地方政府對(duì)煤炭市場(chǎng)失靈進(jìn)行宏觀調(diào)控的對(duì)策研究
[Abstract]:The coal industry, as the main basic energy in the industrialization process of our country, is the pillar industry of our national economy and has an important strategic position. It also plays a great role in the rapid development of our country's social economy. However, since the 2008 international financial crisis, the coal industry has also appeared multiple crises, such as coal supply and demand imbalance, coal industry structural overcapacity, oversupply of products, imported coal shocks and a series of increasingly prominent problems. In recent years, China has continuously issued a series of policies to curb overcapacity, and local governments have also taken a series of emergency measures to alleviate the local economic recession caused by the coal industry crisis, but the problem has not yet been effectively solved. As an invisible hand in the market economy system, the coal market is usually unable to effectively adjust its own defects to solve the market failure problem, while the local government, as a "visible hand" in the development of social economy, is unable to effectively adjust its own defects to solve the problem of market failure. The reasons of non-market factors, such as its inherent nature and the failure of decision making, have restrained the adjustment of the market, failed to supplement the market mechanism and failed to intervene in the coal market. Based on the theory of government intervention and the basic research methods of market failure, excessive competition theory, excessive entry and excessive investment in government economics, this paper uses the basic research methods, such as government intervention theory, excessive competition theory, excessive entry and excessive investment, as the theoretical basis. This paper studies the problem of coal market failure in China at present from the angle of local government macro-control. Based on the analysis of market failure and the current situation of local government macro-control, the problems of local government finance, officials' interests, government functions and policy making are discussed. This paper analyzes the reasons for the failure of macro-control of local government, such as game between central supervision and local government. Finally, this paper puts forward concrete countermeasures to alleviate the problem of coal market failure from three aspects: perfecting the promotion system and financial system of government officials, perfecting the regulation of central government, and defining the role of local government. In order to alleviate the current coal market downtrend and other issues to make reference to promote the coal industry and the national economy better and faster development.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:內(nèi)蒙古大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2015
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】:F426.21;D630
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