本文關(guān)鍵詞：我國(guó)證券投資基金老鼠倉(cāng)行為與治理研究　出處：《廣西大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 老鼠倉(cāng) 基金治理 動(dòng)態(tài)博弈 事件研究法

【摘要】：1998年,我國(guó)首次推出兩家封閉式基金正式揭開了證券投資基金發(fā)展的序幕。歷經(jīng)10多年的快速發(fā)展,截至2012年底,我國(guó)證券投資基金達(dá)到1241只,管理資產(chǎn)合計(jì)36225.52億元,其中,公募基金產(chǎn)品1173只,公募基金資產(chǎn)規(guī)模約合為28661億元,基金賬戶數(shù)為4018.69萬戶。證券投資基金已經(jīng)成為我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)不可或缺的一部分,基金業(yè)的健康發(fā)展對(duì)于我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)的穩(wěn)定持續(xù)發(fā)展有著深遠(yuǎn)的意義。但由于種種原因,基金業(yè)近幾年來頻頻發(fā)生老鼠倉(cāng)事件,這種行為不僅損害了基金資產(chǎn)和基金份額持有人的利益,動(dòng)搖了基金投資者對(duì)基金的投資信心,長(zhǎng)此以往還將引發(fā)基金投資者對(duì)基金業(yè)的信任危機(jī)并影響整個(gè)基金市場(chǎng)的可持續(xù)發(fā)展,進(jìn)而危及我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)的穩(wěn)定。因此,如何有效治理老鼠倉(cāng)以保護(hù)基金持有人的利益,樹立投資者對(duì)基金投資的信心是基金業(yè)發(fā)展的核心問題。本文在前人研究的基礎(chǔ)上,結(jié)合信息不對(duì)稱理論、委托代理理論、聲譽(yù)理論,分析了基金老鼠倉(cāng)產(chǎn)生的原因是信息不對(duì)稱條件下,基金特殊的雙重代理關(guān)系造成的。通過構(gòu)建博弈模型研究老鼠倉(cāng)行為相關(guān)利益主體之間的博弈關(guān)系,求出納什均衡解,并結(jié)合實(shí)際分析老鼠倉(cāng)行為產(chǎn)生的原因主要有：基金經(jīng)理違法成本過低；基金管理公司內(nèi)部監(jiān)管失職；基金經(jīng)理投資渠道受阻；基金投資者維權(quán)困難。在此基礎(chǔ)上本文進(jìn)一步用事件研究法對(duì)老鼠倉(cāng)行為的市場(chǎng)影響進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析,發(fā)現(xiàn)老鼠倉(cāng)事件公布對(duì)涉及老鼠倉(cāng)的基金公司收益有一定的負(fù)面影響,但極為有限。因此,本文研究主要結(jié)論認(rèn)為治理老鼠倉(cāng)需要追究基金管理公司的失職責(zé)任,使基金公司有壓力和動(dòng)力加強(qiáng)內(nèi)部監(jiān)管。
[Abstract]:In 1998, the first two closed-end funds in China officially opened the prelude to the development of securities investment funds. After more than 10 years of rapid development, until end of 2012. There are 1,241 securities investment funds in our country, and the total assets under management are three tillion six hundred and twenty-two billion five hundred and fifty-one million nine hundred and ninety-nine thousand and nine hundred and ninety-nine yuan, of which 1,173 are public offering fund products, and the asset scale of public offering fund is about two tillion eight hundred and sixty-six billion one hundred million yuan. The number of fund accounts is forty million one hundred and eighty-six thousand and nine hundred . Securities investment funds have become an indispensable part of China's capital market. The healthy development of the fund industry has a far-reaching significance for the stable and sustainable development of the capital market in China. However, for various reasons, the fund industry has frequently occurred rat trading events in recent years. This behavior not only damages the interests of fund assets and fund share holders, but also shakes the investment confidence of fund investors. In the long run, it will lead to the trust crisis of fund investors and affect the sustainable development of the whole fund market, thus endangering the stability of China's capital market. How to effectively control the mouse warehouse to protect the interests of fund holders and establish investors' confidence in fund investment is the core problem of fund industry development. This paper combines the theory of asymmetric information on the basis of previous studies. The principal-agent theory and reputation theory analyze the reason why the fund mouse warehouse is produced under the condition of asymmetric information. By constructing a game model to study the game relationship between the stakeholders involved in rat warehouse behavior, the Nash equilibrium solution is obtained. Combined with the actual analysis of the rat warehouse behavior, the main reasons are: the fund manager's illegal cost is too low; Dereliction of duty of internal supervision of fund management company; The investment channel of fund manager is blocked; It is difficult for fund investors to protect their rights. On this basis, this paper further uses the event study method to analyze the market impact of rat warehouse behavior. It is found that the announcement of the rat warehouse event has a certain negative impact on the income of the fund company involved in the mouse warehouse, but it is very limited. The main conclusion of this paper is that it is necessary to investigate the dereliction of duty of fund management companies in order to make the fund companies have the pressure and motivation to strengthen the internal supervision.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：廣西大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51

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