【摘要】：20世紀(jì)90年代后,西方國家的市場化發(fā)展速度漸趨緩和,并出現(xiàn)了“逆市場化”現(xiàn)象,即政府部門收回外包的公共服務(wù)自主經(jīng)營的現(xiàn)象,進(jìn)入了后市場化時(shí)代。而這一現(xiàn)象近年來在我國的公共服務(wù)市場化改革中也出現(xiàn)了�？疾爝@一現(xiàn)象,對我國公共服務(wù)市場化改革具有重要的戰(zhàn)略意義。本文通過考察D縣污水處理廠“逆向合同外包”的過程發(fā)現(xiàn):交易成本和官僚組織中的激勵(lì)結(jié)構(gòu)是“逆市場化”的主要原因,而政府官僚組織的激勵(lì)結(jié)構(gòu)起著更為基礎(chǔ)性的作用。雖然市場化在一定程度上可以擺脫自主經(jīng)營的內(nèi)部生產(chǎn)成本,但它同樣也會(huì)帶來額外的交易成本。如果不能發(fā)展出降低交易成本的有效機(jī)制,政府部門就有可能做出“逆市場化”的政策選擇。但相較于私企的管理者,政府部門的管理者并不會(huì)那么關(guān)心成本問題。基層政府官員的行為在很大程度上是對其所在環(huán)境和制度的投影,政府官僚組織的激勵(lì)結(jié)構(gòu)影響了他們的制度選擇行為。在D縣污水處理廠“逆市場化”案例中,從微觀層面上看,D縣政府部門基層官員的行為選擇受到了組織內(nèi)部績效激勵(lì)的影響;從宏觀層面上看,無論是D縣地方政府選擇引進(jìn)民間資本進(jìn)行外包經(jīng)營,還是選擇收回外包自主經(jīng)營,組織內(nèi)部的財(cái)政激勵(lì)是隱藏在政府行為背后的最重要的因素。而交易成本正是建立在這樣的激勵(lì)結(jié)構(gòu)基礎(chǔ)上才發(fā)揮作用。因此基層官員的財(cái)政激勵(lì)結(jié)構(gòu)是影響“逆市場化”這一行為的關(guān)鍵。
[Abstract]:After the 1990s, the speed of the western countries' market-oriented development was gradually relaxed, and the phenomenon of "counter-marketization" appeared, that is, the government took back the self-management of the outsourced public services, and entered the post-market-oriented era. In recent years, this phenomenon has also appeared in the reform of public service marketization. The investigation of this phenomenon is of great strategic significance to the market-oriented reform of public service in China. By investigating the process of "reverse contract outsourcing" in county D sewage treatment plant, this paper finds that transaction cost and incentive structure in bureaucracy are the main reasons of "reverse marketization". The incentive structure of the government bureaucracy plays a more basic role. Although marketization can get rid of the internal production cost of independent operation to some extent, it will also bring extra transaction cost. If we fail to develop an effective mechanism to reduce transaction costs, government departments may make "counter-market" policy choices. But government managers are less concerned about costs than private managers. To a large extent, the behavior of grass-roots government officials is the projection of their environment and system, and the incentive structure of government bureaucracy affects their institutional choice behavior. In the case of "inverse marketization" of county D sewage treatment plant, from the micro level, the behavior choice of grass-roots officials in D county government department is affected by the internal performance incentive of the organization. From the macro level, whether it is the D county local governments choose to introduce private capital for outsourcing operations, or choose to withdraw outsourcing autonomy, the financial incentives within the organization is the most important factor hidden behind the government behavior. The transaction cost is based on this incentive structure to play a role. Therefore, the financial incentive structure of grassroots officials is the key to the anti-market behavior.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華僑大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：D630

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