)和兩權(quán)分離度三個(gè)角度提出大股東與盈余管理關(guān)系的相關(guān)假設(shè)。 第五章選取2009-2010年A股上市公司作為研究樣本,引入研究變量,借鑒國(guó)內(nèi)外研究對(duì)研究模型進(jìn)行設(shè)定,運(yùn)用多元回歸分析大股東與盈余管理的關(guān)系。研究結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)：第一大股東持股比例與盈余管理正相關(guān)；第一大股東為國(guó)有股時(shí),上市公司盈余管理程度更低；兩權(quán)分離度與盈余管理程度正相關(guān)。此外,穩(wěn)健性測(cè)試的結(jié)果支持了本文研究結(jié)論的穩(wěn)健性。 第六章對(duì)全文做出了總結(jié),指出本文的研究假設(shè)得到了驗(yàn)證,同時(shí)說明了文章的創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)和不足。 本文的創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)在于利用經(jīng)驗(yàn)研究的方法嘗試性地驗(yàn)證了第一大股東性質(zhì)和兩權(quán)分離度對(duì)真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理的影響,較為全面地分析了大股東與盈余管理之間的關(guān)系,對(duì)第一大股東持股比例與盈余管理之間的關(guān)系做出了進(jìn)一步解釋。盡管如此,本文的局限性仍是顯而易見的,即本文未能將大股東導(dǎo)致盈余管理的具體行為與盈余管理聯(lián)系起來考察大股東與盈余管理的關(guān)系。利用大股東控制權(quán)價(jià)值(包括控制權(quán)共享收益和控制權(quán)私人收益)的研究似乎可以在一定程度上解決這個(gè)問題,但遺憾的是,目前還沒有能夠?qū)刂茩?quán)價(jià)值進(jìn)行精確度量的有效方法,尤其是控制權(quán)私人收益的度量,因此大股東控制權(quán)價(jià)值與盈余管理的關(guān)系是一個(gè)值得嘗試的領(lǐng)域。
[Abstract]:With the continuous development of China's securities market, the problem of corporate governance has been paid more and more attention. Large shareholders of Listed Companies in China is in a dominant position in the major decisions in all enterprise, can influence or control the listed company. At the same time, the earnings management behavior of Listed Companies in China is widespread in China. Based on this, then made a number of attempts such as the reduction of state-owned shares and non tradable shares reform of listed companies, the relationship between large shareholders and earnings management reform under the background of the equity is worth exploring. In addition, the earnings management includes the choice of accounting earnings management and real earnings management activities. At home and abroad are mostly from the accounting choice effect of corporate governance on earnings management study of large shareholders, real earnings management activities are rarely involved. With securities regulators continue to strengthen, the accounting choice of earnings management space more and more small, real activities earnings The characteristics of the more implicit management make the space of its play bigger. Therefore, it is of theoretical and practical significance to study the governance effect of large shareholders from the perspective of real activity earnings management.
In this paper, empirical research is used to verify the relationship between large shareholders and earnings management (including accounting choice earnings management and real activity earnings management) from three aspects of the largest shareholder's shareholding ratio, nature or status and the separation of two powers. The whole paper is divided into six chapters.
The first chapter gives a brief description of the research background and significance of the article, and puts forward the research content and framework of the article.
The second chapter reviews the related literature research on the relationship between large shareholders and earnings management from three aspects: the largest shareholder's shareholding ratio, the nature of the largest shareholder and the separation of the two powers (the separation of cash flow right and control right). Based on that, the existing literature is commented.
The third chapter introduces the theoretical basis of large shareholders and earnings management. Firstly, this chapter from the definition, methods and basic conditions for the existence of the comprehensive analysis on earnings management. Secondly, based on the incomplete contract theory, principal-agent theory and control theory of value depth analysis of the relationship between large shareholders and earnings management.
On the basis of theoretical analysis, the fourth chapter puts forward the hypothesis of the relationship between large shareholders and earnings management from the three perspectives of the largest shareholder's shareholding ratio, the nature and the separation of two powers.
The fifth chapter selects 2009-2010 A-share listed companies as A research sample, introduce the research variables, research from home and abroad to study the model was set, using multiple regression analysis of the relationship between large shareholders and earnings management. The results showed that: the proportion of the first shareholder and earnings management; the largest shareholder of state-owned shares of listed companies. The extent of earnings management is lower; the separation of two rights is positively related to the degree of earnings management. In addition, the robust test results support the conclusion of the study of robustness.
The sixth chapter makes a summary of the full text, pointing out that the research hypothesis of this paper has been verified, and at the same time, it shows the innovation and deficiency of the article.
The innovation of this paper is to use empirical research method to attempt to verify the nature of the largest shareholder and the two rights separation degree of influence on the real earnings management activities, comprehensively analyzes the relationship between large shareholders and earnings management, made a further explanation of the relationship between the proportion of the first shareholder and earnings management. Although so, the limitation of this paper is obviously, that this will lead to earnings management of large shareholders failed to link specific behavior and earnings management of large shareholders and earnings management. The control rights of large shareholders value (including the control of shared benefits and private benefits of control) research seems to solve this problem in a certain degree but, unfortunately, there is no effective method to measure the precise value of control, especially the measurement of private benefits of control rights, Therefore, the relationship between the value of the control rights of the large shareholders and the earnings management is a field worth trying.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51

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