本文關(guān)鍵詞：我國家族控股上市公司控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離對(duì)投資效率的影響研究　出處：《西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

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【摘要】：自改革開放以來,我國資本市場(chǎng)規(guī)模逐步壯大,私營資本發(fā)展迅速。隨著深市中小板塊的發(fā)展及2009年創(chuàng)業(yè)板在深市推出,我國家族控股上市公司發(fā)展迅猛,已成為國民經(jīng)濟(jì)的重要組成部分。針對(duì)家族控股上市公司,學(xué)術(shù)界對(duì)其在控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離狀況下的公司治理問題進(jìn)行了一些研究,諸如兩權(quán)分離對(duì)公司價(jià)值的影響、對(duì)投資行為的影響等,并得出了控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離會(huì)對(duì)公司價(jià)值、投資行為等產(chǎn)生影響的結(jié)論。作為家族控股上市公司終極控制人的自然人或由自然人組成的家族性群體基于經(jīng)濟(jì)人假設(shè),他們會(huì)利用自己手中掌握的控制權(quán)為家族謀取最大利益。當(dāng)控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)的分離度出現(xiàn)變化時(shí),家族控制人基于對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和利益的考量,他們對(duì)上市公司的投資行為施加的影響可能發(fā)生改變,由此帶來的投資效率也可能發(fā)生改變。而投資作為上市公司的一項(xiàng)重要活動(dòng),是公司發(fā)展的主要?jiǎng)恿臀磥憩F(xiàn)金流量增長(zhǎng)的重要基礎(chǔ),投資是否有效率將直接影響公司的業(yè)績(jī)和發(fā)展前景。投資效率高則說明公司未來發(fā)展前景較好,能夠吸引市場(chǎng)投資者的投資熱情。因此,研究家族控股上市公司控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離對(duì)投資效率的影響,對(duì)于在控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離的基礎(chǔ)上判斷家族控股上市公司發(fā)展前景、如何有效提振投資者信心具有積極的作用。 在檢索國內(nèi)有關(guān)研究文獻(xiàn)時(shí),發(fā)現(xiàn)國內(nèi)學(xué)者在研究家族控股上市公司控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離時(shí),多是研究?jī)蓹?quán)分離對(duì)公司價(jià)值、公司績(jī)效的影響,而忽視了對(duì)影響公司價(jià)值或績(jī)效的傳導(dǎo)機(jī)制——投資效率的研究。因此,研究家族控股上市公司控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離對(duì)公司投資效率的影響可能會(huì)更清晰地揭示由于兩權(quán)分離而影響公司價(jià)值或績(jī)效的黑匣子。 本文共分六章,各章主要內(nèi)容如下： 第一章.緒論 本章首先介紹了本文的研究背景和研究意義,其次對(duì)研究思路和研究框架進(jìn)行了闡述。在研究背景中加入了兩個(gè)在本文實(shí)證部分收集到的具有明顯對(duì)比特征的樣本公司,它們的控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離度的變化以及隨之而來的投資效率的變化對(duì)本文的寫作意圖有一個(gè)很形象的詮釋。在研究意義部分,簡(jiǎn)要介紹了本文所要研究的課題的理論意義和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。為了使本文的研究思路有一個(gè)更為直觀的感受,在緒論部分對(duì)研究思路進(jìn)行了框架式處理。 第二章.研究現(xiàn)狀 由于本文搜集到的相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)較為有限,因此,將上市公司控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離對(duì)投資效率影響方面的研究現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行了一個(gè)梳理。有學(xué)者基于大股東與中小股東的代理理論,研究得出控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)的分離會(huì)引起公司的非效率投資。有的學(xué)者針對(duì)非效率投資的兩個(gè)主要表現(xiàn)形式——投資不足和投資過度進(jìn)行了研究,一些學(xué)者得出兩權(quán)分離度越大越容易引起公司投資不足的結(jié)論,但也有學(xué)者在對(duì)樣本公司區(qū)分產(chǎn)權(quán)后的研究中得出兩權(quán)分離度與公司投資過度呈現(xiàn)出顯著正相關(guān)關(guān)系的結(jié)論。 第三章.理論分析 本章首先對(duì)在本文中涉及到的諸如家族企業(yè)、終極控制人、控制權(quán)、現(xiàn)金流權(quán)以及投資效率進(jìn)行了概念界定。在概念界定部分的寫作模式主要是先列舉兩三個(gè)現(xiàn)有的對(duì)該概念的界定并對(duì)該界定有何特點(diǎn)進(jìn)行了簡(jiǎn)單述評(píng),然后給出本文的界定并指出其特點(diǎn)或意義。 其次,對(duì)本文研究中涉及到的理論基礎(chǔ)進(jìn)行了簡(jiǎn)要介紹。在本文中所涉及到的理論基礎(chǔ)主要有委托代理理論、不完全契約理論以及控制權(quán)理論。在對(duì)理論基礎(chǔ)進(jìn)行了簡(jiǎn)要介紹后,本文還對(duì)相關(guān)理論與本文的關(guān)系進(jìn)行了闡述,以表明該理論對(duì)本文有何指導(dǎo)意義。 再次,對(duì)控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離及其實(shí)現(xiàn)方式進(jìn)行了簡(jiǎn)要介紹。在本文中,由于控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離是一個(gè)很重要的概念,因此對(duì)什么是控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離進(jìn)行了界定。然后對(duì)產(chǎn)生控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)類型,如直接控制式、金字塔式和交叉持股式進(jìn)行了闡述。 最后,對(duì)控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離和投資效率之間的關(guān)系進(jìn)行了較為深刻的解析。此處是本文寫作思路的邏輯所在,通過本節(jié)分析可以得出控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)的分離會(huì)對(duì)家族控股上市公司的投資效率產(chǎn)生影響,分離度越大,投資非效率程度越嚴(yán)重。而基于利益協(xié)同效應(yīng),較高的現(xiàn)金流權(quán)在兩權(quán)分離時(shí)對(duì)投資效率的負(fù)面影響具有一定的抑制作用。 第四章.實(shí)證研究設(shè)計(jì) 本章首先在控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離對(duì)投資效率的影響的分析基礎(chǔ)上提出了本文的兩個(gè)研究假設(shè)。其次,對(duì)本文中用到的變量進(jìn)行了定義并列出了各個(gè)變量的計(jì)量方法。再次,對(duì)本文應(yīng)用的模型和樣本進(jìn)行了闡釋。本文運(yùn)用了兩個(gè)模型,一個(gè)是衡量公司投資是過度還是不足以及多大程度上的過度或不足的Richardson模型,這是一個(gè)在國內(nèi)外應(yīng)用得較多的成熟的模型,另一個(gè)是以控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)的分離度為關(guān)鍵解釋變量、投資過度或投資不足程度為被解釋變量的多元回歸模型。本文的樣本公司范圍限定在家族控股上市公司,并根據(jù)樣本在樣本選定期間是否被ST處理以及關(guān)鍵數(shù)據(jù)是否完整等條件進(jìn)行了進(jìn)一步的篩選。 第五章.實(shí)證檢驗(yàn) 本章首先基于Richardson模型對(duì)家族控股上市公司的投資效率進(jìn)行了實(shí)證研究,得到本文所選樣本的投資效率數(shù)據(jù)。 其次,利用得到的投資效率數(shù)據(jù)并將它們分為投資過度和投資不足兩組,然后運(yùn)用模型二分別驗(yàn)證家族控股上市公司終極控制人控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離對(duì)投資過度和投資不足的影響,研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離度與家族控股上市公司投資不足顯著正相關(guān)。 再次,基于利益協(xié)同效應(yīng),將投資過度樣本組與投資不足樣本組按照各組現(xiàn)金流權(quán)中位數(shù)為線再分為高現(xiàn)金流權(quán)組和低現(xiàn)金流權(quán)組以檢驗(yàn)在不同現(xiàn)金流權(quán)水平下家族控股上市公司終極控制人控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離對(duì)投資過度和投資不足的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：控制性家族持有現(xiàn)金流權(quán)較低時(shí),兩權(quán)分離度越大越易導(dǎo)致公司投資不足。 最后,由于Richardson模型應(yīng)用條件的限制和模型二中所用變量不同的計(jì)量方式可能對(duì)實(shí)證結(jié)果帶來影響,本文在此對(duì)前節(jié)的實(shí)證結(jié)果進(jìn)行了穩(wěn)健性檢驗(yàn),發(fā)現(xiàn)前節(jié)的檢驗(yàn)結(jié)果并沒有受到模型應(yīng)用條件和變量不同計(jì)量方式的影響,可以確認(rèn)實(shí)證結(jié)果是穩(wěn)健的。 在本章中,運(yùn)用了描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)、相關(guān)性分析以及多元線性回歸等計(jì)量方法。 第六章.研究結(jié)論、對(duì)策與本文的局限 本章首先在前文的理論分析和實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)的基礎(chǔ)上得出了本文的研究結(jié)論,即：①我國家族控股上市公司普遍存在著投資非效率現(xiàn)象；②控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)的分離會(huì)影響家族控股上市公司的投資效率,分離度越大,投資不足越嚴(yán)重；③控制性家族持有現(xiàn)金流權(quán)較低時(shí)兩權(quán)分離度越大越易導(dǎo)致公司投資不足。 其次,基于研究結(jié)論提出了針對(duì)性的對(duì)策建議。即：①壓縮控制鏈的層級(jí),以緩解普遍存在著的非效率投資行為問題；②限制家族控股上市公司控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)的分離度以抑制投資不足；③提高家族控制人的現(xiàn)金流權(quán)以限制其非效率投資行為。 最后,對(duì)本文寫作中的一些局限性作了簡(jiǎn)單的闡述。 本文的主要貢獻(xiàn)是： 首先,拓展了家族控股上市公司控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離引起的公司治理問題的研究視角。目前國內(nèi)學(xué)者基于家族控股上市公司控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離的研究多集中于對(duì)公司價(jià)值影響方面,且大多都得出兩權(quán)分離度對(duì)公司價(jià)值具有負(fù)面影響的結(jié)論,而對(duì)于影響公司價(jià)值傳導(dǎo)機(jī)制之一的投資鮮有討論。本文則是從投資效率這一角度著力,研究在家族控股上市公司范圍內(nèi),終極控制人控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)的分離對(duì)投資效率的影響,以期驗(yàn)證兩權(quán)分離度的不同是否對(duì)公司投資效率產(chǎn)生不同的影響結(jié)果。 其次,填補(bǔ)文獻(xiàn)研究空白。在本文能夠搜集到的文獻(xiàn)中,大多是研究控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離所產(chǎn)生的一系列代理問題,而并未對(duì)家族控股上市公司這一特殊公司群體在控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離下的投資效率進(jìn)行探討。因此,本文試圖對(duì)此進(jìn)行有益的嘗試并試圖填補(bǔ)在這一研究方面的文獻(xiàn)空白。 本文需進(jìn)一步研究的方向： (1)本文將主要精力用于解決控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)的分離對(duì)家族上市公司投資的影響,且主要是負(fù)面影響,而未對(duì)兩權(quán)分離是否對(duì)公司的投資有正向影響進(jìn)行分析和探討。因此,未來在兩權(quán)分離度方面的研究可以對(duì)此進(jìn)行探討。 (2)由于目前很難獲得終極控制人對(duì)不同投資項(xiàng)目的偏好,無法研究終極控制人在兩權(quán)分離的情況下對(duì)不同投資項(xiàng)目的代理問題。若在未來能夠獲得這些數(shù)據(jù)則可以對(duì)此進(jìn)行研究。 (3)已有學(xué)者研究得出,有侵占公司資源動(dòng)機(jī)的控股股東更傾向于讓上市公司持有更多的現(xiàn)金流。因此,可以研究家族控股上市公司持有的現(xiàn)金流量是否對(duì)公司的投資效率產(chǎn)生了影響,是何種影響。但在進(jìn)行研究時(shí)要注意因解釋變量與被解釋變量的相互影響作用而導(dǎo)致的模型內(nèi)生性問題。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, the scale of China's capital market is gradually growing, private capital has developed rapidly. With the development of the gem and small plates of Shenzhen in 2009 in Shenzhen, China's family holding listed company is developing rapidly, has become an important part of the national economy. The family holding listed companies, the academic circles have carried out some research on the control rights and cash flow rights separation under the condition of corporate governance, such as the separation of two rights on the value of the company, the impact on investment behavior, and get the control rights and cash flow rights separation will affect the value of the company, investment behavior and other conclusions. As the ultimate controller of listed family controlled natural person the company consists of natural person or family groups based on the hypothesis of economic man, they will use their power in the hands of the maximum benefit for the family. When the control right and now Separation of gold Liuquan changes when the family control of risk and benefits based on considerations, they exert influence on the investment behavior of listed companies may be changed, the investment efficiency of the resulting changes may also occur. Investment as an important activity of the listed company, the company is the main motive force of development and future cash flow the growth of an important basis, investment efficiency will directly affect the company's performance and prospects. The efficiency of investment is the company's future development prospects, the market can attract investors. Because of this, the study of family holding flow rights separation effect on the efficiency of investment control right and cash flow of listed companies, for the basic right of separation in the judgment of control rights and cash holdings family prospects of listed companies, how to effectively boost investor confidence has a positive effect.
In the domestic related research literature retrieval, found that the domestic scholars in the study of family holding listed company control rights and cash flow rights separation, is much research on the separation of two rights on the company value, affect the company's performance, while ignoring the conduction mechanism to affect the company's value or performance -- A Study on the efficiency of investment. Therefore, the study of family holdings the listed company control rights and cash flow rights separation effect on investment efficiency may reveal more clearly the separation of the two powers affect the value of the company or performance of the black box.
This article is divided into six chapters, the main contents of each chapter are as follows:
Chapter 1. Introduction
This chapter first introduces the background and significance of the research, then describes the research ideas and research framework. Adding two collected in the empirical part of this article has obvious contrast characteristics of Sample Firms in the background of the change of control rights and cash flow rights of their separation and subsequent changes in the efficiency of investment the intention of writing this article is a very vivid interpretation. In the part of the research significance, briefly introduces the theoretical significance of this paper is to study the topic and practical significance. In order to make the research ideas of this paper have a more intuitive feel, in the introduction part, research ideas are framed.
The second chapter. The present situation of the study
Because of the relevant literature to the relatively limited, therefore, the listed company control rights and cash flow rights separation effect on investment efficiency the research progress of a sort. Some scholars agency theory of majority shareholders and minority shareholders based on the separation of control rights and cash Liuquan will cause non efficiency investment company some scholars. According to the two main forms of non efficiency investment, under investment and over investment are studied, some scholars concluded the separation of two rights more easily lead to inadequate investment results, but there are also scholars in the study of different property rights after the Sample Firms that the separation of two rights and corporate over investment show a significant positive correlation between the results.
The third chapter. Theoretical analysis
This chapter firstly in this paper including family enterprise, ultimate controller, control right, cash flow right and investment efficiency. The definition in the definition of the definition part of the writing mode is to enumerate the two or three existing on the definition of the concept and the definition of what the characteristics of the simple review, then this paper gives the definition and points out its characteristics and significance.
Secondly, on the theoretical basis of this study involved are briefly introduced. The theoretical basis involved in this paper include principal-agent theory, incomplete contract theory and control theory. The theoretical basis is briefly introduced, the relationship between the related theory and the described in what is the theory shows that the significance of this paper.
Again, the control rights and cash flow rights separation and its realization are introduced. In this paper, the control rights and cash flow rights separation is a very important concept, so what is the control rights and cash flow rights separation was defined. Then the control rights and cash flow rights separation the ownership structure types, such as direct control type, pyramid and cross ownership type are discussed.
Finally, the relationship between control rights and cash flow rights and the separation between investment efficiency are analyzed deeply. It is this paper's writing logic, through this section can be obtained by the analysis of control rights and cash flow rights and the separation of the family holding listed companies investment efficiency impact, the greater the degree of separation. The more serious inefficient investment. And based on the interests of synergies, the higher the cash flow right in the separation of two rights the negative impact on the investment efficiency have a certain effect.
The fourth chapter. Empirical research design
This chapter first analysis based on control rights and cash flow rights separation effect on the investment efficiency of the proposed two hypotheses of this paper. Secondly, the variables of this paper lists the definition of the measurement of each variable. Thirdly, the application of the model and the interpretation of in this paper. Use two models, one is a measure of corporate investment is excessive or lack of Richardson model and to what extent the excessive or insufficient, this is a more applied in the domestic and foreign mature model, another is to separate the control rights and cash flow rights is the key explanatory variables, investment excessive or inadequate investment degree for the multiple regression model explanatory variables. The Sample Firms limited range of Listed Companies in the family holding, and according to the sample period in the sample is selected by the ST processing and the key data is finished The whole condition was further screened.
The fifth chapter. Empirical test
In this chapter, based on the Richardson model, the investment efficiency of the family holding companies is empirically studied, and the investment efficiency data of the selected samples are obtained.
Secondly, using the investment efficiency data and divide them into excessive investment and insufficient investment in two groups, and then use the model to verify each two family holding listed companies ultimate control rights and cash flow rights separation effect, excessive and insufficient investment on investment research found: the control rights and cash flow rights and the degree of separation of the family holding listed inadequate investment are significantly correlated.
Again, based on the interests of synergies, the excessive investment and insufficient investment in the sample group sample group according to the median value of cash flow right are divided into high cash flow right group and low cash flow rights group to test in different level of cash flow right under the ultimate control of family owned listed company control rights and cash flow rights separation effect and excessive investment the lack of investment. It is found that the control of the family holding cash flow rights is low, separation of two rights more easily lead to underinvestment.
Finally, because the measurement of variables used to limit the application conditions of Richardson model and model 2 different effects on the empirical results, based on the empirical results of section of the robustness test, test results found in the preceding section was not affected by model application conditions and variables of different measurement methods, the empirical results can be confirmed robust.
In this chapter, descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and multivariate linear regression are used.
The sixth chapter, the conclusion, the countermeasures and the limitations of this article
In this chapter, based on theoretical analysis and empirical test of the above obtained on the conclusion of this article, namely, the Chinese family controlled listed companies generally have the phenomenon of non efficiency of investment; the separation of control rights and cash flow rights will affect the family holding listed companies investment efficiency, the greater separation of investment. The more serious the shortage; the controlling family holding cash flow right lower degree of separation of the two rights is more easily lead to underinvestment.
Secondly, based on the research conclusion put forward the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions: 1. The compression control chain level, non efficiency investment behavior problems to alleviate widespread; the limitation of family controlling rights and cash flow rights separation degree of control of listed companies to curb investment shortage; the increase of cash flow right to family controller the limit behavior of non efficiency investment.
Finally, some limitations in this paper are briefly described.
The main contributions of this article are:
First, expand the research perspective of corporate governance of family holding rights and cash flow rights separation caused by the control of listed companies. At present, the domestic scholars study of family owned listed company control rights and cash flow rights separation based on the influence to the company value, and most of them are the separation of two rights has a negative impact on firm value the conclusion, for one of the value of the transmission mechanism affect the company's investment few discussions. This article is from the perspective of investment efficiency to research in family holding listed companies within the scope of the ultimate control rights and cash flow rights separation effect on the efficiency of investment, in order to verify whether the different separation of two rights of the company the efficiency of investment have different effects.
Secondly, to fill the blank in this paper. The literature research to collect literature, mostly a series of agency problems of control rights and cash flow rights separation produced, not for family holding listed companies of this special group in the company control right and cash flow right under the separation of investment efficiency are discussed. Therefore, this paper trying to try and try to fill in the blank of research literature.
The direction of this paper is to be further studied.
(1) this article will mainly focus on issues affecting the separation of control rights and cash flow rights of family investment in listed companies, and is a major negative impact, but not for the separation of two rights are analyzed and discussed the positive impact on the company's investment in the future. Therefore, the separation of the two powers of the might to explore.
(2) because it is difficult to get the preference of the ultimate controller to different investment projects at present, it is impossible to study the agency problem of the ultimate controller in different investment projects under the separation of the two powers. If we can get these data in the future, we can do this research.
(3) of some scholars that had occupied the company's resources motivation of controlling shareholders tend to allow listed companies to hold more cash flow. Therefore, the cash flow can be of family holding listed companies held by whether the impact on investment efficiency, what kind of impact. But the study should pay attention to a problem due to interaction of explanatory variables and explained variables of the model.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51;F224

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