本文關(guān)鍵詞： 機(jī)構(gòu)投資者 盈利預(yù)測(cè) 非理性自利行為　出處：《湖南大學(xué)》2012年博士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：客觀可靠的信息是資本市場(chǎng)企業(yè)價(jià)值評(píng)判的基礎(chǔ),是資本市場(chǎng)價(jià)格機(jī)制正常運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)和實(shí)現(xiàn)有效資源配置的前提。而盈利預(yù)測(cè)信息是關(guān)于企業(yè)價(jià)值最核心的信息,因此是資本市場(chǎng)最重要的信息內(nèi)容之一,有助于指引普通投資者進(jìn)行投資,進(jìn)而引導(dǎo)市場(chǎng)市場(chǎng)實(shí)現(xiàn)資源優(yōu)化配置。機(jī)構(gòu)投資者作為維護(hù)市場(chǎng)運(yùn)行的金融中介,具有規(guī)模、信息和知識(shí)的優(yōu)勢(shì),是資本市場(chǎng)天然的信息“權(quán)威”,是市場(chǎng)上普通投資者最重要的信息源。理性的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者發(fā)布客觀可靠的盈利預(yù)測(cè),指引普通投資者進(jìn)行投資,可以實(shí)現(xiàn)市場(chǎng)資源配置的優(yōu)化,維護(hù)資本市場(chǎng)的秩序。但如果機(jī)構(gòu)投資者表現(xiàn)出非理性自利行為,發(fā)布錯(cuò)誤的或誤導(dǎo)性的盈利預(yù)測(cè),則會(huì)影響普通投資者的投資決策,誤導(dǎo)資本市場(chǎng)的資源流向,從而嚴(yán)重地?fù)p害資本市場(chǎng)的運(yùn)行秩序。 以往的學(xué)者對(duì)于機(jī)構(gòu)投資者盈利預(yù)測(cè)的研究大多遵循技術(shù)范式的研究思路,考察影響機(jī)構(gòu)投資者盈利預(yù)測(cè)準(zhǔn)確性的技術(shù)因素,而缺乏對(duì)其內(nèi)在利益關(guān)系的探究。國(guó)外部分學(xué)者檢驗(yàn)了承銷業(yè)務(wù)利益對(duì)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者盈利預(yù)測(cè)的影響,發(fā)現(xiàn)為了承銷業(yè)務(wù)利益,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者會(huì)采取非理性的自利行為,發(fā)布樂(lè)觀的盈利預(yù)測(cè)以追逐承銷業(yè)務(wù)利益。這說(shuō)明當(dāng)存在自身利益與市場(chǎng)利益的沖突時(shí),非理性自利的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者可能會(huì)以犧牲盈利預(yù)測(cè)的客觀性為代價(jià)而換取自身的現(xiàn)實(shí)利益。 “經(jīng)濟(jì)人”的理性自利是以集體理性為目標(biāo)的。經(jīng)濟(jì)個(gè)體在追求自身利益時(shí),能實(shí)現(xiàn)集體的利益和自身的長(zhǎng)期利益,這樣才能保證自身利益的安全性和可持續(xù)性。因此,個(gè)體理性與集體理性是否一致是自利的理性判斷標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。但現(xiàn)實(shí)中,個(gè)體理性與集體理性之間往往存在矛盾,過(guò)度的追求個(gè)體利益會(huì)導(dǎo)致個(gè)體理性對(duì)集體理性的損害。非理性自利實(shí)質(zhì)為個(gè)體理性對(duì)集體理性的背離,其內(nèi)涵是犧牲集體利益以謀求自身的利益,放棄長(zhǎng)期利益來(lái)?yè)Q取短期利益。非理性自利行為發(fā)生的條件在于市場(chǎng)倫理和聲譽(yù)機(jī)制的缺失、信息的不對(duì)稱、市場(chǎng)地位的失衡、市場(chǎng)監(jiān)管的失效。我國(guó)的資本市場(chǎng)逐利氛圍濃厚、機(jī)構(gòu)投資者盈利壓力巨大,這樣會(huì)誘發(fā)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的非理性自利動(dòng)機(jī)。而由于我國(guó)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在信息知識(shí)上的主導(dǎo)地位、市場(chǎng)聲譽(yù)機(jī)制的不健全、市場(chǎng)監(jiān)管和內(nèi)部控制低效等方面的原因,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者很可能會(huì)在利益誘導(dǎo)下產(chǎn)生非理性自利行為。 由于機(jī)構(gòu)投資者主要利益在于承銷、自營(yíng)和經(jīng)紀(jì)三類業(yè)務(wù),因此本文重點(diǎn)考察了在這三類業(yè)務(wù)利益的誘導(dǎo)下,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在盈利預(yù)測(cè)中所表現(xiàn)出的各種非理性自利行為。在承銷業(yè)務(wù)方面,通過(guò)選取我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)相關(guān)樣本數(shù)據(jù)說(shuō)進(jìn)行檢驗(yàn),發(fā)現(xiàn)我國(guó)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者會(huì)因?yàn)樽分鸪袖N業(yè)務(wù)利益而在盈利預(yù)測(cè)中表現(xiàn)出樂(lè)觀傾向,以提升擬上市公司的市場(chǎng)認(rèn)可度,增加承銷利益；同時(shí)維護(hù)與上市公司管理層的良好關(guān)系,爭(zhēng)取未來(lái)的承銷業(yè)務(wù)機(jī)會(huì)；而這種樂(lè)觀傾向會(huì)影響其盈利預(yù)測(cè)的準(zhǔn)確性,并且會(huì)導(dǎo)致短期市場(chǎng)超額報(bào)酬上升,但中期卻下降,因而會(huì)損害普通投資者的利益,影響市場(chǎng)資源配置。在自營(yíng)業(yè)務(wù)方面,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者為了保護(hù)自營(yíng)業(yè)務(wù)利益,可能會(huì)有選擇性地隱瞞自己的真實(shí)盈利預(yù)測(cè),而發(fā)布非客觀真實(shí)的盈利預(yù)測(cè)報(bào)告；通過(guò)相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)分析,發(fā)現(xiàn)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的盈利預(yù)測(cè)調(diào)整方向與其自營(yíng)業(yè)務(wù)的投資方向并不相關(guān),表明機(jī)構(gòu)投資者沒(méi)有采納其他機(jī)構(gòu)投資者和自己的盈利預(yù)測(cè)報(bào)告進(jìn)行投資,也即機(jī)構(gòu)投資者發(fā)布的盈利預(yù)測(cè)選擇性地隱瞞了其真實(shí)意圖。在經(jīng)紀(jì)業(yè)務(wù)方面,通過(guò)經(jīng)紀(jì)業(yè)務(wù)利益和盈利預(yù)測(cè)關(guān)系的考察,發(fā)現(xiàn)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者存在發(fā)布顯著偏離市場(chǎng)前期盈利預(yù)測(cè)的傾向,而且這種偏離激發(fā)了市場(chǎng)交易量,最終會(huì)引致其經(jīng)紀(jì)業(yè)務(wù)利益的增加。根據(jù)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者非理性自利行為的影響因素和條件,本文最后提出從個(gè)體理性走向集體理性的實(shí)現(xiàn)路徑,并據(jù)此從我國(guó)市場(chǎng)倫理環(huán)境的改善、市場(chǎng)監(jiān)管與機(jī)構(gòu)投資者內(nèi)部控制的提升、市場(chǎng)聲譽(yù)機(jī)制的建立等多個(gè)方面提出了對(duì)策建議。 本文對(duì)自利的理性標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和非理性自利的內(nèi)涵及產(chǎn)生條件進(jìn)行了分析界定,并以此為基礎(chǔ)對(duì)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者盈利預(yù)測(cè)中的非理性自利行為機(jī)理和表現(xiàn)形式進(jìn)行了系統(tǒng)性研究,既是對(duì)本領(lǐng)域文獻(xiàn)的重要補(bǔ)充,也是對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)組織在利益沖突環(huán)境下的行為分析范式的貢獻(xiàn)。對(duì)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在三類業(yè)務(wù)利益驅(qū)動(dòng)下的盈利預(yù)測(cè)非理性自利行為進(jìn)行了實(shí)證檢驗(yàn),這些研究結(jié)論對(duì)普通投資者理解機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的盈利預(yù)測(cè)行為,對(duì)監(jiān)管部門(mén)規(guī)范和引導(dǎo)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的發(fā)展都具有重要的理論和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。
[Abstract]:Objective and reliable information is the foundation of capital market of the enterprise value evaluation, capital market price mechanism for normal operation and premise of realizing effective allocation of resources. And the profit forecast information about the core value of the enterprise information, so the capital market is the most important information content, help ordinary investors, and guide the market to optimize the allocation of resources. Institutional investors as the maintenance of financial intermediary, the operation of the market scale, information and knowledge advantage, is the capital market natural information "authority", is the ordinary investors on the market is the most important source of information. Rational institutional investors issued objective and reliable earnings forecast, direct the general investors. Can optimize the allocation of market resources, maintaining the order of capital market. But if institutional investors exhibit non rational self-interest,. The misleading or misleading earnings forecasts will affect the investment decisions of ordinary investors, mislead the capital market, and seriously damage the operation order of capital market.
Research of previous scholars for the study of institutional investors earnings forecast mostly follow the technological paradigm, the influence of institutional investors earnings forecast accuracy of technical factors, and the lack of research on its internal relations. Some foreign scholars examined the influence of institutional investors on underwriting business interest earnings forecasts, in order to find the underwriting business interests, institutional investors the non rational self-interest behavior, optimistic earnings forecasts issued to chase the underwriting business interest. This shows that when the conflict has its own interests and the interests of the market when the non rational self benefit institutional investors may be in exchange for real's own interests at the expense of the objectivity of earnings forecasts.
"Rational self-interest of economic man is the collective rationality as the goal. The individual economy in the pursuit of their own interests, to achieve the long-term interests of the collective interests and their own, so as to ensure the safety and sustainability of their own interests. Therefore, individual and collective rationality is a rational judgment standard of self-interest. But in reality, there are contradictions between individual and collective rationality, individual interests will lead to excessive pursuit of individual rationality of collective rationality damage. Non rational self-interest is individual rationality to deviate from the collective rationality, its connotation is sacrifice collective interests to seek their own interests, give up long-term interests for short-term interests of non. Rational self-interest behavior is the lack of market ethics and reputation mechanism, information asymmetry, unbalance of market position, the failure of market supervision. The capital market of our country by the atmosphere Wei strong, institutional investors profit pressure, which can induce institutional investors non rational self-interest. But due to the dominance of Chinese institutional investors in the information knowledge, the market reputation mechanism is not perfect, the market supervision and internal control efficiency etc., institutional investors may have a non rational self-interest in the interests of under the induction.
As institutional investors, the main interest is in underwriting, brokerage and proprietary business three categories, this paper focuses on the induction of these three types of business interests, various institutional investors represented in earnings forecast in the non rational self-interest behavior. In the underwriting business, through the selection of China's capital market related sample data to test said and found that China's institutional investors will chase because underwriting business interest in earnings forecast showed optimism, to promote listed companies to increase the degree of market acceptance, underwriting profit; and maintain good relationship with the management of listed companies, for future underwriting business opportunities; and this optimism will affect the accuracy of their earnings forecasts, and will lead to short-term market excess returns rise, but the medium-term declined, which will damage the interests of ordinary investors, affect the market in resource allocation. Business, institutional investors in order to protect the proprietary business interests would selectively hide their true earnings forecasts, published non objective truth profit forecast report; through data analysis, found that the investment direction to adjust the direction of its proprietary business institutional investors earnings forecasts are not related, shows that institutional investors did not adopt other institutional investors and their earnings forecasts for investment, namely, institutional investors issued a profit forecast selectively to conceal the true intentions. In the brokerage business, through the investigation of brokerage business interests and profit forecast relationship, found that institutional investors have significant tendency to deviate from the market early released earnings forecasts, and the deviation to stimulate the market trading volume finally, increase will lead to its brokerage business interests. According to institutional investors non rational self interest The influence factors and conditions, this paper finally puts forward the realization path from individual rationality to collective rationality, and accordingly from China's market ethics environment, improve the internal control of market supervision and institutional investors, many aspects of the market reputation mechanism establishment put forward suggestions.
The connotation of rational criterion of self-interest and non rational self-interest and conditions are analyzed and defined, based on the systematic research on the mechanism of non rational self-interest behavior and forms of institutional investors in the earnings forecast, is an important supplement to the field of literature, but also contribute to the behavior analysis paradigm of economic organization in the conflict environment. To carry on the empirical test of institutional investors in the three types of business profit driven interests under the prediction of non rational self-interest behavior, these results for ordinary investors understand the institutional investors profit forecast behavior, has important theoretical and practical significance to the regulatory authorities to regulate and guide the development of institutional investors.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F224

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