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  本文關(guān)鍵詞：我國上市公司股權(quán)激勵績效實證研究　出處：《山東農(nóng)業(yè)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 上市公司 股權(quán)激勵 事件研究法 績效

【摘要】：股權(quán)激勵制度是解決現(xiàn)代企業(yè)委托與代理關(guān)系的重要途徑，它有助于解決股東與經(jīng)營者的代理問題，促使公司管理層規(guī)避短期行為而使其更多地關(guān)注公司的長期持續(xù)發(fā)展。根據(jù)現(xiàn)代激勵理論，股權(quán)激勵是一種有效的長期激勵方式，是適合現(xiàn)代企業(yè)長期發(fā)展的激勵手段。在國外成熟市場，股權(quán)激勵是促進公司經(jīng)營者與股東形成利益共同體的有力手段。但是，由于我國市場經(jīng)濟所處的階段不同，這種激勵機制在我國所面臨的環(huán)境和條件不同，激勵機制所產(chǎn)生的績效受其所在的環(huán)境和條件影響。正是基于這樣的思考，本文對我國上市公司股權(quán)激勵的績效進行了實證研究。 本文以2006年至2010年之間實施股權(quán)激勵的我國上市公司為研究對象，旨在通過實證研究揭示我國上市公司股權(quán)激勵的市場績效和業(yè)績績效。首先，采用了事件研究法來研究我國上市公司股權(quán)激勵的市場績效。其次，選取反映上市公司經(jīng)營業(yè)績?nèi)驳臓I運能力、發(fā)展能力、償債能力和盈利能力的財務(wù)指標(biāo)，利用SPSS軟件進行因子分析，得到一個綜合反映公司經(jīng)營業(yè)績的指標(biāo)，以此作為因變量表示股權(quán)激勵業(yè)績績效，以企業(yè)用于股權(quán)激勵的股份比例作為自變量來進行線性回歸研究股權(quán)激勵的業(yè)績績效。 本文的研究結(jié)果表明：我國上市公司股權(quán)激勵的市場績效并不顯著，，并且對經(jīng)營業(yè)績無明顯的改善。股權(quán)激勵在事件日有短暫的超額收益率，但僅在股權(quán)激勵事件日當(dāng)日產(chǎn)生了積極的市場績效；而且，實行股權(quán)激勵后，上市公司的經(jīng)營業(yè)績并無顯著的變化，公司的經(jīng)營業(yè)績未得到明顯的改善。 通過實證分析結(jié)果可見，我國的上市公司在制定經(jīng)營者股權(quán)激勵計劃過程中確實還存在一些問題。針對這些問題，本文最后提出了完善上市公司經(jīng)營者股權(quán)激勵公司內(nèi)部環(huán)境和改善公司外部環(huán)境方面的建議。 本文共八章，各章主要內(nèi)容如下： 第一章引言。介紹了本文的選題背景及意義，回顧了該領(lǐng)域國內(nèi)外相關(guān)的研究文獻，并簡要概述了本文的主要研究內(nèi)容、研究框架以及采用的研究方法。 第二章理論研究部分。該部分首先對包括委托代理理論和人力資本理論等在內(nèi)的股權(quán)激勵相關(guān)理論基礎(chǔ)進行了回顧，為后續(xù)實證研究樹立理論框架。其次，介紹了股權(quán)激勵相關(guān)基本概念，并介紹了股權(quán)激勵的方式。 第三章我國上市公司實施股權(quán)激勵的制度背景及現(xiàn)狀分析。首先展示了我國上市公司實施股權(quán)激勵的制度背景；其次對我國已推出股權(quán)激勵方案的上市公司進行總體考察，包括我國上市公司已推出股權(quán)激勵方案在不同年份的統(tǒng)計、所處的行業(yè)分布、公司的類型、股權(quán)激勵方式的選擇、股權(quán)激勵股票的來源及其實施股權(quán)激勵的力度。 第四章股權(quán)激勵績效的度量及評價方法。首先介紹了股權(quán)激勵績效的度量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，包括抽象的、無法量化的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和實際的、可以量化的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)兩類；其次介紹股權(quán)激勵績效的度量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)選擇，績效評價的常用方法包括托賓Q值法、經(jīng)濟增加值法、平衡積分卡法、財務(wù)指標(biāo)法；最終選擇財務(wù)指標(biāo)法作為本文的績效評價方法。 第五章我國上市公司股權(quán)激勵的市場績效。首先介紹了事件研究法的研究方法，其次介紹了事件研究法的具體步驟：第一，定義事件與時間窗口。第二，構(gòu)造樣本。第三，正常收益模型的介紹。第四，計算超額收益率與累積超額收益率。最終得出實證結(jié)果為市場對股權(quán)激勵計劃的實施的反應(yīng)總體上是不顯著的，即認(rèn)為實施股權(quán)激勵計劃的公司并不能對其公司股價產(chǎn)生明顯積極的作用，投資于該類公司并不能夠獲得一定的超額收益。同時也說明了投資者對于上市公司實施股權(quán)激勵的反應(yīng)并不一致，市場對推出股權(quán)激勵計劃的公司的反應(yīng)并不是很積極。 第六章我國上市公司股權(quán)激勵的業(yè)績績效。該部分首先選取了能夠反映上市公司盈利能力、償債能力、成長能力、資產(chǎn)運營能力的四個方面八個財務(wù)指標(biāo)作為因子分析的起點。然后運用因子分析法得出衡量企業(yè)的業(yè)績績效的綜合因子。本文以上市公司業(yè)績指標(biāo)的綜合因子得分作為因變量，以用于激勵的股份占總股本的比例為自變量，采用一元回歸分析模型進行回歸分析。得出我國上市公司業(yè)績績效和股權(quán)激勵并不相關(guān)。 第七章結(jié)論與建議。提出了建立健全股權(quán)激勵公司內(nèi)部環(huán)境的建議和建立健全股權(quán)激勵公司外部環(huán)境的建議，得出了我國上市公司股權(quán)激勵的市場績效不顯著，并且對經(jīng)營業(yè)績無明顯的改善的研究結(jié)果。最后提出了論文的進一步的研究方向。
[Abstract]:Equity incentive system is an important way to solve the modern enterprise principal-agent relationship, it is helpful to solve the agency problem between shareholders and operators, prompting the short-term actions of managers to pay more attention to the company's long-term sustainable development. According to the modern incentive theory, stock ownership incentive is an effective long-term incentive mode is for the long-term development of the modern enterprises incentive means. In the mature foreign markets, equity incentive is a powerful means of promoting the interests of the community, shareholders and managers. However, due to China's market economy at different stages, this kind of incentive mechanism in our country faces different environments and conditions, from the incentive system performance influence of the environment and conditions. It is based on this thinking, this paper on China's listed companies equity incentive performance by empirical research.
The implementation of equity incentive of Listed Companies in China from 2006 to 2010 this paper as the research object, through empirical research reveals the equity incentive of Listed Companies in China market performance and performance. First, using the event study method to study the listed company's equity incentive market performance. Secondly, selected to reflect the performance of listed companies. The operation ability, development ability, financial solvency and profitability index, factor analysis by SPSS software, get the operating performance of a comprehensive reflection of the company's index as the dependent variables are expressed in the performance of equity incentive, equity incentive for enterprises the proportion of shares as independent variables to the linear regression analysis of equity incentive performance.
The results of this study show that: the equity incentive of Listed Companies in China market performance is not significant, and there is no obvious improvement of business performance. In the event of equity incentive on transient excess return, but only in the equity incentive event day had a positive market performance; moreover, the implementation of equity incentive of listed companies after the change the operating results are significant, the company's operating performance has not been significantly improved.
Through the empirical analysis shows that China's Listed Companies in the formulation of executive equity incentive plan in the process there still exist some problems. To solve these problems, this paper finally puts forward suggestions of listed companies and improve the company's internal environment, the external environment is proposed.
This paper consists of eight chapters. The main contents of the chapters are as follows:
The first chapter is introduction. It introduces the background and significance of this topic, reviews the related research literatures in the field, and briefly summarizes the main research contents, research framework and research methods.
Part of the second chapter. The first part including the theory of principal-agent theory and human capital theory, equity incentive related theories are reviewed, establish a theoretical framework for the following empirical research. Secondly, introduces the basic concepts related to equity incentive, and introduces the way of equity incentives.
Analysis of institutional background and current situation of implementing equity incentive of Listed Companies in China. The third chapter first introduces the institutional background of Chinese Listed Companies in the implementation of equity incentive; secondly, the overall inspection of China has launched equity incentive plan in listed companies, including listed companies in our country have been pushed out of equity incentive programs in statistics in different years, the distribution of the industry, company type, equity incentive options, equity incentive stock sources and the implementation of equity incentive efforts.
The fourth chapter equity incentive effectiveness measurement and evaluation methods. First introduced the measure of equity incentive performance, including abstract, unable to quantify the standard and actual, measurable standard for class two; followed by the introduction of equity incentive performance metrics selection, commonly used methods of performance evaluation include Tobin Q value method, economic value added method, the balanced scorecard method, financial index method; finally choose financial index as the performance evaluation method in this paper.
The fifth chapter of equity incentive of Listed Companies in China market performance. First introduced the research method of the event study method, then introduces the specific steps of the method of event study: first, the definition of event and time window. Second, third. The sample structure, introducing the normal revenue model. Fourth, calculate the abnormal return and cumulative abnormal return the empirical results obtained. Finally the overall implementation of the market reaction for the equity incentive plan on is not significant, that the implementation of equity incentive plan of the company does not have a positive effect on the company's share price, investment in the company is not able to obtain a certain excess returns. At the same time also shows that the implementation of equity incentive for investors the reaction of listed companies are not the same, the market to launch equity incentive plan of the company's response is not very positive.
The sixth chapter of equity incentive of Listed Companies in China. The first part of the performance is selected that can reflect the profitability of listed companies, debt paying ability, growth ability, analysis ability of asset operation starting point in four aspects of the eight financial indicators as the factors. Then use the comprehensive factor analysis method to get a measure of the performance of enterprises based on performance. Comprehensive factor score of listed company performance indicators as the dependent variable, for incentive shares in the proportion of the total share capital as independent variables, using a regression analysis model for regression analysis. The performance of Chinese listed companies performance and equity incentive are not related.
The conclusion and suggestion. The seventh chapter proposed to establish equity incentive company internal environment to establish and perfect the equity incentive proposals and the external environment of the company, the equity incentive of Listed Companies in China market performance is not significant, the results of research and substantial improvement in the performance. Finally, the further research direction of the thesis presents.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東農(nóng)業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F272.92;F832.51;F224

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