本文關(guān)鍵詞： 最終控制人 制度環(huán)境 過度投資　出處：《合肥工業(yè)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：由于目前我國(guó)工業(yè)化尚未完成，所以在可預(yù)見的未來(lái)我國(guó)可能繼續(xù)保持高投資率的狀況。但是高投資率和經(jīng)濟(jì)飛速增長(zhǎng)的背后，，卻存在著重復(fù)建設(shè)和過度投資現(xiàn)象。一方面這種過度投資降低了企業(yè)的價(jià)值，影響企業(yè)的成長(zhǎng)；另一方面而言，大量投資過度會(huì)使得經(jīng)濟(jì)過熱導(dǎo)致生產(chǎn)能力過剩，阻礙我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展。 隨著現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度的建立，我國(guó)逐步實(shí)現(xiàn)了政企分離、科學(xué)管理，以及國(guó)有企業(yè)股份制改革的推進(jìn)，但是企業(yè)中仍然存在著嚴(yán)重的代理問題。所以研究中國(guó)上市公司的投資效率問題必須結(jié)合控制人背景和制度環(huán)境進(jìn)行綜合考慮。制度環(huán)境往往會(huì)影響代理人的理性行為，而公司的投資決策直接受到代理人的行為影響，從而產(chǎn)生了非效率投資。所以將最終控制人背景和制度環(huán)境對(duì)過度投資的影響納入研究拓寬了現(xiàn)有的企業(yè)投資研究視角。 本文的主要研究?jī)?nèi)容就是在我國(guó)特有的制度環(huán)境下，比較不同最終控制人的投資效率問題，嘗試著用新制度經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的理論來(lái)解釋作用機(jī)理。具體利用Richardson(2006)模型測(cè)算得出樣本的投資過度和投資不足，并且按照上市公司的最終控制人性質(zhì)將樣本公司劃分為三個(gè)組別，同時(shí)引入制度環(huán)境衡量指標(biāo)。在此基礎(chǔ)之上，對(duì)制度環(huán)境與我國(guó)上市公司過度投資行為的相關(guān)性進(jìn)行實(shí)證研究。結(jié)果表明：政府控制的上市公司比私人控制的上市公司發(fā)生過度投資的傾向更高，特別是地方政府控制的上市公司；制度環(huán)境的改善減輕了上市公司過度投資的嚴(yán)重程度；政府控制的上市公司中過度投資行為受政府干預(yù)的影響程度要高于私人控制的上市公司受影響程度，受金融環(huán)境影響的程度小于私人控制的上市公司受影響程度，受法律環(huán)境的影響程度與私人控制的上市公司不存在較大的差異。
[Abstract]:As China's industrialization has not yet been completed, China may continue to maintain a high investment rate for the foreseeable future. But behind the high investment rate and rapid economic growth, On the one hand, such overinvestment reduces the value of enterprises and affects their growth; on the other hand, overinvestment can cause overheating of the economy and lead to overcapacity. Hinder the development of our economy. With the establishment of modern enterprise system, China has gradually realized the separation of government and enterprises, scientific management, and the promotion of the reform of state-owned enterprises' stock system. However, there are still serious agency problems in enterprises. Therefore, in order to study the investment efficiency of listed companies in China, it is necessary to consider comprehensively the background of the controlling person and the institutional environment, which often affects the rational behavior of the agents. The investment decision of the company is directly influenced by the behavior of the agent, which leads to the inefficient investment. Therefore, the influence of the background of the ultimate controller and the institutional environment on the overinvestment is included in the study, which widens the existing perspective of the enterprise investment research. The main research content of this paper is to compare the investment efficiency of different ultimate controllers in the unique institutional environment of our country. This paper tries to use the theory of new institutional economics to explain the mechanism of action. The model of Richardson's 2006) is used to calculate the overinvestment and underinvestment of the sample, and the sample companies are divided into three groups according to the nature of the ultimate controller of the listed company. At the same time, the system environment measurement index is introduced. This paper makes an empirical study on the correlation between the institutional environment and the over-investment behavior of listed companies in China. The results show that the government-controlled listed companies tend to overinvest more than the privately controlled listed companies. Especially the listed companies controlled by the local government, the improvement of the system environment reduces the serious degree of excessive investment of the listed companies. The excessive investment behavior of the listed companies controlled by the government is affected more by government intervention than by the private listed companies, and the degree of financial environment is less than that of the private controlled listed companies. There is no significant difference between the degree of influence of the legal environment and the private-controlled listed companies.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：合肥工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51;F224

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