【摘要】：政府購買公共服務(wù)是轉(zhuǎn)變政府職能、減少財(cái)政負(fù)擔(dān)、提高服務(wù)質(zhì)量的一種創(chuàng)新供給模式。目前我國(guó)的政府購買公共服務(wù)尚處于起步階段,形式單一、受眾面窄,在實(shí)踐中需要借鑒西方國(guó)家的先進(jìn)經(jīng)驗(yàn)。值得引起關(guān)注的是政府在購買公共服務(wù)過程中與承包商之間形成的委托-代理關(guān)系,由于二者之間的信息不對(duì)稱必然導(dǎo)致逆向選擇和道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問題,在實(shí)踐中必將偏離政府最初的政策目標(biāo)。本文從激勵(lì)理論入手,分析了政府購買公共服務(wù)過程中的委托-代理問題和與之相關(guān)的選擇、激勵(lì)與監(jiān)督機(jī)制,并結(jié)合博弈模型闡述了這些機(jī)制的設(shè)計(jì)思路和方法,從而最大限度地實(shí)現(xiàn)社會(huì)福利最大化目標(biāo)。本文一方面構(gòu)建了雙信號(hào)、雙目標(biāo)的博弈模型,從理論模型的角度研究如何防范政府購買公共服務(wù)過程中的逆向選擇和道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問題;另一方面從經(jīng)驗(yàn)分析的角度比較了目前國(guó)內(nèi)主要的政府購買公共服務(wù)模式所采用的選擇機(jī)制、激勵(lì)機(jī)制和監(jiān)督機(jī)制。根據(jù)理論與實(shí)證兩個(gè)方面的研究表明,政府購買公共服務(wù)必須提高供給過程的透明度,降低信息不對(duì)稱的程度;必須支付檢查成本,形成公益性激勵(lì)預(yù)期;必須加強(qiáng)多方監(jiān)管,滿足社會(huì)對(duì)公共服務(wù)的期望。最后從我國(guó)政府購買公共服務(wù)的責(zé)任、實(shí)踐環(huán)境的優(yōu)化、機(jī)制的完善三個(gè)方面提出相應(yīng)的政策建議。
[Abstract]:The purchase of public services by the government is an innovative mode of supply to change the functions of the government, reduce the financial burden, and improve the quality of services. At present, the government buys public service in our country is still in the initial stage, the form is single, the audience is narrow, we need to draw lessons from the advanced experience of western countries in practice. What is worthy of concern is the principal-agent relationship formed between the government and the contractor in the process of purchasing public services. Because of the asymmetric information between the two, the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard will inevitably be caused by the asymmetry of information between the two. In practice, it is bound to deviate from the government's original policy objectives. Starting with the incentive theory, this paper analyzes the principal-agent problem in the process of government purchasing public service and the related selection, incentive and supervision mechanism, and expounds the design ideas and methods of these mechanisms in combination with the game model. So as to maximize the goal of social welfare maximization. On the one hand, this paper constructs a two-signal and two-objective game model, and studies how to prevent adverse selection and moral hazard in the process of government purchasing public service from the perspective of theoretical model. On the other hand, this paper compares the selection mechanism, incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism used by the major domestic government purchasing public service mode from the perspective of empirical analysis. According to the theoretical and empirical research, the government must improve the transparency of the supply process, reduce the degree of information asymmetry, pay the inspection cost, and form the public welfare incentive expectation. Multi-party supervision must be strengthened to meet the expectations of the community for public services. Finally, the corresponding policy suggestions are put forward from three aspects: the responsibility of the government to purchase public services, the optimization of the practice environment, and the perfection of the mechanism.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：青島大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號(hào)】：D630

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