發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-01-12 04:25

  本文關(guān)鍵詞：金融中介機(jī)構(gòu)聲譽(yù)與IPO前盈余管理關(guān)系實(shí)證研究　出處：《哈爾濱工業(yè)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 金融中介機(jī)構(gòu) 聲譽(yù) IPO 盈余管理

【摘要】：自上世紀(jì)末開(kāi)始，上市公司盈余管理操縱引起國(guó)內(nèi)外學(xué)術(shù)界廣泛關(guān)注。無(wú)論是上市前盈余管理還是上市后盈余管理，都起到了美化財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表的作用，這無(wú)疑給外部投資者甄別有價(jià)值公司增添了困難，加大了信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)，導(dǎo)致逆向選擇等惡果。如何限制公司盈余管理操縱成為實(shí)業(yè)界跟學(xué)術(shù)界的重要課題。而公司在首次公開(kāi)募股過(guò)程中存在著一支協(xié)助它們上市的金融中介機(jī)構(gòu)，主要包括風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)、主承銷(xiāo)商和會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所。隨著我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)和金融中介機(jī)構(gòu)的不斷成熟與發(fā)展，，金融中介機(jī)構(gòu)在參與公司上市過(guò)程中占有越來(lái)越重要的地位，其自身經(jīng)營(yíng)利益及所起到的中介作用對(duì)我國(guó)首次公開(kāi)發(fā)行股票公司的經(jīng)濟(jì)行為和決策產(chǎn)生著重要影響。在協(xié)助企業(yè)上市中，金融中介機(jī)構(gòu)有沒(méi)有發(fā)揮它們盡職調(diào)查的義務(wù)，有沒(méi)有起到認(rèn)證作用，有沒(méi)有起到監(jiān)督以抑制公司盈余管理操縱向外部投資者提供公正、中立的價(jià)值信號(hào)作用。這方面研究還鮮有著述。 本文基于金融中介機(jī)構(gòu)在協(xié)助公司上市過(guò)程中的特殊地位研究它們對(duì)公司上市前盈余管理操縱有何影響，以中國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)2009年10月31日開(kāi)板至2011年9月16日為止上市的264家公司為研究對(duì)象，通過(guò)定義中介機(jī)構(gòu)聲譽(yù)來(lái)反映它們自身綜合實(shí)力，同時(shí)選擇修正jones模型、真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理模型對(duì)比測(cè)算公司盈余管理水平，考察了金融中介機(jī)構(gòu)在參與IPO過(guò)程中在限制公司上市前盈余管理是否有顯著的作用。尤其我們檢驗(yàn)了上市前的盈余管理行為與主承銷(xiāo)商、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)以及會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所聲譽(yù)是否呈負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系。結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)：風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本的參與并沒(méi)有降低公司盈余管理，而且有聲譽(yù)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本和有聲譽(yù)的主承銷(xiāo)商均有鼓勵(lì)公司盈余管理之嫌，而它們的聯(lián)合作用更是加強(qiáng)了盈余管理水平，而有聲譽(yù)的會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所則起到了抑制盈余管理的作用。由此我們得出在我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)剛剛成立，發(fā)行、退市制度等還不健全，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本及主承銷(xiāo)商還是敢于尋找機(jī)會(huì)鋌而走險(xiǎn)與公司勾結(jié)獲得短期利益而并沒(méi)有體現(xiàn)中介機(jī)構(gòu)獨(dú)立性身份。
[Abstract]:Since the end of the last century, earnings management manipulation of listed companies has attracted extensive attention in the academic circles both at home and abroad. Both pre-listing earnings management and post-listing earnings management have played a role in beautifying financial statements. This undoubtedly makes it difficult for external investors to identify valuable companies and increases information asymmetries. How to limit the manipulation of earnings management has become an important issue in industry and academia. However, there is a financial intermediary to assist them in the process of initial public offering (IPO). It mainly includes venture capital institutions, principal underwriters and accounting firms. With the development of capital market and financial intermediaries in China. Financial intermediaries play an increasingly important role in the process of participating in the listing of companies. Its own operating interests and its intermediary role have an important impact on the economic behavior and decision-making of China's initial public offering stock companies in assisting the listing of enterprises. Have financial intermediaries played their due diligence obligations, whether they have played a certification role, whether they have served as supervision to curb the manipulation of corporate earnings management to provide justice to outside investors. Neutral value signalling. There are few works in this field. Based on the special status of financial intermediaries in assisting companies in the process of listing, this paper studies how they affect the earnings management manipulation before listing. From October 31st 2009 to September 16th 2011, 264 companies listed in China growth Enterprise Market (gem) were selected as the research objects. By defining the reputation of intermediary institutions to reflect their own comprehensive strength, at the same time choose to modify the jones model, real earnings management model to measure the level of corporate earnings management. This paper examines whether financial intermediaries play a significant role in limiting earnings management before listing in the process of participating in IPO. In particular, we examine earnings management behavior and lead underwriters before listing. The results show that the participation of venture capital does not reduce the earnings management. Moreover, both reputable venture capital and reputable principal underwriters have the suspicion of encouraging earnings management, and their combined role has strengthened the earnings management level. The reputation of the accounting firm has played a role in restraining earnings management. From this we draw a conclusion that the gem market has just been established issuance delisting system and so on is not perfect. Venture capital and lead underwriters still dare to look for opportunities to take risks and collude with the company to obtain short-term benefits and do not reflect the independent identity of the intermediary.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：哈爾濱工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F830.42;F832.51

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