本文關(guān)鍵詞： 民營上市公司 管理層持股 公司績效　出處：《東北農(nóng)業(yè)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：現(xiàn)代公司制企業(yè)最顯著的特征是公司所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營權(quán)相分離,由此導(dǎo)致了委托代理關(guān)系的產(chǎn)生。如何在競爭性市場中不斷提高公司的生產(chǎn)和管理效率,降低代理成本,使公司利潤最大化或者所有者財富最大化,一直是公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)中的一個核心議題。管理層持股作為解決委托代理問題的一種有效途徑,也受到學(xué)術(shù)界越來越多的關(guān)注。理論上,隨著我國股權(quán)分置改革的完成,非流通股得到解禁,上市公司股東的利益開始趨于一致,做大做強已逐漸成為公司的共同目標(biāo),在此基礎(chǔ)上引入管理層持股激勵模式對降低代理成本、提高公司績效的確能起到正面的積極影響。然而管理層持股激勵模式在我國能否產(chǎn)生其應(yīng)有的作用,還有待于實踐的檢驗。本文正是基于這種背景,選擇管理層持股對公司績效的影響進行深入的分析研究。另外,考慮到在國有上市公司中研究管理層持股對公司績效的影響在理論上存在較大缺陷,進而會影響實證研究的結(jié)果,故僅選擇民營上市公司作為研究對象,理論上更具有針對性和適用性,實際意義也更大。 本文從理論與實證兩個角度研究我國民營上市公司管理層持股對公司績效的影響。首先回顧了國內(nèi)外學(xué)者的研究成果并將相關(guān)的理論和假設(shè)進行梳理,在描述民營上市公司管理層持股與公司績效現(xiàn)狀的基礎(chǔ)上,提出民營上市公司管理層持股中存在的問題,并分析了問題的成因。運用2008-2010年三年管理層連續(xù)持股的民營上市公司數(shù)據(jù)進行實證研究,旨在揭示管理層持股在民營上市公司中應(yīng)用的實際激勵效應(yīng)。通過實證研究得出的主要結(jié)論：管理層持股對民營上市公司績效的影響存在區(qū)間效應(yīng),呈N形曲線,即公司績效隨管理層持股比例的上升出現(xiàn)先下降,后上升,再下降的趨勢�；诶碚摲治龊蛯嵶C研究的結(jié)論,本文提出了堅持實施管理層持股激勵模式、重新定位管理層持股制度、確定合理的管理層持股水平、優(yōu)化民營上市公司內(nèi)部約束機制以及完善管理層持股外部環(huán)境等一系列提高民營上市公司績效的建議。
[Abstract]:The most prominent feature of modern corporate enterprises is the separation of ownership and management right, which leads to the emergence of principal-agent relationship. How to improve the efficiency of production and management in competitive market. Reducing agency cost and maximizing corporate profit or owner's wealth is always a core issue in corporate governance structure. Management shareholding is an effective way to solve the principal-agent problem. In theory, with the completion of the reform of non-tradable shares in China, non-tradable shares have been lifted, the interests of shareholders of listed companies began to converge. Bigger and stronger has gradually become the common goal of the company, and on this basis, the introduction of managerial shareholding incentive mode to reduce agency costs. Improvement of corporate performance can indeed play a positive role. However, whether the incentive mode of managerial shareholding can play its due role in our country remains to be tested in practice. This paper is based on this background. In addition, considering the influence of management ownership on corporate performance in state-owned listed companies, there are some defects in theory. Then it will affect the results of empirical research, so only select private listed companies as the research object, theoretically more targeted and applicable, and practical significance is greater. This paper studies the impact of management ownership on corporate performance in China's private listed companies from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. Firstly, it reviews the research results of domestic and foreign scholars and combs the relevant theories and assumptions. On the basis of describing the current situation of management ownership and corporate performance of private listed companies, this paper puts forward the problems existing in the management ownership of private listed companies. And analyzed the causes of the problem, using the 2008-2010 management of three years of continuous ownership of private listed companies for empirical research. In order to reveal the practical incentive effect of the application of management shareholding in private listed companies, the main conclusion of the empirical study is that there is an interval effect on the performance of private listed companies. N-shaped curve, that is, the company performance with the increase in the proportion of managerial ownership first decreased, then rose, then decreased. Based on theoretical analysis and empirical research conclusions. This paper proposes to insist on the implementation of management stock ownership incentive model, re-positioning management ownership system, and to determine a reasonable level of management ownership. A series of suggestions to improve the performance of private listed companies, such as optimizing the internal restraint mechanism of private listed companies and perfecting the external environment of management shareholding, are proposed.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北農(nóng)業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F275;F832.51;F224

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