中國(guó)私募股權(quán)基金監(jiān)管研究
本文關(guān)鍵詞:中國(guó)私募股權(quán)基金監(jiān)管研究 出處:《遼寧大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文 論文類型:學(xué)位論文
更多相關(guān)文章: 私募股權(quán)基金 監(jiān)管 經(jīng)驗(yàn)借鑒
【摘要】:私募股權(quán)基金作為一種新型的金融中介,可以為企業(yè)提供一種全新的融資方式,企業(yè)可以通過私募股權(quán)基金得到有效的資金供給,,對(duì)于企業(yè)來說,它減緩了融資的難題,為企業(yè)的發(fā)展提供了機(jī)會(huì),同時(shí)也完善了金融市場(chǎng)體系。 從第一只私募股權(quán)基金開始,私募股權(quán)基金在中國(guó)已經(jīng)有了20多年的發(fā)展,它為企業(yè)提供了有效的融資途徑,伴隨著創(chuàng)業(yè)板的推出、企業(yè)融資需求的不斷增加以及各地政府出臺(tái)的優(yōu)惠政策,越來越多的機(jī)構(gòu)和投資者注意到私募股權(quán)基金。 對(duì)于許多中小企業(yè)來說,在信貸環(huán)境不利的情況下,它們又找到了一個(gè)新的融資途徑。然而,由于相關(guān)法律的缺失、不完善,相關(guān)監(jiān)管措施的滯后,我國(guó)私募股權(quán)基金的發(fā)展中存在諸多監(jiān)管真空,在很大程度上制約了我國(guó)私募股權(quán)基金及整個(gè)市場(chǎng)的發(fā)展。 本文共分為四部分:第一部分主要對(duì)市場(chǎng)失靈理論、監(jiān)管的博弈分析、監(jiān)管的效率價(jià)值分析、監(jiān)管激勵(lì)理論的理論基礎(chǔ)進(jìn)行了闡述,并且提出了我國(guó)私募股權(quán)基金在監(jiān)管方面應(yīng)該注意的幾點(diǎn),第二部分分析了我國(guó)私募股權(quán)基金的發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀和監(jiān)管現(xiàn)狀,雖然我國(guó)私募股權(quán)基金不斷在發(fā)展,但是在發(fā)展和監(jiān)管過程中還是存在問題,所以這部分也分析了監(jiān)管存在的問題,接下來的第三部分分析了典型國(guó)家的監(jiān)管制度,得出了我國(guó)私募股權(quán)基金監(jiān)管須借鑒的國(guó)際經(jīng)驗(yàn),包括監(jiān)管模式、信息披露、法律法規(guī)等方面。第四部分根據(jù)前幾部分的分析,對(duì)完善我國(guó)私募股權(quán)基金的監(jiān)管提出了對(duì)策,筆者認(rèn)為我國(guó)應(yīng)從監(jiān)管主體、監(jiān)管的法律法規(guī)、行業(yè)自律以及信息披露等方面出發(fā),采用適合國(guó)情的監(jiān)管模式、私募股權(quán)基金監(jiān)管的法律法規(guī),規(guī)范私募股權(quán)基金的操作,以期保護(hù)投資者利益,推進(jìn)我國(guó)私募股權(quán)基金行業(yè)長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)的進(jìn)步。
[Abstract]:As a new type of financial intermediary, private equity funds can provide a new financing method for enterprises, enterprises can get effective capital supply through private equity funds, for enterprises. It alleviates the problem of financing, provides opportunities for the development of enterprises, and improves the financial market system. From the first private equity fund, private equity funds in China has been more than 20 years of development, it provides an effective financing for enterprises, accompanied by the launch of the gem. Growing demand for corporate financing and preferential policies from governments around the world have led more and more institutions and investors to take note of private equity funds. For many small and medium-sized enterprises, in the case of unfavourable credit environment, they have found a new way of financing. However, due to the lack of relevant laws, imperfect, relevant regulatory measures lag behind. There are many regulatory vacuums in the development of private equity funds in China, which to a great extent restrict the development of private equity funds and the whole market. This paper is divided into four parts: the first part mainly describes the theory of market failure, the game analysis of supervision, the efficiency value analysis of supervision, and the theoretical basis of regulatory incentive theory. And put forward the supervision of private equity funds in China should pay attention to several points, the second part of the analysis of China's private equity fund development and regulatory status, although China's private equity funds are constantly developing. However, there are still problems in the process of development and supervision, so this part also analyzes the problems of supervision. The third part analyzes the regulatory system of typical countries. The author draws the international experience of private equity fund supervision in China, including regulatory model, information disclosure, laws and regulations. Part 4th is based on the previous part of the analysis. To improve the supervision of private equity funds in China, the author puts forward countermeasures, the author thinks that our country should start from the main regulatory body, regulatory laws and regulations, industry self-discipline and information disclosure, and so on, and adopt a regulatory model suitable for the national conditions. In order to protect the interests of investors and promote the long-term progress of China's private equity fund industry, the regulation of private equity fund regulation and the regulation of the operation of private equity fund will be regulated.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:遼寧大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2012
【分類號(hào)】:F832.5
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