本文關(guān)鍵詞： 創(chuàng)業(yè)投資聲譽 IPOs初始收益 長期業(yè)績 信號博弈 信息效率　出處：《重慶大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機構(gòu)是培育、篩選優(yōu)質(zhì)企業(yè)的重要推手，也是中小企業(yè)擺脫融資困境的“重磅利器”，尤其是對加速創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)完成上市計劃和加快培育科技創(chuàng)新企業(yè)進程“功不可沒”。與此同時，優(yōu)秀的創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機構(gòu)很極可能受創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)和投資者的“青睞”，成為創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)創(chuàng)新的“孵化器”、提升創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)價值的“貼身專家”及外部投資者信號的“傳感器”。為此研究創(chuàng)業(yè)投資的聲譽效應(yīng)價值匪淺。創(chuàng)業(yè)投資聲譽既是創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機構(gòu)與交易者重復(fù)博弈的結(jié)果，也是一種能吸引更優(yōu)秀創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)和招募更知名承銷商的積淀性因素。 基于我國創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機構(gòu)發(fā)展日趨成熟的背景，本文結(jié)合IPO經(jīng)典折溢價理論、博弈理論和IPO后企業(yè)長期經(jīng)營業(yè)績狀況，以有無創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機構(gòu)參與、創(chuàng)業(yè)投資持股及創(chuàng)業(yè)投資聲譽為研究視角，選取創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場IPOs為樣本，運用靜態(tài)和動態(tài)博弈理論探析了創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機構(gòu)、創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)、外部投資者、發(fā)審機構(gòu)之間的博弈關(guān)系及對IPO效應(yīng)的影響，采用了兩階段回歸模型實證研究了有無創(chuàng)業(yè)投資參與、創(chuàng)業(yè)投資持股比例、創(chuàng)業(yè)投資聲譽對IPO初始收益與長期業(yè)績的影響效應(yīng)。 理論分析發(fā)現(xiàn)：第一，創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機構(gòu)參與不能作為甄別優(yōu)秀創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)的有效信號，長此以往高質(zhì)量的創(chuàng)業(yè)公司被驅(qū)逐出境，為了避免這種情況IPO折價存在；第二，有創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機構(gòu)參與的IPO企業(yè)長期業(yè)績優(yōu)于無創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機構(gòu)參與的IPO后企業(yè)長期業(yè)績；第三，創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機構(gòu)的聲譽高低可以作為評價IPO創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)的質(zhì)量高低的信號之一，因為聲譽較高的創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機構(gòu)推薦發(fā)行的新股通常定價比較合理，不確定性較小，對外部投資者有潛在的暗示指導(dǎo)作用，從而導(dǎo)致創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)IPO折價較低，反之IPO折價較高；第四，聲譽高的創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機構(gòu)發(fā)送高質(zhì)量的信號，從而提升創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)的長期業(yè)績，反之，聲譽低的創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機構(gòu)選擇發(fā)送低質(zhì)量的信號，導(dǎo)致企業(yè)的長期業(yè)績不佳；第五，發(fā)審機構(gòu)與創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機構(gòu)、創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)之間的存在著利益“合謀”，但外部投資者接收不到這種信號，他們之間存在著信息不對稱，正是由于這種信息不對稱的存在導(dǎo)致了IPO折價和IPO后企業(yè)的長期業(yè)績。 實證結(jié)果表明：（1）有無創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機構(gòu)參與對IPOs初始效應(yīng)無影響，即我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場中創(chuàng)業(yè)投資核證作用微弱（幾乎不存在）；而有創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機構(gòu)參與的IPO企業(yè)長期業(yè)績優(yōu)于無創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機構(gòu)參與的IPO企業(yè)的長期業(yè)績，即創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機構(gòu)對創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)有一定的篩選作用。（2）創(chuàng)業(yè)投資持股比例對IPOs初始收益無顯著影響，但對IPO后企業(yè)的長期業(yè)績影響顯著；（3）創(chuàng)業(yè)投資聲譽對IPOs折價程度無顯著影響，即創(chuàng)業(yè)投資聲譽效應(yīng)在IPO初始收益中未能體現(xiàn)。（4）創(chuàng)業(yè)投資聲譽對IPO后企業(yè)長期業(yè)績有顯著正效應(yīng)，即高聲譽創(chuàng)業(yè)投資為企業(yè)帶來高長期回報IPOs長期業(yè)績有顯著正效應(yīng)，說明創(chuàng)業(yè)投資聲譽確實提升了IPO后企業(yè)的長期業(yè)績。 針對博弈分析和實證分析的差異性，本文從創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場特性、非理性投資行為視角進行了解釋，并提出增強創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機構(gòu)聲譽信息效率的相關(guān)建議。如：增強IPO審核時創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機構(gòu)聲譽信號有效傳遞，建立與完善創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機構(gòu)聲譽評估體系，構(gòu)筑健全薪酬激勵和約束機制以保證創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機構(gòu)“獨立性”，減少投資者非理性行為以提升創(chuàng)業(yè)投資機構(gòu)聲譽信息效率及制定落實相應(yīng)法律法規(guī)以促進創(chuàng)業(yè)投資有序發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:VC is an important promoter of cultivation, screening high quality enterprise, get rid of the financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises is the heavy weapon, especially to accelerate the enterprise to complete the listing plan and accelerate the development of the enterprise technological innovation process "contributed". At the same time, venture capital institutions is very outstanding entrepreneurs and investors may be affected by the "favor", become the enterprise innovation incubator, enhance the enterprise value of the "personal expert" and "sensor signal outside investors." the price for reputation effect of venture capital value greatly. The reputation of the venture capital institutions and venture capital is not only the result of the game between traders, is also a kind of attractive more and more outstanding entrepreneurial enterprises to recruit well-known underwriters accumulation factors.
The maturity of the background of the development of China's venture capital institutions based on combining IPO classic premium theory, game theory and IPO enterprise long-term operating performance, with no participation in the venture investment institutions, and the reputation of Venture Investment Holdings as the research angle of view, select the GEM market IPOs as a sample, using the static and dynamic game the theory of venture capital institutions, enterprises, external investors, the game relation between the trial mechanism and influence on the IPO effect, the empirical study has no venture capital to participate in the two stage regression model, venture capital holdings, the effect of venture capital reputation effects on IPO initial return and long term performance.
Theoretical analysis shows that: first, venture capital institutions participate not as effective screening of outstanding entrepreneurial enterprises, if things go on like this high-quality start-up companies were deported, in order to avoid this situation IPO second discount; enterprise IPO is involved in the venture investment institutions for the long term performance is better than the non participation of venture capital institutions IPO enterprise long-term performance; third, venture capital's reputation as one of the high quality signal evaluation of IPO business, because the reputation of venture capitalists recommended higher IPO pricing than usually is reasonable, the uncertainty is small, suggesting the potential role for external investors, resulting in enterprise IPO discount is relatively low, and the discount of IPO high; fourth, the high reputation of the venture investment institutions to send high quality signal, so as to enhance the long-term performance of enterprises, and vice versa, Select the signal sending low quality low reputation of venture capital institutions, resulting in long-term business performance is poor; fifth, the trial organization and venture capital institutions, enterprises exist among the "conspiracy", but the interests of outside investors can not receive the signal, there is information asymmetry between them, because of the information asymmetry due to the existence of the long-term performance of IPO discount and enterprises after IPO.
The empirical results show that: (1) there is no participation in the venture investment institutions have no effect on the IPOs initial effect, namely China's gem venture capital certification role of weak (almost non-existent); and the enterprise IPO participation of venture capital institutions long-term performance is better than the long-term performance of enterprises IPO venture capital institutions involved, i.e. venture capital institutions screening effect on entrepreneurial enterprises. (2) venture capital shareholding ratio has no significant effect on IPOs initial return, but the long-term performance of enterprises after IPO significant effect; (3) the reputation of the venture capital has no significant effect on IPOs underpricing, the reputation of the venture capital effect is not reflected in the initial return in IPO. (4) the reputation of the venture capital on the long-run performance of IPO after the enterprise has a significant positive effect, namely the high reputation of venture capital for enterprises to bring high long-term returns IPOs long-term performance has a significant positive effect, that is the reputation of the venture capital The long-term performance of IPO has been improved.
According to the difference of game analysis and empirical analysis, this article from the GEM market characteristics, from the perspective of non rational investment behavior is explained, and puts forward relevant suggestions to enhance the reputation of the information efficiency of venture capital institutions. Such as: enhanced IPO audit business reputation signal investment institutions to establish and perfect the effective transfer of venture capital institutions to build reputation evaluation system. Perfecting the salary incentive and restraint mechanism to guarantee the venture capital institutions "independence" to reduce the non rational behavior of investors to enhance the reputation of information efficiency of venture capital institutions and formulate and implement relevant laws and regulations in order to promote the orderly development of venture capital.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F832.51;F224.32

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