本文關鍵詞：我國上市公司股權激勵方式選擇的影響因素研究　出處：《湖南大學》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

  更多相關文章： 股票期權 限制性股票 股權激勵 方式選擇 影響因素

【摘要】：隨著我國經(jīng)濟高速發(fā)展，現(xiàn)代公司制度建立，企業(yè)所有權與經(jīng)營權分離導致的代理問題日益嚴重。起源于上世紀50年代的股權激勵制度，歷經(jīng)幾十年的發(fā)展，證明能夠?qū)芾韺悠鸬介L期激勵作用，，已成為激勵代理人的行為與委托人利益一致、調(diào)和委托人和代理人兩權分離矛盾的有效手段。在我國證券市場日臻成熟的今天，已有越來越多的上市公司進行股權激勵，運用最多的是股票期權和限制性股票這兩種激勵方式。 本文主要研究股票期權和限制性股票這兩種股權激勵方式，比較了股票期權和限制性股票的制度異同，選取2010年1月1日至2013年2月28日我國公布過股權激勵預案的上市公司為樣本，建立logistic模型，分析了各種公司特征變量對股權激勵標的選擇傾向變量的影響，發(fā)現(xiàn)企業(yè)成長性、企業(yè)盈利情況是影響股權激勵方式選擇的主要因素，高成長性、盈利情況好的企業(yè)，分別以顯著性水平5%和10%傾向于選擇股票期權方式；企業(yè)現(xiàn)金流動性、行業(yè)性質(zhì)、控股股東性質(zhì)、高管年齡與高管持股比例對企業(yè)選擇股權激勵方式的影響不顯著；企業(yè)現(xiàn)金流動性高、國有企業(yè)更傾向于選擇股票期權的激勵方式，但并不顯著。股權集中度、獨立董事比例、董事長與總經(jīng)理兼任與否這三個公司治理特征對企業(yè)選擇股權激勵方式的影響不顯著。 因此，為充分發(fā)揮股權激勵的激勵作用，企業(yè)應優(yōu)化股權結(jié)構，加強獨立董事和監(jiān)事會對股權激勵的監(jiān)督制衡，并設置專門的薪酬委員會，結(jié)合實際，選擇恰當?shù)墓蓹嗉罘绞�，形成企業(yè)特有的激勵模式，并逐步擴大企業(yè)股權激勵的接受面。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of our economy, the establishment of modern company system, the agency problem caused by the separation of enterprise ownership and management rights is becoming more and more serious. The equity incentive system, which originated in -50s, has experienced decades of development. Proved to be able to play a long-term incentive role to the management, has become an incentive agent behavior consistent with the interests of the principal. The effective means of reconciling the contradiction between the principal and the agent. Nowadays, more and more listed companies have carried out equity incentive in the stock market of our country. Stock options and restricted stocks are the two most widely used incentive methods. This paper mainly studies the stock option and restricted stock, and compares the institutional similarities and differences between stock option and restricted stock. From January 1st 2010 to February 28th 2013, the listed companies with stock incentive plan were selected as samples, and the logistic model was established. This paper analyzes the influence of various company characteristic variables on the choice tendency variable of the stock right incentive target, and finds that the growth of the enterprise and the profit of the enterprise are the main factors affecting the choice of the equity incentive mode, and the high growth is the main factor. Enterprises with good profitability tend to choose stock options with significant levels of 5% and 10% respectively; The cash liquidity, industry nature, controlling shareholder nature, senior executive age and the proportion of executive stock ownership have no significant influence on the choice of equity incentive mode. Because of the high cash liquidity, state-owned enterprises prefer to choose the incentive mode of stock option, but it is not significant. The degree of equity concentration, the proportion of independent directors. The three corporate governance characteristics of chairman and general manager have no significant influence on the choice of equity incentive. Therefore, in order to give full play to the incentive role of equity incentive, enterprises should optimize the ownership structure, strengthen the independent director and board of supervisors of the supervision and balance of equity incentive, and set up a special compensation committee, combined with the reality. Choose the appropriate equity incentive mode, form a unique incentive model, and gradually expand the acceptance of corporate equity incentive.
【學位授予單位】：湖南大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F275;F276.6;F832.51

【參考文獻】

相關期刊論文 前3條

1 季勇;;公司治理對股權激勵方式選擇的影響——基于中國資本市場的實證分析[J];系統(tǒng)工程;2010年03期

2 劉浩;孫錚;;西方股權激勵契約結(jié)構研究綜述——兼論對中國上市公司股權激勵制度的啟示[J];經(jīng)濟管理;2009年04期

3 趙祥功;俞瑋;;股權激勵中股票期權與限制性股票方式的比較研究[J];經(jīng)濟師;2011年01期

本文編號：1395732