本文關(guān)鍵詞：從代理成本角度分析我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的股利政策　出處：《上海師范大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 創(chuàng)業(yè)板 股利政策 代理成本 公司治理

【摘要】：股利政策是企業(yè)三大財務(wù)行為之一，一直是學(xué)界研究的焦點。而創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場與主板市場在功能和機制設(shè)置上有很大的區(qū)別，這使得研究創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的股利政策具有獨特的意義。同時，本文對我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司股利政策的研究是從代理成本的角度展開的，研究結(jié)論能夠為監(jiān)管層提供我國公司治理以及股利政策兩方面的更好的了解，推進監(jiān)管機構(gòu)對上市公司現(xiàn)金股利分配的監(jiān)管和政策制定，促進證券市場的健康發(fā)展。 本文從規(guī)范研究和實證研究兩個角度對股利代理理論在我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場的適用性進行了研究。本文首先對我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的股利分配現(xiàn)狀進行了總結(jié)和分析，并將創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司股利政策的特征與主板進行比較。 創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司2009年至2011年連續(xù)三年進行現(xiàn)金股利支付的公司的比例在90%左右，同時連續(xù)三年的現(xiàn)金股利支付率分別為37%、36%和38%，由此本文得出了創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司具有高比例派現(xiàn)、高比例送轉(zhuǎn)、股利政策連續(xù)性較好的特征。然后本文從現(xiàn)象著手對我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場的“高送轉(zhuǎn)” 現(xiàn)象進行了理論分析，本文認為創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的大比例資本公積金轉(zhuǎn)增是超募嚴重的必然后果，這個過程并不損害中小股東的利益。隨后本文從理論角度對創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的股利代理理論進行了分析，并分析了利益輸送假說在我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場并不適用。最后本文利用創(chuàng)業(yè)板2009年至2011年三年的數(shù)據(jù)組成混合樣本，設(shè)置衡量代理成本的變量以及顯著影響上市公司股利政策的控制變量，構(gòu)建了多元線性回歸模型。文章通過實證分析的結(jié)果，證實了股利政策代理理論在我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司具有一定的適用性。結(jié)論證明代理成本小、公司治理好的上市公司傾向于派發(fā)較多的現(xiàn)金股利，，降低公司多余的自由現(xiàn)金流，以進一步降低公司的代理成本，更好的保證股東的利益。但由于我國上市公司存在公司治理問題，使得上市公司的一些治理機制不能有效得起到降低公司代理成本的目的，從而無法起到影響上市公司股利政策制定的情況出現(xiàn)。本文同時發(fā)現(xiàn)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的現(xiàn)金股利發(fā)放與企業(yè)的盈利性、企業(yè)規(guī)模、現(xiàn)金流量呈正比例關(guān)系，而與財務(wù)杠桿、企業(yè)未來的成長性呈負比例關(guān)系，而企業(yè)的限售股比例對上市公司的現(xiàn)金股利發(fā)放沒有顯著的影響。所以本文認為我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司在發(fā)放現(xiàn)金股利時充分考慮了企業(yè)的盈利性、未來的成長性以及企業(yè)的代理成本問題，符合股利代理理論中的自由現(xiàn)金流假說，而利益輸送假說在我國并不適用。
[Abstract]:Dividend policy is one of the three financial behaviors of enterprises and has always been the focus of academic research. However, the gem market and the main board market are very different in function and mechanism setting. This makes the research on the dividend policy of gem listed companies has a unique significance. At the same time, the research on the dividend policy of gem listed companies in China is carried out from the perspective of agency cost. The conclusion can provide a better understanding of the corporate governance and dividend policy in China, and promote the supervision and policy formulation of the cash dividend distribution of listed companies. To promote the healthy development of the securities market. This paper studies the applicability of dividend agency theory in the gem market from the perspective of normative research and empirical research. Firstly, this paper summarizes the current situation of dividend distribution of listed companies on the gem. Analysis. And the gem listed company dividend policy characteristics and the main board are compared. From 2009 to 2011, the proportion of companies that paid cash dividends for three consecutive years was about 90%, and the cash dividend payment rate for three consecutive years was 37% respectively. From 36% and 38, this paper draws a conclusion that gem listed companies have a high proportion of cash, a high proportion of transfer. The characteristics of good continuity of dividend policy. Then this paper starts from the phenomenon of the gem market in our country "high transfer" The phenomenon is analyzed theoretically. This paper thinks that the increase of large proportion of capital accumulation fund of gem listed companies is the inevitable consequence of excessive capital raising. This process does not harm the interests of minority shareholders. Then this paper analyzes the dividend agency theory of gem listed companies from the theoretical point of view. Finally, this paper uses the gem data from 2009 to 2011 to form a mixed sample. Setting up variables to measure agency cost and controlling variables that significantly affect dividend policy of listed companies a multivariate linear regression model is constructed. The conclusion proves that the agency theory of dividend policy has certain applicability in the gem listed companies of our country. The conclusion proves that the cost of agency is small and the listed companies with good corporate governance tend to distribute more cash dividends. Reduce the excess free cash flow in order to further reduce the agency costs of the company, better ensure the interests of shareholders. But due to the existence of corporate governance problems in listed companies in China. Some governance mechanisms of listed companies can not play an effective role in reducing agency costs. The paper also finds that the cash dividend distribution of the listed companies is proportional to the profitability, size and cash flow of the listed companies. And with financial leverage, the future growth of enterprises showed a negative proportional relationship. However the proportion of restricted shares has no significant effect on the cash dividend distribution of listed companies. Therefore this paper considers that the profit of the listed companies is considered when issuing cash dividends in the gem of our country. The future growth and agency cost of enterprises are in line with the free cash flow hypothesis in dividend agency theory, but the benefit transmission hypothesis is not applicable in our country.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：上海師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F832.51;F275

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