本文關(guān)鍵詞： 控制權(quán)配置 股權(quán)激勵 財富效應(yīng) 短期效應(yīng) 長期效應(yīng) 上市公司　出處：《燕山大學(xué)》2013年博士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：2006年以來，隨著股權(quán)激勵相關(guān)法規(guī)的陸續(xù)出臺，股權(quán)激勵制度不斷完善，越來越多的上市公司宣告和實施了股權(quán)激勵方案，股權(quán)激勵已成為現(xiàn)代公司解決委托代理問題的重要手段。但現(xiàn)實中股權(quán)激勵實施效果的差別以及學(xué)術(shù)界學(xué)者們對股權(quán)激勵效應(yīng)及其產(chǎn)生原因持不同的觀點，使股權(quán)激勵問題成為研究和討論的熱點。本論文選取2006-2011年宣告股權(quán)激勵方案的上市公司作為研究樣本，從公司控制權(quán)配置視角，揭示股權(quán)激勵和控制權(quán)現(xiàn)狀，并系統(tǒng)研究控制權(quán)配置對股權(quán)激勵的影響以及股權(quán)激勵的財富效應(yīng)。 首先，在文獻回顧的基礎(chǔ)上，闡述和界定股權(quán)激勵偏好、股權(quán)激勵成本、股權(quán)激勵方式和股權(quán)激勵強度等股權(quán)激勵概念，終極控制人性質(zhì)、第一大股東控制力、董事會結(jié)構(gòu)以及高管持股等控制權(quán)及控制權(quán)配置概念；從短期和長期，絕對和相對兩個層面界定財富效應(yīng)，并闡述其衡量指標。闡述分析委托-代理理論、人力資本理論、不完全契約理論等股權(quán)激勵理論，馬克思的產(chǎn)權(quán)理論、現(xiàn)代企業(yè)理論、內(nèi)部人控制理論等控制權(quán)理論以及有效市場理論和信號傳遞理論等財富效應(yīng)理論。 其次，從基本面、激勵偏好、激勵成本、激勵方式和激勵強度等五個方面揭示和分析股權(quán)激勵現(xiàn)狀；從終極控制人性質(zhì)、第一大股東控制力、董事會結(jié)構(gòu)和高管持股等四個方面揭示和分析宣告股權(quán)激勵方案的上市公司控制權(quán)配置現(xiàn)狀。 再次，檢驗控制權(quán)配置對股權(quán)激勵的影響。構(gòu)建Logit模型以及多元線性回歸模型，檢驗終極控制人性質(zhì)、第一大股東控制力、董事會結(jié)構(gòu)和高管持股等控制權(quán)配置變量分別對股權(quán)激勵偏好、股權(quán)激勵方式、股權(quán)激勵成本和股權(quán)激勵強度的影響。 第四，測度股權(quán)激勵的短期財富效應(yīng)。運用事件研究法檢驗股權(quán)激勵公告事件產(chǎn)生的市場反應(yīng)，用CAR衡量股權(quán)激勵短期絕對財富效應(yīng)；構(gòu)建SFA效率模型，以股權(quán)激勵的成本和強度作為投入指標、CAR作為產(chǎn)出指標，并將終極控制人性質(zhì)、第一大股東控制力、董事會結(jié)構(gòu)、高管持股等控制權(quán)配置變量納入模型，衡量股權(quán)激勵的短期相對財富效應(yīng)。 第五，測度股權(quán)激勵的長期財富效應(yīng)。構(gòu)建多元線性回歸模型，分三個步驟系統(tǒng)考察股權(quán)激勵獨立作用、股權(quán)激勵與控制權(quán)共同作用、股權(quán)激勵與控制權(quán)交互作用等三種情況下股權(quán)激勵的長期絕對財富效應(yīng)；構(gòu)建SFA效率模型，以股權(quán)激勵的成本和強度作為投入指標、剔除掉行業(yè)影響的△Tobin’Q作為產(chǎn)出指標，并將終極控制人性質(zhì)、第一大股東控制力、董事會結(jié)構(gòu)、高管持股等控制權(quán)配置變量納入模型，衡量股權(quán)激勵的長期相對財富效應(yīng)。 最后，從增強公司的股權(quán)激勵偏好、設(shè)定合理的股權(quán)激勵方案、優(yōu)化控制權(quán)配置結(jié)構(gòu)三個方面提出提高股權(quán)激勵財富效應(yīng)的對策建議。
[Abstract]:Since 2006, with the introduction of equity incentive laws and regulations, the equity incentive system has been constantly improved, more and more listed companies announced and implemented the equity incentive scheme. Equity incentive has become an important means for modern companies to solve the principal-agent problem, but in reality, the difference of the effect of equity incentive and academic scholars have different views on equity incentive effect and its causes. This paper selects the listed companies that announced the equity incentive scheme from 2006-2011 as the research sample, from the perspective of corporate control allocation. It reveals the current situation of equity incentive and control right, and systematically studies the influence of control right allocation on equity incentive and the wealth effect of equity incentive. First of all, on the basis of literature review, this paper expounds and defines the concept of equity incentive, such as the preference of equity incentive, the cost of equity incentive, the mode of equity incentive and the intensity of equity incentive. The first major shareholder control power, board structure, executive ownership and other control rights and control rights allocation concept; From the short-term and long-term, absolute and relative levels to define the wealth effect, and explain its measurement indicators. Explain the principal-agent theory, human capital theory, incomplete contract theory and other equity incentive theory. Marx's property right theory, modern enterprise theory, insider control theory and wealth effect theory, such as efficient market theory and signal transmission theory. Secondly, the present situation of equity incentive is revealed and analyzed from five aspects: fundamental aspect, incentive preference, incentive cost, incentive mode and incentive intensity. From four aspects: the nature of ultimate controller, the first shareholder control power, the structure of board of directors and the ownership of senior executives, this paper reveals and analyzes the status quo of the allocation of control rights of listed companies. Thirdly, to test the influence of the allocation of control rights on the equity incentive. Construct Logit model and multiple linear regression model, test the nature of the ultimate controller, the largest shareholder control. The influence of board structure and executive ownership on equity incentive preference, equity incentive mode, equity incentive cost and equity incentive intensity. 4th, measure the short-term wealth effect of equity incentive, use event research method to test the market reaction of stock right incentive announcement event, and use CAR to measure the short-term absolute wealth effect of equity incentive; Construct SFA efficiency model, take the cost and intensity of equity incentive as the input index and car as the output index, and take the nature of the ultimate controller, the first shareholder control, the board of directors structure. Control allocation variables such as executive ownership are incorporated into the model to measure the short-term relative wealth effect of equity incentive. 5th, measure the long-term wealth effect of equity incentive. Build multiple linear regression model, examine the independent role of equity incentive, equity incentive and control of the joint action in three steps. The long-term absolute wealth effect of equity incentive under the interaction of equity incentive and control right. Build SFA efficiency model, take the cost and intensity of equity incentive as input index, eliminate the industry impact of Tobin'Q as output indicators, and the ultimate nature of the controller, the largest shareholder control. Board structure, executive ownership and other control allocation variables are incorporated into the model to measure the long-term relative wealth effect of equity incentive. Finally, the paper puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions to improve the wealth effect of equity incentive from three aspects: strengthening the preference of equity incentive, setting up reasonable equity incentive scheme and optimizing the structure of control right allocation.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：燕山大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F275;F832.51

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