本文關鍵詞： 風險投資 創(chuàng)業(yè)板 IPO 盈余管理　出處：《南京大學》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：2009年10月創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場的成功推出,標志著我國多層次資本市場的進一步完善。創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場在為更多的創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè),特別是高新技術企業(yè)提供融資服務的同時,也為國內(nèi)風險投資提供了良好的退出渠道,越來越多的風險資本選擇通過協(xié)助企業(yè)完成在創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場首次公開募股(IPO)的形式實現(xiàn)風險資本的增值,獲取豐厚的投資回報。然而,創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)為了盡快獲得稀缺的上市資格、抬高股票發(fā)行價格,往往通過盈余管理的手段對公司財務狀況進行粉飾,阻礙了資本市場資源配置作用的發(fā)揮和創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場的健康發(fā)展。針對這種現(xiàn)象,風險投資作為認證中介(Certifying Agent),在創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)IPO過程中可能起到認證、監(jiān)督作用,抑制管理層的盈余管理行為,但也可能出于自身利益的考慮對其產(chǎn)生“躁動效應”,加重擬上市公司的盈余管理程度。 本文選取2009年10月至2012年2月在我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場上市的193家創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)作為樣本,選擇合理的盈余管理計量模型,并通過描述性統(tǒng)計、Pearson相關性檢驗和多元逐步回歸分析,研究風險投資對創(chuàng)業(yè)板IPO盈余管理的影響。研究結果顯示,創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場的上市公司在IPO過程中存在普遍的盈余管理行為,而與沒有風險投資背景的創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)相比,有風險投資參與的企業(yè)在創(chuàng)業(yè)板IPO過程中的盈余管理水平較低。當聯(lián)合風險投資參與單個創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)的IPO活動時,風險投資原有的認證、監(jiān)督作用會被“躁動效應”所代替,盈余管理不減反增。
[Abstract]:In October 2009, the successful launch of the gem market marked the further improvement of the multi-level capital market in China. The gem market is becoming more and more entrepreneurial enterprises. In particular, high-tech enterprises provide financing services, but also for domestic venture capital to provide a good exit channel. More and more venture capital choose to realize the increment of venture capital by assisting enterprises to complete initial public offering (IPO) in the gem market and obtain rich investment returns. In order to obtain the scarce qualification of listing and raise the issuing price of stock as soon as possible, the start-up enterprises often use the means of earnings management to whitewash the financial situation of the company. It hinders the development of the capital market resource allocation and the healthy development of the gem market. In view of this phenomenon, venture capital acts as a certification intermediary certifying agent. In the process of start-up enterprise IPO, it may play a role of certification, supervision, restrain the management of earnings management behavior, but also out of self-interest considerations may produce a "restless effect" on it. To increase the degree of earnings management of listed companies. This paper selects 193 enterprises listed on the gem market from October 2009 to February 2012 as the sample, chooses the reasonable earnings management measurement model, and through descriptive statistics. Pearson correlation test and multiple stepwise regression analysis to study the impact of venture capital on IPO earnings management. The listed companies in the gem market have common earnings management behavior in the process of IPO, and compared with the venture capital enterprises without background. The level of earnings management of venture capital participating enterprises in the process of gem IPO is low. When the joint venture capital participates in the IPO activities of a single venture enterprise, the original certification of venture capital is obtained. Supervisory role will be replaced by "restless effect", earnings management will not decrease but increase.
【學位授予單位】：南京大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F832.51;F224

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